¶ … Education Politics
Dumping $2.6 Million on Bakersfield (Or How Not to Build a Migratory Farm Worker's Clinic)
The central issue of this case was that the social ecology of administration and other external factors were not taken into consideration during the implementation of a plan to build new health clinics for migrant farm workers in Bakersfield California.
The program was created to meet the requirements of legislation of the 1970 Migrant Health Act sponsored by Senator Walter Mondale. Although there was plenty of money available, the money came with time constraints and the group who needed to spend the money had a poor overall knowledge of the community the funding was supposed to serve. This case was significant because it demonstrated how multiple levels of government, both federal and local, often mismanage their responsibilities simply because of poor communication and planning.
There were several factors that created this problem. The first issue was that there was legislation that made money available but none of the available individuals actually knew about the potential windfall. This may not have been a problem except that there were time constraints on the money being spent. The sequence of events then was that the HEW mandates added time constraints to the money. When the money arrived in Bakersfield, the local community was not ready to accept it with the time constraints and they were not sure of rules tied to the money. All they knew was that they would lose it if they did not spend. The next problem was that after not consulting with any other local groups, a group that was not covered by the program actually received a promise of funding.
Some alternatives in solving the underlying problems can be seen in what may have saved the HEW program implementation. The federal and local governments tried to work together to through press conferences to soften the community outrage. They clearly kept the grant so...
After the board added medical professionals and the clinic was built in a politically correct place, the initial planning problems were reduced and not made to look so bad.
This case had many underlying problems, but the biggest question to address was the fact that so many social ecology factors were completely missed. For example, how could local officials not know that there were no significant Chicano community groups that they could delegate to and they were completely ignorant of the implications of the must spend because of the end of budget year issues. One has to know his or her community as well as external factors that will or may potentially influence it.
This was a case of everything not to do for future administrators. The outcome was not a complete failure but it was bad enough to teach some lessons. A clinic was eventually built in Weedpatch. There were concerns of doctors not speaking the language of the Mexican workers and the medical director took heat about having proper credentials. There were many ongoing complaints and protests especially between the black and Mexican communities since combining boards was a no great overall solution. The main thing that could be learned from the events and actions of the case that could also be applied to the future is that both federal and local communities have got to work better in understating the other. The federal mandates of time for receiving the money put so much pressure on local administrators that they made more mistakes than they would have without the mandates of time. The local administrators also should have been better acquainted with potential legislation that would, and in this case did, affect them.
CASE 2 - The Last Flight of Space Shuttle Challenger
The central issue is that NASA and the American people were first horrified and then later embarrassed by the cause of the shuttle Challenger disaster. This case brought to light the underlying power struggle that constantly goes on because of either monetary or political reasons at NASA and probably every governmental concern. The combination of public and private entities and companies were too influential in the approval…
As they pushed engineers to continually test the limits when it came to the launches. This is because, the leadership inside NASA and at the different subcontractors created an atmosphere that made this possible. (Gross 1997) (Space Shuttle Challenger Case Study n.d.) The Influence of the Media Given the high profile nature of the program, meant that there were considerable pressures to be ready for the next shuttle launch. This is
Judgment in Managerial Decision Making Almost everyone has, at some point, been a victim of groupthink -- perhaps by thinking of speaking up in a meeting, and then deciding not to, so as not to appear unsupportive of the team's stand. Although such occurrences are quite common, and may appear quite normal, they are indicative of faulty thinking. Groupthink is, in basic terms, "a phenomenon that occurs when the desire for
Space Shuttle Challenger disaster took place on January 28, 1986 as the Space Shuttle Challenger blew up into pieces just 73 seconds after its launch. The destruction blew the shuttle into flames and dust causing the death of all seven crew members. Even though the crash was a sad moment in the history of NASA and United States Space programs, it is still being studied merely to figure out
NASA After the Challenger disaster, NASA was required to make changes in the way it managed its operations. There was to be more communication and more centralization, as well as better consultation with experts in order to make sure that the shuttle did not launch when it was not safe to do so. Despite all of the alleged changes, though, further disaster occurred. This was believed to be a product of
In addition, the Rogers Commission made specific recommendations related to these issues. They suggested that NASA restructure its management system, including bringing astronauts into management positions, which will increase attention to flight safety issues. They suggested a full examination of all critical systems before conducting any more shuttle launches. They were instructed to establish an Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality control. These suggestions bring safety back to prominence in
Challenger Launch Decision JOE KILMINSTER'S ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CHALLENGER DISASTER On January 28, 1986, the Challenger, one of the reusable space shuttle by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or NASA, was launched off at the John F. Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida but exploded 72 seconds after liftoff. The launch was approved and ordered by the management of the Morton Thiokol, Inc., an aerospace company, that manufactures solid propellant