Afghanistan's Political, Military, Social, and Economic Crisis

Introduction: Afghanistan and the Challenge of State-Building

Afghanistan is a country of many facets, of paramount importance to the broader region and to the global fight against terrorism. For the United States, it represented both a challenge for establishing new democratic principles and values and a cornerstone in the struggle against terrorism as an emerging security threat. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Afghanistan became the primary focus of U.S. administrations in an attempt to align its democratic structures with those of the Western world. The late 2001 invasion of Afghanistan marked, for the international community, the beginning of a new effort in state and democracy building. However, almost a decade later, coalition forces were facing deeply rooted fundamentalist challenges. The experience of the Afghan war proved once again that democracy is a process that must be built upon from within, and cannot simply be imposed from outside.

The current situation in Afghanistan provides yet another perspective on the difficulty Middle Eastern countries face in establishing democracy in any meaningful sense, and in adapting to democratic values and norms grounded in human rights and human dignity. This paper assesses the impact that the continuous war since 2001 has had on the political, military, social, and economic dimensions of life in the country.

The military perspective is analyzed with particular regard to the influence U.S. and coalition forces have had on the training and development of Afghan security forces. The political framework of the Afghan state is examined in terms of how international forces have positively or negatively shaped Afghan political life. The economic dimension plays an important role in the country's development and is closely tied to the societal fabric of Afghan life. The analysis highlights the dependency between the economic and social systems: in order to assess the level of development and change in Afghan society as a whole, it is necessary to observe whether economic evolution has influenced social evolution. At this point, the social component has yet to undergo meaningful development despite constant attempts to intervene financially and otherwise.

The current state of democracy and the economy in Afghanistan is largely determined by the level of instability the country continues to experience. Like any system that starts from zero, this country needed — and will always need — internal and external stability in order to progress. An analysis of the insurgency is therefore necessary to understand its causes and to consider how the Afghan government, together with its international partners, might address it.

Classical theories of civil wars and insurgencies are difficult to apply to Afghanistan. As Seth Jones clearly points out, there are at least two competing theories: the first is based on ethnic conflicts that transcend politics and time, and the second is based on the drive for resource accumulation and power by certain individuals (Jones, 2008). In the case of Afghanistan, one of the primary conditions enabling the insurgency's growth was a structural weakness in the country's political system: "weak governance is a common precondition of insurgencies. The Afghan government was unable to provide basic services to the population; its security forces were too weak to establish law and order; and too few international forces were available to fill the gap" (Jones, 2008, p. 8).

One important factor complicating Afghan politics — closely connected with social and cultural issues — lies deep within the ancient conflicts between ethnic groups across the broad territory that constitutes Afghanistan. After the fall of the Taliban government in 2001, the new democratic regime had to confront a serious challenge: uniting different and often mutually hostile ethnic groups under a single national framework. As one group gained something, the others perceived it as their loss, so any movement that favored one side risked igniting conflict. Political sustainability in a failed state like Afghanistan is therefore extremely difficult to achieve, even with the military and political support of major international actors and donors. Moving from a "collapsed" state to a "failed" state and beyond represents progress for Afghanistan, but the pace is extremely slow.

References

Filkins, Dexter. "Taliban Elite, Aided by NATO, Join Talks for Afghan Peace." The New York Times, 2010.

Jones, Seth. "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad." International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), pp. 7–40.

RAND Corporation. "Afghanistan." America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq. 2004, pp. 129–148.

Rotberg, Robert. Weak and Failing States: Critical New Security Issues. n.d.

Rubin, Alissa. "Contrary to Hopes, Afghan Vote Disappoints." The New York Times, 2010.

Schweich, Thomas. "Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?" The New York Times Magazine, 2008.

United Nations Development Programme. Afghanistan Country Profile on Human Development Index. 2010.