Truman, the Korean War, and the Doctrine of Limited War

Introduction: The Forgotten War

The Korean War is often called the quiet or forgotten war. Sandwiched between the widely celebrated World War II and the deeply unpopular Vietnam War, the Korean conflict was not primarily a contest of hardware and military might as WWII had been. Nor was it the political boondoggle that arose during the Vietnam era. Instead, the Korean conflict tested the wills and strategies of the world's global superpowers, and how they would respond—including the newly formed United Nations—when confronted with armed aggression. As such, the Korean conflict tested the character of the nations involved rather than their military might or will to win, and President Truman was at the center of that crucible, responding to the crisis with considerable political acumen.

Following the use of atomic weapons on Japan to end WWII, the Soviet Union had developed its own atomic weapons. Thus, as the world entered the military flashpoint of the Korean peninsula, each country feared a conflict that would escalate to a level at which atomic weapons would be used again. The prior generation's definition of victory—total victory at all costs—became a secondary goal in the prosecution of this war. This war was about forming alliances that would endure through a lengthy Cold War and securing partners who could watch borders from around the world. Because of atomic weaponry, prosecuting a war was no longer simply a matter of moving large numbers of men and equipment from one location to another. War had become a far more strategic enterprise. For the newly formed United Nations and the two major victors of WWII, the conflict was a test of how far they would go while still avoiding all-out war, rather than how far they would go to win outright. As the world looked at the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, everyone understood clearly that an all-out war would produce no victors.

Because of these changed dynamics, when communist-supplied and -supported North Korea marched over the 38th Parallel into South Korea, President Truman approached the situation from the vantage point of a diplomat as well as a military commander. He placed General MacArthur on the ground with orders to repel the North Korean forces and protect the South, but he did so through the legal authority of the UN rather than a formal declaration of war by the United States. According to Berger (1965), for two years prior to the onset of the war, Truman had been working with the UN to engage a lasting peace on the continent. The UN had attempted to hold nationwide elections on the peninsula and finally, under leadership from the Truman White House, arranged to hold elections in the North and the South only after joint initiatives had failed. While this angered the Russians, who accused the United States of "attempting to colonize Korea" (New York Times, 1948), engaging a peace process prior to the outbreak of war helped shift the world's opinion of the United States—from a country that was willing to drop atomic bombs on its adversaries to a nation committed to working toward peace.

Therefore, when the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea, America was swift to respond militarily, with the full support of the UN and the international community. President Truman sent troops into the region on the basis of a "peacekeeping mission" rather than a declaration of war against the North. Without a formal declaration of war against North Korea, Russia was at a diplomatic disadvantage and could not officially enter the conflict either. Although the Soviets were strongly in support of the measures taken by the North—and may indeed have helped initiate the conflict—they too faced the difficult challenge of fighting a political and diplomatic war in the world community while troops battled for land and control of the Korean Peninsula.

According to Matlof (1990), fifty-three UN members signified support of the Security Council's June 27 action calling for an international response to North Korean aggression, and twenty-nine of these made specific offers of assistance. The ground, air, and naval forces eventually sent to assist South Korea would originate from twenty UN members and one non-member nation. The United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Turkey, Greece, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Thailand, the Philippines, Colombia, and Ethiopia furnished ground combat troops. India, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Italy (the non-UN country) furnished medical units. Air forces arrived from the United States, Australia, Canada, and the Union of South Africa; naval forces came from the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

The Truman Doctrine

The Truman Doctrine was also framed within the political realities of the post-WWII era. Truman began by describing the military and political pressures being applied to Greece and Turkey by terrorists and communists. While he did not specifically mention the Soviet Union, there was little doubt in the minds of his listeners that the Soviets were the largest implicit target of his aggressive political policy. Truman explained that the British government was limited in the aid it could provide, since its resources were needed to rebuild its own country. He stated that the assistance of the United Nations had been considered but that the UN was not in a position to extend the help required—namely, military backing for political will. Using communist expansion in the Greek isles as a backdrop, he conceded that the Greek government was not perfect and stated that U.S. aid did not mean the condoning of extremism on either the left or the right.

Reaffirming U.S. support for the UN's goals of freedom and independence for all its members, Truman insisted that these objectives would not be realized "unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes... This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." (Edwards, 1989) This was the heart of the Truman Doctrine: international peace and U.S. security were linked, and as of the completion of WWII, America had assumed Great Britain's role as keeper of the peace—not only in the Near East but around the world.

In response to the totalitarian threat being felt in the Greek isles, a full four years before the Korean War, Truman insisted that the United States respond firmly. However, in order to build international support, he focused his attention primarily on aid that could be provided through economic assistance.

