Malayan Emergency

¶ … Malayan Emergency in the context of the post-WWII major power experience.

What was different in the ways that the major powers chose to employ force and how was this different from the high-intensity conflict of WWII? During World War II, Malaysia was occupied by the Japanese forces but the resumption of control by the British of the area was far from triumphant.[footnoteRef:1] The disruption of the tin and rubber industries had left the Malaysian economy in a state of ruin, and the British were determined to reestablish their colonial authority because of the extent to which their economy depended upon a steady supply of these resources.

However, the native population resisted the resumption of British control and a prolonged state of guerrilla warfare was touched off by the murder of three British plantation owners. The primary opponents of the British were the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) and the Malayan People's Liberation Army (MPLA).

Although one might think that they would be little match for the strength of the British empire, the British forces had been dealt a severe blow during World War II, and its Malay police forces were staffed largely by inexperienced men.[footnoteRef:2] [1: Michael Carver, War Since 1945 (Dublin: The Ashfield Press, 1990), p.14.] [2: Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), p.114.] In contrast to the sweeping, dramatic gestures of World War II which ensued once the conflict had formally broken out, the Malay Emergency proceeded in a series of fits and starts, with guerrilla actions by the communists alternated with slow, painful encroaching control of the British over the jungle.[footnoteRef:3] This occurred for several years until 1952 when the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, was assassinated by the opposition.

This posed a profound psychological setback for the British.[footnoteRef:4] Soon after the death of Gurney, Winston Churchill's Tories assumed control over the British Parliament once again. Churchill had long maintained that a more forceful attitude towards the Malayan conflict was necessary. Churchill installed new leadership in the form of Gerald Templar and placed stronger emphasis on improving intelligence gathering and creating a more cohesive opposition to the communists.

[3: Moyar, 119.] [4: Moyar, 119.] "Operations in Malaysia from 1948 to 1952 had engendered only modest refinements of the theories drawn from past conflicts…They did not give authors sufficient methods for establishing essential tasks such as gaining the cooperation of allied leaders, organizing self-defense forces, winning support of the population, motivating the troops, persisting in the face of difficulty, or adjusting methods in response to changing enemy tactics." [footnoteRef:5]The new leadership did not so much employ a formal new strategy so much as it improved training and recruitment of men and gave soldiers more flexibility to respond.[footnoteRef:6] This decentralized approach was more effective, indicating the need for a more individualized approach to this new form of warfare.

Counterinsurgency tactics were improved and the British learned to more effectively cut off supplies such as food to the communist soldiers hiding in the countryside.[footnoteRef:7] [5: Moyar, 127.] [6: Moyar,.