Gulf War Air and Ground Campaign: A Military Assessment

Introduction

While the second Iraq War was extremely mixed in its results, outcomes, and process, the first one was far more successful. Indeed, it made presiding General Norman Schwarzkopf a national hero. This paper covers the buildup of forces, the ground force surge, the air campaign, an overall assessment of the battle, and a conclusion that ties all of the above together. While everything could always be done better, the way in which the Coalition air campaign paralyzed the Iraqi forces — and thus made it far easier for the ground forces to win the war — was executed exquisitely well. Ultimately, it is the ground forces that truly won the day.

Buildup of Forces

The first war in Iraq, commonly referred to as the Gulf War, occurred in 1990 and 1991. The war was a response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Iraq had been seeking roughly $10 billion in damages, and Kuwait countered with an offer of $9 billion. Rather than accept or make a counteroffer, Iraq's response was to invade Kuwait. This led to a coalition response and buildup of forces organized under the United Nations. After first demanding verbally that Iraq withdraw, an actual buildup of forces began to coalesce in the greater Iraq region. The forces came from nearly three dozen countries, with the United States serving as the dominant contributor. Countries from Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas were all represented. As noted in the introduction, it is the air campaign that first set the tone and thereby allowed ground forces to be extremely effective.

The Air Campaign

The bombing campaign began in January 1991 after the deadline for Iraqi forces to vacate Kuwait lapsed. There were more than one hundred thousand bombing runs and missions levied against the Iraqis. Nearly that many tons of bombs were dropped during those raids. About seventy to eighty planes were lost, with roughly half of those losses attributable to Iraqi surface-to-air missiles and other countermeasures. Iraq had warned in advance that it would target Israel and Saudi Arabia if attacked, and it made an effort to follow through on that threat by using its infamous Scud missiles. The United States augmented its air campaign by neutralizing the Scud threat through the deployment of Patriot missile batteries. The Patriot missiles were deployed specifically to protect civilian targets (Head, 2013).

A major component of the air campaign for the United States and coalition forces was the use of the AC-130 gunship. On the first night of hostilities, AC-130s were called into action near Al-Khafji. The Iraqis did not simply absorb the attacks passively, and the AC-130s engaged in a very precise "dance of death," proving exceedingly efficient at executing their mission. Even so, Iraqi forces eventually signaled surrender by reversing their turrets — the conventional sign of capitulation. The air and ground campaigns were obviously not mutually exclusive; each supported the other. Commonly, Marines on the ground would call in air support from attack planes, bombers, helicopter gunships, and other aircraft. Al-Khafji was a notable exception because it was a Saudi town temporarily captured by Iraqi forces. General Khaled made a point of reaching out to General Norman Schwarzkopf and imploring him for assistance. The coalition commander responded by sending an Arab regiment supported by air cover (Head, 2013).

The air and ground campaigns were ultimately successful, but not before the tragedy of the Spirit '03. The Spirit was shot down by Iraqi surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, making it one of the few instances in which the Iraqi Army successfully countered American air power. The American response, at least among many, was driven by a desire for retribution — a reaction that carried its own potential for further tragedy. Despite the loss of the Spirit and the death of more than a dozen crew members, the air campaign was ultimately a significant success and accomplished its strategic objectives (Head, 2013). The air campaign lasted only forty-three days in total and did not even constitute half of the roughly hundred-day war. As described by Kelly (2002): "Operation Desert Storm was primarily a sustained 43-day air campaign by the United States and its allies against Iraq between January 17th, 1991 and February 28th, 1991."

Kelly (2002) further noted that "the accuracy of the bombing was extraordinary." General Michael Dugan went on record stating that the F-16 and F/A-18 fighters were "able to place fifty percent of their bombs within thirty feet of their aim points; but even 30-foot accuracy is no longer interesting." Smart bombs were even more precise, "routinely hitting within three feet of their targets." This performance was described as "a vindication of the old concept of precision bombing; the technology had finally caught up with the doctrine." Heavy use was made of still-famous aircraft including the F-16, the F/A-18, the F-117 Stealth Fighter, the A-10 Warthog, and the AC-130 gunship. The Spirit casualty was particularly notable given that the crew members killed represented close to ten percent of all U.S. personnel deaths in the Gulf War — only 146 people died in total during the entire 100-day conflict (Kelly, 2002). One significant and unusual effect of Iraqi actions during the war was the deliberate ignition of Kuwaiti oil wells. There came a point at which the sky was so darkened by smoke that aircraft operations by planes such as the F/A-18 were ultimately suspended ("The ground war," 1992).

Conclusion

A concise way to characterize the overall course of the Gulf War is to say that the air and ground forces, in that order, delivered an effective one-two punch that led to the swift end of Iraqi hostilities. The ground forces could not have won the day on their own, and the same is true of the air campaign alone. As demonstrated by events in the former Yugoslavia, air attacks can only accomplish so much — one cannot typically force a government out of an occupied country through airstrikes alone. The Gulf War confirmed this, as Iraqi forces remained capable of resistance even after the devastating air campaign. Wars in the Middle East will always be complicated by religion and the centuries-old Arab-Israeli conflict. Even so, conflicts can conclude cleanly and quickly when combatants avoid nation-building and regime change as objectives.

Indeed, a comparison of the 1990–1991 Gulf War and the 2003–present Iraq War reveals both similarities and meaningful differences. Whether the issue is the presence or absence of a United Nations mandate, the goal of deposing a country's leadership rather than simply repelling an invasion, the challenge of what to do after hostilities end, or the stated and unstated motives for entering the conflict — these questions will always be subject to scrutiny and debate.

References

Ahmed, H. H. (1991). Iraq's conduct of the Gulf crisis: A critical assessment. Arab Studies Quarterly, 13(1/2), 11.

Cigar, N. (2014). Did Iraq expect a nuclear Desert Storm? Deterrence, paradigms, and operational culture in a weapons of mass destruction environment. War in History, 21(3), 274–301.

Head, W. (2013). The Battle for Ra's Al-Khafji and the effects of air power January 29–February 1, 1991 Part I. Air Power History, 60(1), 4–15.

Kelly, M. (2002). The American way of war. Atlantic, 289(6), 16–18.

The ground war. (cover story). (1992). U.S. News & World Report, 112(2), 51.