Truman emphasized the seriousness of the crisis in the Near East, stating that the fall of Greece and Turkey would cause "confusion and disorder" throughout the entire Middle East and would have a "profound effect" upon Europe. He therefore asked Congress for $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey, arguing that "the free peoples of the world" looked to the United States to help them maintain their freedom. "If we falter," said the president, "we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation." (Jones, 1955)

The president received a standing ovation from Democrats and Republicans alike upon the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, but as Acheson noted, "this was a tribute to a brave man rather than unanimous acceptance of his policy." In the Senate, party loyalists began to sort out the details of what this doctrine would mean in dollars and commitment of military might. Some conceded that the United States had abandoned its previous practice of isolationism and would assist democratic governments in retaining their freedom in every appropriate way.

By linking international peace and U.S. security, the president appeared to suggest that the United States would "find it necessary to defend the United States against what might be called the chain reaction of aggression wherever it occurs in the world."

Through the course of hearings over the following weeks, senators began to digest the logical consequences of the Truman Doctrine. The president's statement substantially broadened the concept of peace and security for the United States. The Truman Doctrine specified that wherever the United States found free peoples having difficulty maintaining free institutions and defending against aggressive movements seeking to impose totalitarian regimes upon them, the United States was taking a position that put those totalitarian regimes on notice: while the U.S. might not respond identically to each situation, it did propose to react. (Jones, 1955) In this discussion before Congress regarding the changing landscape of foreign policy, a bipartisan understanding of the global thrust of the Truman Doctrine was publicly forged. With its emphasis on assisting already-free peoples rather than non-free nations, the Truman Doctrine could be understood as a policy of containment rather than liberation.

While the doctrine was forged in response to the destabilizing situation in Greece and Turkey, William H. Melish of the Council of American-Soviet Friendship said flatly: "We see in this measure, and especially in the solemn language with which the President proposed it, a tacit declaration of political and economic war upon the Soviet Union." (Muste, 1947) Nonetheless, Truman was able to garner political support for his doctrine both within the nation and at the United Nations. It was initiated with the complete support of the U.S. government and carried out with full explanation to the United Nations, accompanied by leadership intended to reinforce that body's authority.

Thus, when events on the Korean Peninsula turned from diplomatic to military, Truman was already positioned in the world community to take action. He had the full support of the American government and the United Nations to pursue a course of action that would contain and oppose the spread of communism. The brilliance of Truman's achievement was that he was able to seize the moral high ground without declaring war on the Soviet Union. He was also able to step back from the nuclear trigger and establish a course of action that would pursue military, economic, and political responses when opposing the spread of totalitarian regimes around the world.

Conclusion: Truman's Legacy of Restraint

Truman was a visionary man who understood that the rules governing the playing field of international politics had changed as a result of the Atomic Age. His wisdom and foresight helped solidify the position of the United Nations as an international body capable of influencing world affairs. He engaged the communist nations in a way that made clear the United States would still oppose their expansion and defend those nations that were currently free from encroaching communist pressure. Fighting a limited war is never a satisfying option for military or political leaders, and the Korean conflict—followed closely by the Vietnam War—produced two wars that the nation has long wished to leave in distant memory. Some have argued that these conflicts were the result of ill-conceived policy; however, war is never the product of good choices alone. President Truman's wisdom and foresight kept the Korean conflict from becoming a third global conflict, as he made difficult decisions within a rapidly changing world political and military environment.

References

American Presidents: Life Portraits, C-SPAN, 2004.

Berger, C. The Korea Knot: A Military-Political History. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965.

Bernstein, Barton J., and Allen J. Matusow, eds. The Truman Administration: A Documentary History. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Donovan, Robert J. Nemesis: Truman and Johnson in the Coils of War in Asia. New York: St. Martin's/Marek, 1984.

Edwards, L. "Congress and the Origins of the Cold War: The Truman Doctrine." World Affairs 151 (1989).

Jones, Joseph M. The Fifteen Weeks. New York: The Viking Press, 1955.

Matlof, Maurice. "The Korean War: 1950–1953." American Military History, Chapter 25. U.S. Army, 1990.

McCullough, David. Truman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

National Archives and Records Administration, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, 2004.

Pierpaoli, Paul G., Jr. "Beyond Collective Amnesia: A Korean War Retrospective." International Social Science Review, September 22, 2001.

Testimony of A. J. Muste before U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Congress, 1st session, 1947, p. 100. Testimony of William A. Melish, ibid., p. 106.

The New York Times, March 12, 1948.

Tucker, Spencer C., ed. Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2000.