Welfare State and Postwar Europe: Politics, Communism, and Society

Introduction: Postwar Europe and the Welfare State

The aftermath of World War II saw massive changes in the global political climate — philosophically, theoretically, and practically. The era of direct imperialism was largely over (though this assertion would certainly be disputed by certain populations today, and with legitimate reason), and the era of nation building had, for better or worse, begun. The effects were not limited to far-flung reaches of the globe or struggling Eastern European nations, however. There was also a major shift in the styles of government utilized by Western European powers. Though in no way comparable to the excesses, abuses, and extremes of the Stalinist Soviet Union, a program of social democracy spread throughout Western Europe, effecting the rise of the welfare state in most of these countries — institutions that persist to this day.

The reasons for this shift are quite complex and not easily discernible. In his book Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Tony Judt brings his unique historical and ideological perspective to bear on this issue in an attempt to shed light on the reasons and processes by which the welfare state was established in such a large and seemingly instantaneous (in governmental terms) manner. In one telling phrase, when referring to the social democracy programs that became prevalent in the decades following the Second World War, he calls the emerging welfare state a "child of anxiety." He is referencing the fears and insecurities that many Europeans felt after having witnessed — in many cases firsthand — the destruction and death that war brought with it. The uncomfortable proximity of nations that had found themselves on opposite sides of the war only increased these fears. Though Europe has never been a fully peaceful place in recorded history, the nature of the warfare was different: cities and civilian populations were targeted rather than armies engaged in controlled military skirmishes.

This led to a broadly Europe-wide belief that clear definition and control of boundaries — in both the physical and theoretical worlds — had to be accomplished in order to maintain and ensure security and prosperity for the individual countries of Western Europe. This belief drove a radical change in domestic policy that reflected increased democratization with a very definite purpose. As Judt puts it, the architects of the new European welfare state believed that "if democracy was to work, if it was to recover its appeal, it would have to be planned."

Planning was justified in many ways, not the least of which was the practical consideration that a population better cared for would have less desire to radically change governments and start wars. Less cynical philosophies had been pushing for an increase in social programs and wealth redistribution for over a century, and the Soviet experiment itself — though fatally and very observably flawed — had lasted for a generation based on principles far more radical than those upon which the welfare states of postwar Western Europe were founded. These justifications were more than ample, and the will of a people disillusioned by man's inhumanity to man did not stand in the way of social progress.

The countries of Western Europe had by this time established at least limited democracies and republics, making the processes by which such major institutional shifts could occur at once more achievable and more complex. Increased taxes carried the financial burden of expanded social programs, and the government's response to ongoing demands and inefficiencies remains a continuing process even today.

Communism in Postwar Europe

The Red Scare was a common feature of the 1950s — not only in America, though sentiments appear to have been stronger there — but throughout much of the Western world. Many individuals and governments in Europe were greatly concerned about the Communist "threat" that existed very close to their own borders, and even in pockets within them. Yet by the close of the 1950s, Communism had ceased to be a potent political force across most of Western Europe. As with most major historical and social trends, the reasons for this are complicated, relating both to the changing face of Communism and the attitudes of Communist countries, as well as to shifts occurring in the ostensibly social-democratic and genuinely capitalist countries of Western Europe. Many governments, despite popular fears, had Communist and increasingly Socialist factions within them, and these forces began to have a significant impact on policymaking and the direction of European governance.

This is one of the reasons Communism began to lose its potency — it was being assimilated and watered down in the halls of government to the point that the threat was largely seen for the baseless panic it was. In fact, though the word "Communism" still has the ability to inspire distaste and distrust in many, the word itself lost its potency through its acceptance — which, as any good Orwellian can observe, is as good as making the concept lose its own power. Fear is a very powerful motivator, and without this factor the Communist specter simply became too diminished in size and shadow to be of much political notice or use. There is also the purely practical fact that Western European countries were adopting Communist principles; an ideology cannot be seen as a particularly relevant political force when its goals are being incorporated into mainstream governance — movements fade when their aims are accomplished.

This was not the only reason that Communism ceased to be relevant throughout most of Western Europe in the 1950s. Though countries were becoming increasingly socialized — which shares many features with Communist social programs — fiscally speaking Western Europe remained staunchly capitalist. Increasing commercialization in the years of postwar prosperity swept thoughts of Communism out of most people's minds. In grinding poverty, fears of encroachment and desires for complete financial equality run higher than in prosperous times, and postwar Western Europe provides considerable evidence to attest to this fact.

One exception to this general treatment of Communism in 1950s Europe was Italy, which had emerged from a fascist dictatorship in the middle of the Second World War and thus had a very different starting point than most of Europe. Communist and Socialist parties were banned in Italy in 1948 and 1949, and in many ways the Communist movement in that country was a reactionary force that gained strength from such persecution — and from what many perceived as the continuation of the totalitarian and politically controlling doctrines of Mussolini. Stephen Gundle, author of the film studies and political science book Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian Communists and the Challenge of Mass Culture, maintains that the totalitarian crackdown in the years immediately following the war produced a 1950s that "witnessed a profound transformation in the pattern of economic and social life underlying it." Given the extreme limitations of the conservative governments they had been subjected to, it is little wonder that many Italians reacted with equally extreme movements toward the left and toward Communism.

Conclusion

This is not to suggest that women quietly accepted traditional limitations in the period of prosperity following the war. Rather, the negotiation between traditional and new expectations, alongside expanding opportunities, resulted in a redefining of the Catholic woman in these two countries — which in turn had a formative effect on society as a whole. Properly raising children to be productive members of the new society — arguably the prime role assigned to Spanish and Italian Catholic mothers — required increased engagement with the outside world. The women of this time and place were both shaped by and helped to shape the postwar societies of which they were a part.