ICS Implementation: Hurricane Katrina vs. Toronto SARS Outbreak

Introduction

In both the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the outbreak of SARS in Toronto, the Incident Command System (ICS) had to be implemented, yet both instances presented distinct challenges. In the former, the convergence of disparate agencies fueled an already chaotic situation, as few were ICS-prepared. In the latter, the outbreak was amplified by fear-inducing media coverage, which ICS coordinators had to counter with education, patience, and endurance. In each case, the need for central command was essential, as was the ability of all agencies and workers to remain aligned. This paper compares and contrasts both incidents and examines how ICS was affected and what impact it had in each context.

ICS Failures in New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, ICS in New Orleans was being used only for fire-related incidents. The emergency operations center (EOC) was not trained in ICS, and as a result it became a liability rather than an asset. The primary challenge that the hurricane posed to ICS was that few agencies were prepared to put the concept into practice. ICS training, therefore, had to be delivered on the spot. Little on-site coordination among various departments further compounded the difficulty of implementing true ICS (Samaan & Verneuil, 2009).

For ICS to function properly, it must be understood, embraced, and utilized by all agencies involved. At Katrina, this was not the case. Few agencies were ready and prepared — with the notable exception of the U.S. Coast Guard, which demonstrated a clear "spirit of mission." This meant the Coast Guard understood its role, had the capacity to carry it out, and displayed unity of purpose and preparedness (Samaan & Verneuil, 2009). ICS was embedded in its organizational culture. It should have been part of every responding agency's culture so that all were aligned throughout the incident (Banerjee, n.d.). Because of a lack of planning and organization across agencies, ICS implementation sputtered from the outset.

ICS and the Toronto SARS Outbreak

In Toronto, the situation differed considerably. The chaos was caused not so much by an absence of ICS as by the disproportionate attention given by the media to a relatively contained SARS outbreak. ICS had to contend with a frenzy that was partly fabricated by media coverage, whereas in New Orleans the frenzy was real and partly caused by the unpreparedness of several agencies to handle ICS protocols. The scope of crisis management in Toronto was therefore much more focused, and the situation was considerably more manageable, as different sectors had been trained on how to implement ICS beforehand.

Conclusion

In conclusion, ICS was implemented in both New Orleans and Toronto but with varying degrees of success. Following Hurricane Katrina, few agencies had trained to perform the skills required for ICS, and — barring the exception of the Coast Guard — almost no organizations were capable of implementing it effectively. In Toronto, however, the situation on the ground was not as dire as media outlets suggested. The main challenge to ICS was keeping workers motivated and maintaining high morale, as the news media ultimately proved to be the greatest obstacle rather than the outbreak itself.

References

Banerjee, H. (n.d.). Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans ICS experience. NIDM.Gov. Retrieved from

Hawryluck, L., Lapinsky, S., & Stewart, T. (2005). Clinical review: SARS — lessons in disaster management. Critical Care, 9(4), 384–389.

Samaan, J., & Verneuil, L. (2009). Civil-military relations in Hurricane Katrina: A case study on crisis management in natural disaster response. Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin.