Afghan Mujahidin Resistance in the Soviet-Afghan War

Introduction

The Soviet-Afghan War, which lasted from 1979 to 1989, is one of the defining conflicts of the Cold War era. This paper analyzes the Afghan resistance during that war, including its factions, leaders, tactics, ideologies, and external connections. Throughout the war, the mujahidin rebel forces repeatedly outmaneuvered Soviet troops, producing a ten-year conflict that many have called "Russia's Vietnam." More than 25,000 Soviet troops were killed during the war, and the loss to guerrilla fighters undermined both the Soviet military and public opinion at home.

Origins of the War

In the 1970s, Afghanistan was still a monarchy, and many of its leaders — who followed Marxism and Maoism rather than Islam — did not support the country's dominant religion. Nevertheless, of the approximately 12 million people living in the country, 90% claimed allegiance to the Sunni Muslim sect. The country also relied heavily on the Soviet Union for economic survival. All of that began to change in 1973, when the monarchy was toppled and a new leader took power. As one historian writes, "In July 1973, Prince Muhammad Daud, a former prime minister and cousin of the Afghan King Zahir Shah, overthrew the government, abolished the monarchy, and proclaimed himself president of Afghanistan."

Daud ruled for five years, until he was overthrown by a coup carried out by the very small People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Many observers felt the coup was at least partly supported by the Soviet Union. The PDPA created so many reforms that chipped away at long-held Afghan social and cultural traditions that anarchy spread throughout the country. In fact, just before the Soviets invaded, rebel forces controlled twenty-three of Afghanistan's twenty-eight provinces. Fearing that these growing anti-communist sentiments would spread further throughout the government and the country, the Soviets intervened in December 1979. Before entering the country, Soviet military advisors sabotaged many of the Afghan Army's tanks and other weaponry.

Most military leaders believed the occupation would be short-lived, but that was not the case. The first action Soviet forces took was to assassinate President Hafizullah Amin, the leader of the PDPA. Traditional Muslims then formed a group of guerrilla fighters called the mujahidin — sometimes spelled "mujahideen" — meaning "Warriors of God," who fought the Soviet Union with financial aid from countries such as China and the United States. They believed they were fighting a jihad, or Holy War, to save their way of life and religion. Historian John Esposito writes, "Soviet occupation, however, provided a common enemy and mission. The call for a jihad offered a common, though transient as history would prove, Islamic religious identity and source of inspiration." The Afghan people thus had a common goal and a common enemy, and they fought fiercely to protect their lands and culture from Soviet-imposed reform.

The War Itself

The Soviets expected an easy victory in a country that did not even possess a railroad. However, they did not account for the determination of the mujahidin or the breadth of support the rebels found throughout the region. The resistance succeeded for several important reasons. First, it was extremely localized and lacked formal structure, so the Soviets could not concentrate their attacks on large forces in one or two specific areas. Second, guerrilla fighters often retreated into neighboring Pakistan, where they found safe haven, weapons, and support beyond Soviet reach. Third, the PDPA had essentially destroyed the Afghan Army and most of its officer corps; many of those who survived joined the rebels, bringing their military expertise to the side of the resistance — a development that created further problems for the Soviets, who had expected assistance from Kabul's army. Finally, the rebels held the powerful advantage of genuine conviction: they believed they were fighting a holy war to save their people from domination and the destruction of their culture.

Although the rebel forces lacked tanks and other heavy weapons, they defeated the Soviets through other means. They mined roads, attacked convoys, and isolated villages so that no food or supplies could enter or leave. Historian Anthony James Joes describes their tactics: "When the Soviets launched their periodic sweeps, the guerrillas, even entire villages, faded into the high hills, taking every item of food with them; when the Soviet tide receded, the guerrillas and villagers returned." Ultimately, the rebels did not believe they could defeat the mighty Soviet Army outright, but they calculated that they could prolong the war until the Soviets gave up or the cost became prohibitive.

The Soviets conceded ground to the insurgents almost immediately. After invading, they did not conduct any major military operations, giving the mujahidin time to regroup and strategize. The Soviets were also inexperienced in this form of guerrilla warfare; they had not engaged in serious combat since World War II, and they did not have enough soldiers to effectively counter the rebels' attacks and techniques. Instead, they resorted to systematically destroying the country and its population in an effort to suppress the insurgency. As Joes notes, "The campaign against crops, animals, and people eventually made it impossible in many areas for civilians to supply food to the guerrillas. The Soviets were especially determined to empty the provinces along the borders with the U.S.S.R. and with Pakistan, a program described as 'migratory genocide.'"

To this end, the Soviets employed everything from poison gases to bombs shaped like toys that children would pick up before they exploded. It is believed that over 1.3 million Afghans were killed during the war, largely as a result of Soviet genocidal techniques, and another 4 million were displaced as refugees.

The Soviets possessed far superior air power, and at first their gunship helicopters made a clear difference in the fighting. However, by 1983 the rebels had obtained surface-to-air missiles that kept those helicopters at bay, forcing pilots to fly at higher altitudes and thus reducing their effectiveness. By 1986, the rebels had acquired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles — even more powerful and accurate — which helped shift the war to the ground, where the rebels excelled. The Soviets then turned their attention to Pakistan and its continued support of the Afghan rebels. A reporter writing at the time observed, "In 1985, Soviet and Afghan-government aircraft violated Pakistani airspace more than two hundred times, conducting air strikes that killed dozens of people. Although Pakistan's armed forces have reportedly shot down two intruding aircraft, the incursions continue." Even this tactic failed to stop the flow of support into Afghanistan; in fact, it made the rebel cause more sympathetic in the eyes of much of the world.

Conclusion

The Soviet-Afghan War dragged on for nearly ten years, and ultimately the Soviet forces were defeated, leaving Afghanistan to return to fundamentalist Muslim rule. The rebel mujahidin demonstrated that desire, dedication, and deeply held beliefs — combined with Soviet overconfidence in their own military superiority — could defeat a superpower. However, the war's end brought no peace: the country collapsed into civil war and was eventually taken over by the ultra-conservative Taliban government, which gave free rein to insurgents such as Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network.

The Soviet-Afghan War was not the direct cause of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but it unquestionably created the conditions — the opportunity, the training infrastructure, and the ideological momentum — that allowed terrorists to operate, travel, and continue fighting their jihads. The conflict proved that even the mightiest superpowers can be brought low by intense religious conviction and determined resistance, a lesson that the rest of the world has been slow to absorb.