Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Analysis

Introduction: Psychology as a Lens for Foreign Policy

Foreign policy decisions are often thought of as collective events, conceptualized more in terms of sociology, historical patterns, structures, institutions, and culture before individual psychological variables are considered. Situational and circumstantial variables are treated as tantamount to psychological traits, cognitive cues, emotional cues, or behavioral cues. Structural perspectives like realism, neoliberalism, and idealism had become more important than focusing on the actual actors making decisions, just as the behaviors of corporations can obscure the behaviors of their leaders. Yet power brokers and state-level actors are individual people, with attendant backgrounds, biases, and beliefs. The cluster of variables impacting personal-level decision-making likewise impacts macro-level decision-making. Foreign policy decisions can and should be viewed through a psychological lens in order to better understand historical successes and failures, and perhaps even be used to inform more effective foreign policy.

Foreign policy analysis does in fact depend on a thorough understanding of psychological variables and constraints. Fusing foreign policy with psychology is not necessarily a new approach, but it has become increasingly important in the post-9/11 world, in which non-state actors have transformed geopolitical realities. As a result, the formal and scholarly analysis of foreign policy has been shifting its focus from the "structure of the international system" toward the decisions made by "independent actors," especially after September 11 (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2). The weakening of the classic nation-state has also led to the increased importance of incorporating astute psychological analysis into foreign policy analysis.

The Individual Actor in Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign policy is currently being conceptualized as something that individual actors do — with broad social, economic, and political consequences — rather than as something that societies do collectively. Using this viewpoint, the state is not an "actor," because the state is an abstraction, whereas individual leaders are concrete (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 89). With the actor once again central in the analysis of foreign policy, it becomes easier to make future recommendations based on empirical evidence rather than broad speculation. As Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne put it, critical foreign policy analysis should be "empirical" even if it is not strictly "empiricist" (5). Alden and Amran note that there is "predictive" value in understanding the decision-making process of individual actors (29). It is impossible to remain fully objective and empirical when abstractions like "states" are analyzed, but when social science research is applied to individual actors, the study of foreign policy becomes more objective and more pragmatic.

Focusing on psychological factors does not downplay the role of nation and culture. In fact, social norms and culture inform decisions at all levels, including foreign policy decisions. The behavior of power brokers is directly linked to situational variables and norms, but not determined by those variables alone. The international system can be construed as part of a "psycho-social milieu" (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 23). As Alden and Amran put it, "the relationship between the decision maker, the state, and the structure of the international system is complex" (30). The decision-maker is a psychological being influenced by external, situational, and environmental variables ranging from social norms and culture to social pressure and the constraints of his or her legal position. Both nature and nurture can be accounted for in a psychological framework of foreign policy analysis, with attention paid to the individual's background, leadership style, and personality. Psychological variables will have already impacted the person's decision to become a leader involved in political affairs. Likewise, psychological variables impact daily decisions and decisive actions. Psychology can also shed light on group behavior: "group madness," "collective panic," "violent scapegoating," and "mindless conformity" are common problems associated with the phenomenon of groupthink (Janis 3).

Psychological Variables and Decision-Making Frameworks

Psychological variables directly impact decision-making processes, which is why theories of choice and decision-making have become central to policy analysis. Rational choice theory has remained salient in the study of foreign policy (Alden and Amran). However, rational models of foreign policy analysis are severely limited, if not outright fallacious (Abshire and Dickson; Alden and Amran). Rational theories impose an artificial rationality, placing an "order … on world events, which may not in fact exist" (Abshire and Dickson 114). Rational choice theory can account for an individual actor's choices when those choices are based on self-interest, and various degrees of self-interest in the decision-making process will have a strong bearing on the individual actor and, thus, the outcomes of any one decision. Yet because no human being is fully rational, it is impossible to employ rational choice theory to the exclusion of other theories of choice.

Other theories that apply equally well and can complement rational choice theory include social psychology, cognitive psychology, visual perception, intelligence research, social learning theory, behaviorism, and organizational psychology. An understanding of how to apply these psychological theories to foreign policy analysis can explain why serious mistakes have been made, how leaders can eliminate bias, and how misperceptions often cloud the judgment of leaders. Conversely, applying psychology can help leaders make decisions that best reflect the core goals of their overall foreign policy strategy. Policy advisers can rely on psychological models to guide their leaders. Likewise, psychology is a valuable tool when constructing foreign policies related to military interventions, because it can illuminate the variables motivating individual actors — including suicide terrorists — and also show how political leaders may underestimate their enemies or make serious misjudgments that lead to disastrous outcomes.

Misperception, Cognition, and Foreign Policy Errors

Jervis discusses the importance of cognitive consistency in the assimilation of information used to make foreign policy decisions. Leaders must often make decisions without sufficient data, operating within an ambiguous framework (Jervis 196). Psychological theories of foreign policy are inherently proactive and future-oriented, even as they aid historians in constructing biographical data or historical narratives. Jervis points out the importance of focusing on psychological factors to eliminate future error in foreign policy acts. "It is partly because most international relations scholars have paid no attention to psychology that they have failed to recognize the importance of misperception" in important foreign policy decisions (Jervis 6).

In a similar fashion, Abshire and Dickson state the relevance of comprehending the processes by which miscalculations occur in order to maintain peace. If peace is a common objective, then it is extremely important to recognize errors in judgment, which may simply be errors in perception (Abshire and Dickson). Perception and cognition inform individual and group decisions alike. When perceptions are clear, judgments can be more rational than when perceptions are clouded by distorted views. This is in part why a diverse team of foreign policy advisers can help leaders view problems from multiple angles.

Works Cited

Abshire, D. & Dickson, B. "War by Miscalculation." The Washington Quarterly 6(4), 114–124, 1983.

Alden, C. & Amran, A. Foreign Policy Analysis. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Boulding, K. E. The Image. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961.

Greenstein, F. I. "The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War." Political Psychology 19(1), 1–16, 1998.

Janis, I. L. Groupthink. Boston: Wadsworth, 1982.

Jervis, R. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press, 1976.

Smith, S., Hadfield, A. & Dunne, T. Foreign Policy. Oxford: OUP, 2012.