Veterans Benefits and Political Strategy in U.S. History

Introduction: Veterans as Political Currency

Veterans of war have always been a selling point for politicians in election years. Throughout history, whether on the campaign trail or already sitting in office, politicians have skillfully used veterans to promote a "fair deal" or expanded "benefits" for troops coming home. They do this to curry favor with the public, to demonstrate that they care for soldiers, to show that it pays to serve Uncle Sam, and that when an individual does right by his country, his country does right by him. Thus, there was Truman's "Fair Deal," FDR's "New Deal," Harrison's pensions for Civil War veterans, Nixon and Vietnam Veterans Day, and today's VA hospitals and VA loans — all designed to assist veterans in their transition from military to civilian life.

Politicians have used the plight of veterans both yesterday and today — whether it is Donald Trump or Bernie Sanders makes no difference, as there is always a cry of protest that we need to take better care of our soldiers. This paper examines ways in which policies toward veterans' benefits have been used by politicians at particular points in American political history.

The Gilded Age and Civil War Pensions

The Gilded Age that followed the Civil War saw a virtually Republican-dominated White House, beginning with Lincoln and ending with the election of FDR. Republicans at this time were skillful in their use of the Civil War: they blamed it on the Democrats, and so Union veterans flocked to the Republican Party. President Benjamin Harrison, who had served in the Civil War under Sherman, promoted the idea of pensions for Civil War veterans and "signed a bill providing additional support for disabled Civil War veterans" (The Age of Political Machines, 2013). Harrison's efforts were linked to his broader philanthropy and humanitarianism — he also supported measures designed to assist in educating the South and helping African Americans. However, his support of veterans was an example of how the Republican Party attempted to appeal to the soldiers who had fought to hold the Union together.

The fact that the Party cast blame for the war on the Democrats was disingenuous, for one could argue that had Lincoln — a Republican — not been elected, there might have been no war at all, but rather a more decided attempt at a peaceful, lawful resolution, as Jefferson Davis had hoped (Foote, 1958). Nonetheless, Republican leaders in the Gilded Age attempted to appease a Union that had been virtually ripped apart, with half a million men dead as a result of the conflict. They did this by "sticking up" for veterans and by painting themselves as do-gooders who had nothing to do with that awful war. For this reason, they were called the "bloody shirts," because they were always waving the "bloody shirt" of the soldier and accusing their political opponents — the Democrats — of being the root cause of the bloodshed. This was not true in the least, as the Republican Party was itself full of militant abolitionists. All the same, the veteran was used as a political ploy to curry favor with a sentimental public.

World War I, the New Deal, and Veterans' Welfare

War never really ended for America, and before the 19th century came to a close, American soldiers were fighting Spain for control of the Philippines in an effort to expand American hegemony around the world. World Wars I and II followed, as did the glowing patronage of Uncle Sam for the veterans he pledged to support — even as he did not mind entangling them in one foreign war after another. Woodrow Wilson, one of only two Democrats to enter the White House between Lincoln and FDR, ran on the platform of keeping America out of World War I. He failed to keep that promise when Britain began having serious difficulties. Wilson's subsequent breaking of his campaign pledge could be viewed as a slap in the face to soldiers and veterans alike, representing a clear instance of one policy being promised only to be abandoned for a diametrically opposite one.

FDR attempted to make amends with his New Deal, which harkened back to Harrison's philanthropy — except that instead of expanding benefits to veterans, Roosevelt initially slashed them. The Economy Act of 1933 cut veterans' pensions by fifteen percent, and Roosevelt staunchly opposed the Bonus Bill, which proposed giving a cash bonus to veterans of World War I. Congress had to override Roosevelt's veto in order to finally distribute more than a billion dollars in relief to four million veterans. There was, of course, an election year coming, and Congress had to look good. Roosevelt was primarily concerned with balancing the budget rather than riding a wave of popular support through such gestures — but in the end, he too came around (Leuchtenburg, 1963).

As the New Dealers gained momentum, fiscal conservatism lost ground and budgetary restraint gave way to a new approach: providing welfare for veterans in the form of direct dollars. The result was the Adjusted Compensation Payment Act, the Disabled Veterans Rehabilitation Act, and the "G.I. Bill" — formally the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 — which gave 16 million World War II veterans benefits related to education, housing, and unemployment. One could argue that without this welfare framework, the "middle America" that many observers see vanishing today would never have come into existence in the first place (Bennett, 1999).

References

The Age of Political Machines. (2013). Politics in the Gilded Age. Retrieved from http://sageamericanhistory.net/gildedage/topics/gildedagepolitics.html

Bennett, M. (1999). When Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and the Making of Modern America. Potomac Books.

Foote, S. (1958). The Civil War: Fort Sumter to Perryville. Random House.

Johnson, O. (2012). Military sexual trauma: Shamed into silence. Journal of Military Science and Research, 1(3): 1–5.

Leuchtenburg, W. (1963). Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940. Harper and Row.