Foreseeing Death and Intentionally Bringing Upon Death Ethics and Morality

Ethics and Morality: Foreseeing Death and Intentionally Bringing Upon Death

James Rachels has used Smith and Jones’s hypothetical example and tried to defend his position that there is no moral difference amid killing and letting die. In my opinion, the example is only one scenario that has been used to explain the moral difference. However, there is a possibility that one action that is considered moral could not be applied to another situation. Therefore, the fundamental moral difference would lie in the intention of the patient’s death and whether he has willed for it or not. Again, the two cannot be compared since the intention plays an integral part; injecting harm to the patient for his death and letting him die on his own are two different things that involve a moral spectrum of two kinds (Preston).

Moreover, medical ethics has moved forward to distinguishing between these situations by determining correctly between active and passive euthanasia. All do not understand the moral symmetry principle, and thus, this principle is rejected by numerous people (Tooley). The confusion of being morally acceptable whether a lethal drug should be given to end his life or not giving an antidote when someone has already been poisoned with an overdose of the drug still creates a helpless confusion that seems far from being interpreted accurately.

The two situations where Steinbock argues that ending the patient’s life cannot be associated with intentional killing is when the patient refuses his treatment and the treatment is not improving the patient’s condition, rather making it worse.

The alleged distinction between intentionally bringing about death and merely foreseeing death without bringing about death intentionally depends on the ‘intent’ of the physician. For example, suppose the physician gives medication to the patient who is suffering from an incurable disease or is at his last stage. Still, the medication has a side effect in the long term, bringing about his death. In that case, the physician’s intent cannot be taken as hastening death for the patient (McIntyre). Rather, death is foreseen, but making it natural and less painful with the prescribed pain-relieving drug is justified in this scenario.

The intentional termination of life could be done if the patient allows himself or his family member who plays the role of his surrogate decision-maker to better think of doing so. Then the blunt criticism on withdrawing the life-sustaining equipment could be explained with an intervention of double effect that reflects upon the cat being morally good for not letting the patient receive further harm, or at least the act should be indifferent (McIntyre). The good effect would be seen soon after the bad action is taken, for instance, in the case of a surrogate family member allowing the patient to be taken off the life-sustaining equipment to relieve them of the physical pain if the patient’s body conditions are deteriorating. The good effect would precede the bad action of taking off her equipment it would produce afterward, considering it to be morally effective.

In Preston’s article, the same circumstance has been described with the reiteration of ‘intent’ to deflect the criticism in bringing about death. Two differences were discussed in this article for defending the morphine drip concept. The first one was the intent, and the second elaborated that giving a lethal drug for ending life is the abrupt method of bringing about death which seems unethical as it is taken in terms of ‘killing’ (Preston). However, morphine drip as euthanasia where the slow process of death is brought about. During the process, the family members can meet the patient for the last time, making the process appear natural.