Populism and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America Compared

Defining Populism: Competing Academic Perspectives

This paper is divided into two parts. The first part defends a definition of populism, addressing its ideology, social base, charisma, clientelism, and the extent of institutionalization. The second part argues that populism and guerrilla movements are very similar phenomena, divided only by the level of their extremism.

There are many definitions of "populism," as seemingly each academic uses his or her own definition of the term, expecting all readers to automatically agree with it. As Roberts (1995) observes, "few social science concepts can match populism when it comes to nebulous and inconsistent usage." Roberts (1995) further notes that "these multiple dimensions have allowed the populist concept to be applied to a wide range of loosely connected empirical phenomena, ranging from economic policies and development phases to political ideologies, movements, parties, governments, and social coalitions" — some of which will be discussed below.

Some definitions label political populism as "excessive centralization of decision-making, i.e., rule by decree, with decreasing depoliticization" (Eder, 2003). Many academics, including Eder (2003), have shown that globalization and neoliberalism have not put an end to populism, but have rather transformed it into "neopopulism," which leaves little room for genuine democracy to develop in countries that have followed these paths. As we shall see, Venezuela and Peru are two good examples of the neopopulist effects of globalization, as in these countries neoliberal policies have existed side-by-side with populist strategies (Eder, 2003).

Other academics — for example, Weyland (2001) — have defined populism as "a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers." This single-variable definition is hotly contested, most notably by Canovan (1999), who offered her own seven sub-categories with which to define populism, arguing that such a complex, multi-faceted definition was necessary.

Other academics argue that populists are defined by their message, and that their message can only be heard in countries facing crises, such that populism really needs to be defined within the context of exclusion (Buxton, 2000). Roberts (1995) argues that "populism is a recurring phenomenon, rather than a period-specific historical anomaly."

Still other academics argue that populism is a common characteristic of Latin American politics that has persisted from its inception in the first half of the twentieth century (Coslovsky, 2002). It is argued that populism is both a political and an economic phenomenon, and that, as such, it has played an important role in the region's dual transitions (Coslovsky, 2002). Economic populism can be understood as an attempt to address income inequality through the use of overly expansive macroeconomic policies — that is, deficit financing (Coslovsky, 2002).

In this view, populism is best understood as a political phenomenon, with politicians classed as populist if they fulfil three conditions: (i) their personal style is paternalistic, personal, and charismatic; (ii) they are able to mobilize, from the top down, a heterogeneous coalition that includes urban workers and middle sectors; (iii) their political program is reformist, but avoids class conflict, promoting redistributive measures and implementing a national development program that expands state activism to include more workers in the economy (Coslovsky, 2002). It has been argued, however, that this definition is too broad and can be bent to include almost any politician, especially in Latin America, where weak institutions create breeding grounds for the cult of personality (Coslovsky, 2002; Szulc, 1959; Dix, 1985).

It is apparent that under any definition of populism — whether economic or political — populism is incompatible with neoliberalism. From a historical perspective, populism was expected to end with the modernization of society (Coslovsky, 2002; Meny and Surel, 2002). It was thought that political populism would vanish with the emergence of a free market, since import substitution would drive new alliances among industrialists and the middle classes (Coslovsky, 2002). This, however, did not happen.

Neoliberalism, Neopopulism, and Democratic Erosion

Other academics have argued that neoliberalism and populism converged during the 1990s in Latin America to form "neopopulism," and that the convergence of these two approaches led to a dismissal of democratic processes — a phenomenon called neo-authoritarianism (Coslovsky, 2002; Meny and Surel, 2002; Roberts, 1995).

Many people have argued that the rise of leaders such as Chávez is symptomatic of a general weakening of the democratic process throughout Latin America (Ellner, 2003; Meny and Surel, 2002). Some have argued that these governments represent not populism, not neopopulism, but rather a new category — "hyperpresidentialism" — characterized by charismatic presidential leadership, reliance on executive decrees, use of plebiscites to legitimize authority, employment of anti-party rhetoric, and a discourse with messianic overtones (Ellner, 2003). A new term has thus been added to the lexicon describing Latin American leaders.

Case Studies: Chávez in Venezuela and Fujimori in Peru

Which case studies best illustrate populism and populist leaders? Peru and Venezuela immediately spring to mind. Hugo Chávez, Venezuela's president, is arguably a populist leader: once in power, he implemented a series of radical reforms to the institutional structures of the Venezuelan state, despite significant opposition (Buxton, 2000). It is argued, however, that Chávez is not a neopopulist leader, since the reforms he implemented fall outside the neoliberal framework. His reforms are described as limited and as likely to accelerate a pre-existing political and economic crisis rather than bringing real, lasting change for the benefit of his people (Buxton, 2000; Ellner, 2003).

Similar arguments have been used to characterize Fujimori — who came to power in Peru in 1992 — as a populist leader, although, as Ellner (2003) argues, comparisons between the two regimes often fail to account for the significant differences between them. It is frequently argued that Chávez is without precedent in Latin American politics: "Chavez's electoral triumph was unique in that he was a middle-level officer with radical ideas who had previously led a coup attempt. Furthermore, few Latin American presidents have attacked existing democratic institutions with such fervor while swearing allegiance to the democratic system" (Myers and O'Connor, 1998, quoted in Ellner, 2003).

What, then, is our conclusion as to what the term "populist" actually means? Through a historical review and analysis of leaders — in particular Hugo Chávez — populism can be understood as a political movement that is extremist in character: a kind of last resort adopted by leaders desperate to change the situation in their country and willing to make those changes themselves. Populism, under this interpretation, is caused by the failure of democratic institutions within Latin America — a matter of particular concern at the present moment.

Conclusion: Extremism as the Dividing Line

The dual phenomena of populism and guerrilla movements are commonplace in Latin America, and as we have seen, both can be characterized as extreme movements caused by the failure of democratic institutions within the region. Populist leaders try to remain on the right side of dictatorship — keeping just enough political framework around them to avoid being labelled dictators (though with Chávez, this is arguable) — whilst fighting for change. Guerrilleros, who argue for revolution, argue from much the same standpoint: effecting beneficial changes within the country, for the people, through proactive policies. The difference between the two phenomena can ultimately be seen as a difference only in the level of their extremism.

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