Nuclear Disarmament: Challenges, Ethics, and Global Policy

Introduction: The Scope of the Nuclear Problem

Using the tools of social analysis to examine this immense social problem yields information that demonstrates both the nature of the challenge and the vast level of resources and negotiations that would have to take place before even beginning to approach total disarmament. This goal — sought by many while thwarted by others — is seemingly insurmountable in its complexity (Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, MSN Encarta). Many cultural issues must be addressed alongside strategic policies and demands that are as diverse as the types of weapons that exist and the personalities of the nations and individuals involved. The roots of the problem lie in the complicated manner in which nuclear weapons have become so prolific.

Realistically, we are now speaking of a low probability of a relatively small event. Large-scale nuclear exchanges seem far less likely now than they did in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s — there simply are not the scenarios in which such an event could occur. On the other hand, the possibility of isolated nuclear weapon use by what is sometimes called a "rogue state" cannot be excluded. Indeed, some think it likely: "Somewhere, some time in this decade, someone is going to set off a nuclear weapon in deadly earnest" (Smith 9).

Global Nuclear Stockpiles and the Scale of the Threat

According to the Natural Resources Defense Council's Nuclear Weapons Databook Project, the United States had approximately 10,600 nuclear warheads in 2002, with 7,982 of those deployed — ready for utilization within minutes — and 2,700 held in a contingency stockpile. Russia is estimated to have as many or more. The unrest within Russia has limited its ability to reduce its stockpile through disarmament, a process that is also extremely costly, running approximately $70,000 per warhead (50 Facts About U.S. Nuclear Weapons). There are at least six other nations with ready nuclear warheads, and several others are suspected of either possessing nuclear weapons or holding the materials and equipment needed to develop them (Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, MSN Encarta). The actual number of nuclear weapons — both deployable and in stockpile — is unknown to everyone except the nations and individuals who possess them, but it is estimated to be somewhere in the area of 30,000, of all different sizes and types.

There are also concerns about "missing" bombs — those lost in accidents and never recovered. The United States reports eleven such incidents, but the worldwide number is unknown. Countries still developing nuclear weapons or nuclear processes for ostensibly "peaceful" purposes are heavily regulated by UN-sponsored organizations, yet concerns about significant secrecy persist, as does the constant fear that terrorist organizations will obtain such technology and potentially trigger a nuclear conflict. The amount of known nuclear weapons that exists today is sufficient to destroy the planet several times over (Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, MSN Encarta).

Consider, for example, the possibility of nuclear winter and its effects on both human and nonhuman life on Earth. The nuclear winter theory holds that smoke and dust produced by a large nuclear war would result in a prolonged period of cold. Early versions of this theory were put forward in the early 1980s by Richard P. Turco, Owen B. Toon, Thomas P. Ackerman, James B. Pollack, and Carl Sagan. They argued that low temperatures and prolonged periods of darkness would characterize a post-holocaust event and obliterate plant life, in turn threatening human existence (Mayer 558).

Nuclear weapons were developed by the United States during World War II, roughly between 1939 and 1945. Since then, though the stockpile has diminished in part due to the end of the Cold War — which represented the peak of nuclear capabilities for Russia, the United States, and other nuclear nations — the science, technology, and resources needed to develop and maintain them remain a large portion of the U.S. defense budget (50 Facts About U.S. Nuclear Weapons). This ongoing commitment is itself a significant obstacle to full disarmament. "There is no immediate prospect of nuclear weapons being abolished or eliminated, notwithstanding the opinions of the World Court and the Canberra Commission" (Smith 9). Estimated 1998 spending on all U.S. nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs reached $35,100,000,000, according to the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project (Brookings Institute). Despite UN intervention, the development of regulatory agencies, laws to reduce numbers, and many heated negotiations between nations, real progress is limited by investment, commitment, and defense and logistics concerns — even though most military strategists believe nuclear weapons to be of very little use in modern warfare. As Smith notes, "A major factor in the debate about nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence is the assumption that the possession of nuclear weapons is indefensible because of what they may do, and thus that nuclear deterrence itself is morally indefensible" (Smith 9).

International Treaties and the Limits of Diplomacy

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was approved by the UN General Assembly and signed in 1996; over 170 nations have since signed it. The treaty prohibits all nuclear testing, establishes a worldwide network of monitoring stations, and allows for inspections of suspicious sites. Conservative opposition in the United States led the Senate to reject ratification in 1999, though Russia ratified the treaty in 2000 ("Disarmament, Nuclear").

One expert also notes that the global need for energy will likely further complicate matters, as more and more nations demand the right to utilize nuclear technology for "peaceful" purposes to improve their energy resources. Such use of nuclear technology can seriously impede the ability of regulatory commissions and review boards to investigate, particularly given that nations have been deceptive in the past regarding their development programs.

All-round disarmament and concentration on the peaceable uses of nuclear power was, of course, the ideal resolution to these concerns, but the path toward it remained tortuous and tangled. As Churchill observed, a curious paradox had emerged: "After a certain point has been passed it may be said, 'The worse things get, the better'... It may well be that we shall by a process of sublime irony have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation" (Best 37).

In 1995, France began a series of nuclear weapons tests that broke with international tradition and outraged the world, proving that even nations that are signing members of regulatory treaties and accepted members of the global community might still challenge the system to advance their own understanding of and hold over nuclear technology. As Thakur observes, "The worldwide outrage and disbelief provoked by the French decision to resume nuclear testing in 1995 confirmed both the public revulsion against nuclear weapons and their associated infrastructure and the general belief that they are problems left over from the history of the Cold War." Thakur argues that "on balance, the regional and global security risks posed by the acquisition or retention of nuclear stockpiles exceed any security gains that can reasonably be anticipated from such postures," acknowledging that nuclear weapons can confer certain security benefits while demonstrating that these benefits are outweighed by political and security costs (Thakur 2).

Conclusion

Though solutions to the problem are complicated and multifaceted, almost requiring expertise across fifteen different subjects to understand, educating the public about the expenditures involved in and the effects of this powerful and antiquated weaponry is clearly the best possible way to help solve the problem. Broad awareness can generate the political will needed to push national and international communities toward the kinds of sustained, verifiable, and genuinely global agreements that experts across disciplines agree are the only real path to a nuclear-free world.