Japan 2011 Earthquake Tsunami: Lessons in Emergency Response

Introduction

This paper analyzes the earthquake and tsunami disaster of March 2011 in Japan and proposes important lessons that may be learned from the incident by those seeking to improve the quality of emergency response and recovery. The discussion covers issues related to mental health and societal consequences, the impact of the disaster on Japan's citizenry, and why understanding these issues matters for future preparedness. The paper also identifies possible lead agencies for a comparable catastrophe in the United States and discusses the potential roles of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Japan continues to feel the impacts of the earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011, as well as the radiation leak at the nuclear plant that resulted from the disaster. The country lost approximately 20,000 lives following the 9.0 magnitude earthquake. The nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant — involving explosions and radiation leaks from three reactors — has been compared in scale and severity to the Chernobyl disaster.

Leadership Failures and the Nuclear Crisis

The crisis prompted a significant change in leadership. Japan's governing Democratic Party elected Mr. Noda as the new prime minister in August 2011, replacing Naoto Kan, who was cited as having failed to "galvanize Japan after the disaster" and was ultimately forced to resign (New York Times, 2012).

The operator of the Fukushima Daiichi plant admitted for the first time that it had failed to take stronger preventive measures, citing fear of inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear facilities. This admission appeared to confirm a central criticism of the company: that it refused to acknowledge and address problems in order to protect the so-called "safety myth" — the notion that Japan's nuclear technology was infallible (New York Times, 2012).

A European Commission report released in October 2012 found that nearly all of the more than 130 active nuclear reactors in the European Union required safety improvements, repairs, or upgrades, at a projected cost of up to 25 billion euros ($32 billion) (New York Times, 2012). This finding underscored that the vulnerabilities exposed at Fukushima were not unique to Japan.

Several insiders from Japan's tightly knit nuclear industry came forward to report that Tepco and regulators had for years ignored warnings about the possibility of a larger-than-expected tsunami striking northeastern Japan. As a result, adequate countermeasures — such as raising wave walls or positioning backup generators on higher ground — were never taken (New York Times, 2012).

The government awarded cleanup and rehabilitation contracts to three large construction companies that had no expertise in the remediation of nuclear waste or radiation — a decision that further complicated recovery efforts. The overall disaster response was also hindered by a serious breakdown in trust among the major actors: Prime Minister Kan; the Tokyo headquarters of plant operator Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco); and Masao Yoshida, the on-site manager at the stricken plant. The resulting conflicts produced confused and sometimes contradictory flows of information in the critical early days of the crisis (New York Times, 2012).

Four important lessons can be drawn from the nuclear plant incident that followed Japan's 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

The first lesson is that plant officials must be honest about the actual state of nuclear facility stability following such an incident. Concealing problems — whether to avoid legal liability or to preserve public confidence — only compounds the consequences of a disaster.

Four Lessons Learned

The second lesson is the critical importance of open and honest communication among all major actors during a crisis. Ensuring that accurate status information reaches every stakeholder allows each party to take the necessary precautionary and remedial steps in a timely manner.

The third lesson concerns the maintenance of nuclear facilities. Governments and operators must keep facilities properly upgraded and in safe working condition, rather than continuing to operate facilities that fall short of safety standards while deferring or avoiding necessary improvements.

The fourth lesson is that plans for post-disaster cleanup must be established before a disaster strikes. Personnel assigned to such efforts should be properly trained, equipped, and licensed to conduct the work — a standard that was clearly not met in Japan's case.