Shi'ism: History, Global Impact, and Nigeria's Security

Origins and Theology of Shi'ism

Shiite Muslims constitute the second largest denomination of Islam, after the Sunnis. Shiites represent approximately fifteen percent of the global Muslim population, yet they are the dominant community in Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Bahrain. Muslims also form a plurality in Yemen and Lebanon (Cave, 2006). These two distinct groups within Islam first diverged following the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE. The divide arose from disagreement over whether leadership of the Muslim community should pass to a bloodline successor or to the most capable leader able to propagate the tenets of the faith (Fuller and Francke, 2000).

The Shiite community emerged during the 650s, after Muhammad's son-in-law, known as 'Ali, became Caliph. 'Ali and his descendants are referred to as imams — figures regarded not merely as political leaders but as descendants of the Prophet himself. Following the death of the eleventh imam in 874, and amid reports that his son had disappeared from the burial site, Shiites came to regard the child as a Messiah concealed from the world by God. The largest sect of Shiites, known as the "Twelvers," have anticipated his return ever since (Cave, 2006). Several other Arabs, meanwhile, backed a rival claimant — the Umayyad Mu'awiya — who became Caliph following the murder of 'Ali in 661 CE (Cave, 2006).

From the earliest days of Islam, one vital characteristic distinguishing Shi'ism has been the significance of the concept of ahl al-bayt — the household of the Prophet. From the Shiite standpoint, the rightful leader of the Islamic community must be a descendant of 'Ali, through his marital link to the Prophet's daughter Fatima (Duhnkrack, 2009). Linked to this is a belief in charismatic authority that underlies Shi'ism as a whole. Shi'ites consider themselves the rightful and legitimate interpreters of Islam as revealed through Muhammad's charismatic revolution (Duhnkrack, 2009).

'Ali, whom Shi'ites identify as the original imam in accordance with the concept of ahl al-bayt, holds this charismatic power as a result of the hierarchical connection running from Allah to Muhammad and then to 'Ali. In Shi'ism, 'Ali's charismatic authority is authenticated both by the particular qualities his followers attribute to him and by his designation as the Prophet's heir by Muhammad himself (Duhnkrack, 2009; Winters, 2007).

Nonetheless, 'Ali's charismatic power is not considered divine; rather, it derives from his proximity to the Prophet. It differs not only hierarchically from the Prophet's own charisma, but also lacks the radical, transformative quality of Muhammad's authority. According to Shi'ites, its essential purpose is to establish and maintain the social and religious order that Muhammad proclaimed for his community (Duhnkrack, 2009).

This perspective challenges the common Western characterization of Shi'ism — particularly given the role it played in the Islamic Revolution — as an inherently radical and unruly religious movement (Duhnkrack, 2009). Following 'Ali's assassination, a succession of imams continued to guide the Shi'a community (Duhnkrack, 2009).

The concept of the imamate addresses the question of legitimate leadership through the notion of 'ilm — divine knowledge. Unlike Sunnis, Shi'ites reject the idea that a rightful leader can be selected by or from among ordinary members of the Muslim community. They argue that laypeople are fallible and therefore prone to error in decision-making (Duhnkrack, 2009), and that they lack the capacity to fully comprehend and apply the commands of the Qur'an (Duhnkrack, 2009).

Implications for International Peace and Security

This ancient religious division is actively fueling a resurgence of conflict across the Middle East and the broader Muslim world. Skirmishes between Sunni and Shia forces have fed the Syrian civil war — which threatens to redraw the map of the Middle East — prompted violence tearing Iraq apart, and deepened fractures in several Gulf states (Perry, 2010). Mounting sectarian clashes have also revived hostility within the Muslim community and strengthened global jihadi networks, posing threats that extend far beyond the region (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).

According to Trofimov (2015), the ongoing conflict between Sunnis and Shiites across the Muslim world risks becoming a seemingly permanent source of bloodshed. In recent years, this sectarian fault line has become the dominant axis of competition for supremacy across the Middle East and beyond (Trofimov, 2015). From Yemen to Iraq and Syria to Bahrain, a significant proportion of the region's wars and political struggles pit Sunnis against Shiites. Crucially, these battles are no longer primarily about who was the rightful successor to Prophet Muhammad — the original source of the division. Instead, both sects now fight for political and economic influence within their respective nations and across the greater Middle East (Trofimov, 2015).

The modern intensification of the Sunni-Shiite conflict can be traced to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and its aftermath. Conservative regimes in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, confronted with Tehran's claim to leadership of the Muslim world, responded by challenging the Islamic credentials of Shiite ayatollahs (Trofimov, 2015). The conflict gained fresh momentum with the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003, which empowered the Shiite majority at the expense of the Arab Sunni minority that had governed the country since independence. Out of the resulting turmoil, the militant group now known as Islamic State emerged and elevated anti-Shiite fanaticism to new heights (Trofimov, 2015).

Animosity reached genocidal proportions after the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011. The Islamic State refused to recognize Shiites as Muslims, demanding they either convert to Sunnism or face death (Trofimov, 2015). These religious alignments have also shaped the war in Yemen, with Saudi Arabia assembling a coalition of Sunni nations to oppose the pro-Iranian Houthi insurgents, who follow a strain of Shiite Islam. From Tehran's perspective, Iran was increasingly encircling Saudi Arabia — Shiite influence was no longer a curve but a circle (Trofimov, 2015).

