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Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness and nonreductive explanations

~8 min read Philosophy
Abstract

The problem of consciousness, in short, is that there is a gap between any posited physical explanation and the actual subconscious or immaterial experience of the phenomena, i.e. of the subconscious act itself. The one does not adequately lead onto, or conclusively latch onto, the other, but once one recognizes this problem one may conclude as McGinn (1989) does that our human mind is unable, due to its limitations, to deal with this quandary and we may be reluctant to pursue it further. Offering a way out, Chalmer, therefore, recommends adopting a nonreductive explanation where a naturalistic account of consciousness based on principles of structural coherence and invariant organization as well as a double-aspect view of information may pose as more insightful explanations for the whys and wherefores of consciousness.

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Essay 1,428 words

Chalmer's Argument

The problem of consciousness, in short, is that there is a gap between any posited physical explanation and the actual subconscious or immaterial experience of the phenomena, i.e. Of the subconscious act itself. The one does not adequately lead onto, or conclusively latch onto, the other, but once one recognizes this problem one may conclude as McGinn (1989) does that our human mind is unable, due to its limitations, to deal with this quandary and we may be reluctant to pursue it further. Offering a way out, Chalmer, therefore, recommends adopting a nonreductive explanation where a naturalistic account of consciousness based on principles of structural coherence and invariant organization as well as a double-aspect view of information may pose as more insightful explanations for the why's and wherefores of consciousness.

The problem of consciousness involves the following: the brain is reducibly matter as so is the other organs of the body. How is its possible then that our senses such as visual, kinesthetic, auditory, and so forth can proceed from this material tangible matter? How is it possible that our cognitive ability can emanate from something that appears like meat and is material in all its aspects? From whence this stream of consciousness? Or our emotions? Or other abstract entities such as our ability to be carried away by some phenomena such as music or a piece of art? Or to imagine? Or to engage in qualitative and rich experiences that transcend the banality and one-dimensionality of an earthbound tangible world. It is well-known and certain that experience arises from a physical basis, but as yet no suitable explanation has been produced for the connecting link or for how the link came about. Usually conceptualized as 'qualia' or 'phenomenal consciousness, Chalmer prefers to refer to it as 'conscious experience' or simply 'experience'

The explanations commonly used to address it are the following:

1. The neurobiological theory of consciousness posited by Crick and Koch (1990) who suggest that certain neural oscillations in the cerebral cortex are the explanandum for consciousness due to the fact that the oscillations seem to exist with other sensory features such as the olfactory and visual systems and because they may serve to explain binding conditions. Binding refers to the process where several sensory systems are coupled and synchronized. The problem is that although, Crick and Koch (1990) may have discovered the mechanisms behind 'binding', they have failed to explain why binding, or these neural oscillations, result in consciousness, nor why something that is cerebral results in the qualitative experience of 'qualia'.

2. Cognitive psychology represented by Baars' global workspace theory of consciousness where Baars analogizes consciousness to being housed in a sort of global or neural workspace which mediates, and is placed in the central location of numerous other specialized nonconsious processors.

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This 'qualia' sensation in the central workspace enables communication to and from and between the other processors. Unfortunately, this theory, although serving well as descriptive…
Key Concepts in This Paper
hard problem of consciousness David Chalmers qualia nonreductive physicalism phenomenal consciousness psychophysical principles Colin McGinn naturalistic dualism
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PaperDue. (2011). Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness and nonreductive explanations. PaperDue. https://www.paperdue.com/essay/philosophy-consciousness-47038

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