Truman, the Korean War, and the Doctrine of Limited War

Introduction: The Forgotten War

The Korean War is often called the quiet or forgotten war. Sandwiched between the widely celebrated World War II and the deeply unpopular Vietnam War, the Korean conflict was not primarily a contest of hardware and military might as WWII had been. Nor was it the political boondoggle that arose during the Vietnam era. Instead, the Korean conflict tested the wills and strategies of the world's global superpowers, and how they would respond—including the newly formed United Nations—when confronted with armed aggression. As such, the Korean conflict tested the character of the nations involved rather than their military might or will to win, and President Truman was at the center of that crucible, responding to the crisis with considerable political acumen.

Following the use of atomic weapons on Japan to end WWII, the Soviet Union had developed its own atomic weapons. Thus, as the world entered the military flashpoint of the Korean peninsula, each country feared a conflict that would escalate to a level at which atomic weapons would be used again. The prior generation's definition of victory—total victory at all costs—became a secondary goal in the prosecution of this war. This war was about forming alliances that would endure through a lengthy Cold War and securing partners who could watch borders from around the world. Because of atomic weaponry, prosecuting a war was no longer simply a matter of moving large numbers of men and equipment from one location to another. War had become a far more strategic enterprise. For the newly formed United Nations and the two major victors of WWII, the conflict was a test of how far they would go while still avoiding all-out war, rather than how far they would go to win outright. As the world looked at the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, everyone understood clearly that an all-out war would produce no victors.

Because of these changed dynamics, when communist-supplied and -supported North Korea marched over the 38th Parallel into South Korea, President Truman approached the situation from the vantage point of a diplomat as well as a military commander. He placed General MacArthur on the ground with orders to repel the North Korean forces and protect the South, but he did so through the legal authority of the UN rather than a formal declaration of war by the United States. According to Berger (1965), for two years prior to the onset of the war, Truman had been working with the UN to engage a lasting peace on the continent. The UN had attempted to hold nationwide elections on the peninsula and finally, under leadership from the Truman White House, arranged to hold elections in the North and the South only after joint initiatives had failed. While this angered the Russians, who accused the United States of "attempting to colonize Korea" (New York Times, 1948), engaging a peace process prior to the outbreak of war helped shift the world's opinion of the United States—from a country that was willing to drop atomic bombs on its adversaries to a nation committed to working toward peace.

Therefore, when the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea, America was swift to respond militarily, with the full support of the UN and the international community. President Truman sent troops into the region on the basis of a "peacekeeping mission" rather than a declaration of war against the North. Without a formal declaration of war against North Korea, Russia was at a diplomatic disadvantage and could not officially enter the conflict either. Although the Soviets were strongly in support of the measures taken by the North—and may indeed have helped initiate the conflict—they too faced the difficult challenge of fighting a political and diplomatic war in the world community while troops battled for land and control of the Korean Peninsula.

According to Matlof (1990), fifty-three UN members signified support of the Security Council's June 27 action calling for an international response to North Korean aggression, and twenty-nine of these made specific offers of assistance. The ground, air, and naval forces eventually sent to assist South Korea would originate from twenty UN members and one non-member nation. The United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Turkey, Greece, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Thailand, the Philippines, Colombia, and Ethiopia furnished ground combat troops. India, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Italy (the non-UN country) furnished medical units. Air forces arrived from the United States, Australia, Canada, and the Union of South Africa; naval forces came from the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

References

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Berger, C. The Korea Knot: A Military-Political History. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965.

Bernstein, Barton J., and Allen J. Matusow, eds. The Truman Administration: A Documentary History. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Donovan, Robert J. Nemesis: Truman and Johnson in the Coils of War in Asia. New York: St. Martin's/Marek, 1984.

Edwards, L. "Congress and the Origins of the Cold War: The Truman Doctrine." World Affairs 151 (1989).

Jones, Joseph M. The Fifteen Weeks. New York: The Viking Press, 1955.

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Testimony of A. J. Muste before U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Congress, 1st session, 1947, p. 100. Testimony of William A. Melish, ibid., p. 106.

The New York Times, March 12, 1948.

Tucker, Spencer C., ed. Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2000.