Over four and a half years of armed conflict in Syria, enormous numbers of Syrians have lost their lives. United Nations statistical reports indicated that approximately 90,000 individuals were killed in 2013 alone. By 2014 that figure had doubled to more than 190,000, and by August 2015 the death toll had risen to 250,000. In addition, more than eleven million Syrians were displaced from their homes (Rodgers et al., 2015).

The conflict, initially a struggle between forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and those opposing his regime, has since acquired deeper sectarian dimensions — setting the country's Sunni majority against the President's Shia Alawite Muslim sect. This dynamic has drawn neighboring nations and world powers into the conflict, while the expansion of jihadist groups, including Islamic State, has added yet another party to an already complex equation (Rodgers et al., 2015).

In mid-2013, hundreds of civilians were killed after rockets filled with sarin — a nerve agent — were launched at multiple districts near Damascus. Western powers blamed President Assad's government, while Assad's regime and its ally Russia placed responsibility on the rebel forces (Rodgers et al., 2015). Facing the possibility of U.S. military intervention, President Assad signed an agreement for the comprehensive monitoring and destruction of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal, overseen by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations. That process was completed a year later.

Despite this agreement, the OPCW subsequently reported the use of toxic chemical weapons — including those containing ammonia and chlorine — on multiple occasions between April and July 2014, attributing responsibility to Assad's government in attacks on rebel villages in northern Syria (Rodgers et al., 2015). At least thirteen people died in these attacks. In retaliation, Islamic State deployed homemade chemical weapons containing sulphur mustard against Kurdish forces and civilians in northern Syria (Rodgers et al., 2015).

What began as an Arab Spring uprising against an authoritarian leader has expanded into a vicious proxy war involving regional and international powers. Iran and Russia have steadfastly supported President Assad's Shiite-led government, with Tehran reportedly investing billions of dollars annually in military advisers, subsidized weapons, lines of credit, and oil transfers to Damascus. In September 2015, Russia launched an airstrike campaign targeting Assad's adversaries, insisting it was striking only terrorists, though many strikes hit Western-backed rebels and civilians (Rodgers et al., 2015). The Lebanese Shia Hezbollah movement has also provided direct battlefield support to Assad's forces since 2013 (Rodgers et al., 2015).

On the opposing side, the Sunni-dominated opposition has drawn support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. However, the surge of hardline Islamist rebels and the influx of international jihadists have complicated Western backing. A U.S.-led coalition provided support to Kurdish militia forces defending three autonomous territories in northern Syria from Islamic State, while a program to train and arm 5,000 Syrian rebels to confront Islamic State on the ground yielded limited results (Rodgers et al., 2015).

The sectarian schism in Islam, festering for fourteen centuries, does not by itself explain all the political, economic, and geostrategic factors driving these conflicts. It is, however, a prism through which the fundamental tensions can be understood. At their core, two nations — Sunni-led Saudi Arabia and Shia-led Iran — are competing for the leadership of Islam (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). How this rivalry is resolved will likely shape the political balance between Sunnism and Shi'ism and determine the future of the region, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen.

The Shiite Islamic Sect in Nigeria: History, Culture, and Socio-Politics

Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the promotion of Khomeinism has been a key instrument of Iranian foreign policy across the Muslim world (Akhavi, 1983). Despite Nigeria's considerable geographical and cultural distance from Iran, no region outside the Middle East has proven more receptive to this ideology than northern Nigeria (Soares, 2009).

The pro-Iranian Shi'a Muslim community in Nigeria barely existed three decades ago. Today, it comprises approximately 5% of Nigeria's roughly 80 million Muslims (Zenn, 2013). In recent years, Iran's Quds Force and Lebanon's Hizb Allah have coordinated intelligence-gathering on U.S. and Israeli targets in Nigeria, and have been involved in weapons and drug trafficking into West Africa using operatives drawn from the Nigerian Shi'a community. The Iranian government also maintains ties with a prominent religious organization known as the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). Terror activities linked to prominent IMN imams and former members have contributed significantly to the wave of Islamic fundamentalist violence that emerged in northern Nigeria after the 1970s (Zenn, 2013).

Although Nigeria's Muslim population is predominantly Sunni, a substantial and influential Shiite minority — estimated at up to 10 million followers — exists in the country, with particular strength in the Northeast. Significantly, this is the same region where Boko Haram has entrenched itself and continues to wage a violent insurgency against the Nigerian government (Center for Security Policy, 2014).

The growth of the Shiite movement in Nigeria is relatively recent, expanding substantially during the 1980s under the leadership of Ibrahim Zakzaky, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood of Nigeria (Yan Brotherhood). Zakzaky's turn toward Shia Islam was inspired by the victory of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Akhavi, 1983). Zakzaky and his movement quickly became affiliated with Iran's religious establishment. Iran has long sought to establish Shia networks across Africa, particularly in nations of strategic significance and natural resource wealth, such as Nigeria (Center for Security Policy, 2014).

The Nigerian Shi'a community, like their Iranian counterparts, holds that Islam has the right to govern, and that Sharia should be the supreme law of the land. Adhering to this view, they reject Nigeria's constitution and laws as stemming from illegitimate sources. They openly declare that their activities are directed toward the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria, one governed by the Qur'an and the Hadiths of Prophet Muhammad (Ostien, 2012). The Shiite Islamic Sect also condemns democracy in principle and in practice. Its members do not sing the national anthem, show no deference to the national flag, and pledge no allegiance to the Nigerian state (Ostien, 2012).