Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Global War on Terrorism

Introduction: Defining Counterinsurgency and Its Context

Counterinsurgency, or COIN, can be defined as the sum total of the political, military, paramilitary, economic, civic, and psychological actions undertaken by a government to control and crush insurgency (Forest, 2007, p. 366). The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have focused attention on the relevance of counterinsurgency doctrine to the global war on terrorism. The tremendous growth in urbanization, technology, ethnic and religious extremism, weapons proliferation, and transnational conflicts has changed the environment in which insurgents wage war against the state (Moore, The Basics of Counterinsurgency).

Insurgency is a combination of subversion and guerrilla warfare tactics used by a small fraction of a discontented population to enfeeble and ultimately conquer a nation from within. Insurgents normally operate from a materially and numerically weak position and work within a discontented population by gaining the support of some adherents. They target government facilities, use hit-and-run tactics, and employ violence to draw attention to their cause. Countering such "low-intensity conflicts" — which do not rise to the level of full-scale war yet are devastating nonetheless — is extremely complex and difficult. Such unconventional warfare robs conventional forces of the advantages normally associated with firepower, mobility, and numerical strength, engages them in long, drawn-out operations with indefinite endings and confusing objectives, and simultaneously exposes them to criticism from all quarters (Joes, 1999, p. 26).

Past Experiences with Counterinsurgency

America's experiences with counterinsurgency have not been very successful and have been replete with painful memories, particularly from Vietnam. One of the first detailed examinations by the U.S. Army severely criticized the counterinsurgency doctrine followed in Vietnam. This study also stated that the Army had forgotten the lessons learned there, should have rectified its lack of ability to carry out counterinsurgency operations, and should have closely studied low-intensity conflicts in order to map its strategies and conduct. Despite the fact that the history of U.S. defense forces is filled with numerous experiences of unconventional conflict, the country has remained more interested in the study of conventional, European-style warfare (Cassidy, 2006, p. 119).

However, the global war on terror that the U.S. has pursued since September 2001 is not a conventional war but a counterinsurgency against a global insurgency. Al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups have adapted to all the advantages offered by modern technology and globalization. To counter the challenges posed by these actors, a military transformation preceded by a cultural change within the military is required. The present-day insurgency shares similarities with the revolutionary guerrilla warfare of the twentieth century — such as hit-and-run tactics — but also exhibits vital differences. This hybrid form of insurgency is still evolving and is fundamentally a strategy of the weak. Consequently, military cultural change, interagency coordination, and doctrinal reform must be seriously considered by the United States (Cassidy, 2006, p. 119).

The Iraq War demonstrated that a full-scale conventional military campaign may not improve the global security situation and may, in fact, worsen it. Iraq turned out to be an excellent training ground for insurgents from across the Muslim world, who would be able to apply the lessons learned there to instigate terrorism in their own regions upon returning home. The war also damaged U.S. diplomatic relations with many of its European allies. It therefore becomes essential to apply broad counterinsurgency doctrines rather than blindly employing past COIN tactics to combat global terror forces (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 113).

When counterinsurgency strategy amounts to an outright military exercise requiring overwhelming force and violent measures that affect not only insurgents but the population as a whole, the immediate effect in many cases is a suppression of violence. However, the root problems remain unaddressed and continuous suppression becomes a fixture of operations, resulting in long-term social and political repercussions. By contrast, when counterinsurgency operations focus on providing long-term solutions and establishing peace by addressing the root causes of insurgency, the effect has been more widespread and more effective, since the conditions that gave rise to the insurgency are removed. Successful counterinsurgency strategies therefore involve meeting legitimate grievances without yielding to illegitimate methods (Moore, The Basics of Counterinsurgency).

European Experience and the Four Principles of COIN

European nations, particularly Britain, have enjoyed far greater success in counterinsurgency operations than the United States. During the "counterinsurgency era" of approximately 1945 to 1970, European countries faced a multitude of insurgencies from nations opposing colonial rule. Britain developed successful counterinsurgency techniques that it implemented across various regions, including the Malayan Emergency, the Oman Dhofar campaign, and Northern Ireland in the period between 1919 and 1960 (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 117).

The U.S. would stand to benefit by emulating the four broad principles of counterinsurgency that Britain employed to successfully target insurgency. These four principles are: (i) winning the hearts and minds of the local people through economic and/or political reforms; (ii) initiating and maintaining close cooperation between the police, military, and civil government; (iii) employing force or violence selectively to target insurgents without inflicting undue harm on innocent civilians and thereby alienating them; and (iv) allowing command and control of operations to be decentralized, granting greater independence to civilians, military personnel, and police in fighting insurgents within their local jurisdiction (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 117).

It must be emphasized, however, that the worldwide terror campaign unleashed by the vast, decentralized network of terrorists exemplified by al-Qaeda is significantly different from insurgency perpetrated within a particular region or country. Therefore, studying the particulars of COIN operations from past campaigns with a view to applying them wholesale to current scenarios would be futile. On the other hand, applying the four COIN principles above in combination with effective tactics might yield far better outcomes than the strategies employed in the current global war on terrorism. There is no doubt that counterinsurgency is among the only relevant methods available to combat the nature and scale of global insurgency today, but the manner in which it is pursued must be carefully and humanely designed in order to achieve the basic goal of establishing world peace and eradicating terrorism (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 118).

Conclusion

The reappearance of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the persistent chaos in that country's social, economic, and political life are proof that previous counterinsurgency methods were not successful and that serious rethinking on the issue is required. At the same time, counterinsurgency doctrine cannot be abandoned altogether given the nature of global insurgency and its continuously evolving and innovative tactics. The earlier counterinsurgency policies pursued by the U.S. were ruthless, inhumane, and frequently clumsy. The administration of President Obama, however, promised a departure from those policies, and its preference for "smart power" and diplomacy over blunt and brutal force offered the prospect of much-needed reform in counterinsurgency doctrine. Combining force on an "as and when needed" basis with a focus on minimizing casualties and expanding nation-building activities would bolster counterinsurgency measures and represent a significant step toward long-term peace and stability in the world.

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