Ethical Leadership Case Study: Mikhail Gorbachev

Introduction

As the eighth and last leader of the former Soviet Union, Nobel Peace Prize laureate (1990), and best-selling author, Mikhail Gorbachev served alternatively as Communist Party general secretary from 1985 through 1991, as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Supreme Soviet from 1988 to 1991, and as the first president of the Soviet Union from 1990 to 1991. During this six-year period, Gorbachev's role and leadership behaviors changed dramatically due to external circumstances that threatened the future of his glasnost ("openness") and perestroika ("restructuring") reform policies, as well as the future of the Soviet Union itself.

This paper reviews the relevant literature to describe how and why Gorbachev's leadership theories, styles, and power and influence changed from one role to the next. Drawing on contingency theory, it evaluates the effectiveness of his behaviors in each role within the context of tasks, follower characteristics, and organizational goals. Finally, using specific examples, a recommendation is offered concerning how Gorbachev could have behaved differently within each role to be more effective, followed by a summary of the research and important findings in the conclusion.

Leadership Theories, Styles, and Power Across Roles

In 1985, Gorbachev was appointed general secretary of the Soviet Union at age 54, following the successive deaths of three elderly leaders who represented the Old Guard — making him the youngest Soviet leader in history. At the time, many domestic and international observers expected the new general secretary to implement a series of progressive reforms in an effort to improve the Soviet economy and the country's international image. During the early phases of his leadership career, Gorbachev used a transformational leadership style that was clearly intended to transform the Soviet Union into a modern nation by replacing outdated political and economic systems with more democratic and progressive strategies modeled on the West. In this regard, MacKinnon (2008) reports that, "One could argue in the case of Gorbachev, 'transformational leader' best acknowledges his unmistakable contribution in changing the Soviet system, dismantling Marxist-Leninist ideology and one-party rule while introducing into it elements of civil freedom and democracy" (p. 69).

Indeed, some observers suggest that in Gorbachev's early years as Soviet general secretary, he was a classic textbook example of a progressive, transformational leader. For example, Jasper (2011) points out that, "Transformation [is] a well-worn word in Gorbachev's globalist lexicon, always signifying an urgent need to deconstruct the current political/economic system of sovereign, independent nation-states and the market-based economy and restructure (transform) it into a globalized, centralized, socialized new world order" (p. 18). For a time, Gorbachev's transformational leadership style was welcomed by some liberal elements within the Soviet Union and by the majority of the international community as a breath of fresh air in an otherwise stale and stodgy Soviet bureaucracy that was rife with corruption, mismanagement, and waste. Press coverage of Gorbachev in the Western media was replete with glowing reports about the progressive reforms the Soviet general secretary was making, and greeted each new initiative with even greater praise.

In March 1990, Gorbachev was elected as the Soviet Union's first president — an unsurprising outcome, since he was the only candidate on the ballot. By this time, growing domestic unrest and pressure from the international community had combined to force him to revert, in some instances, to the same types of hard-line approaches used in the past to deal with unrest and uprisings in the Soviet republics — what can best be described as transactional leadership (Valenty & Feldman, 2002). As MacKinnon (2008) points out, "the term 'transformational' leader fails to account for Gorbachev's inability to retain political authority and to complete the process of transformation" (p. 71).

This shift in leadership style during his last two years in office can be attributed in large part to the challenge posed by the rising Boris Yeltsin, who sought the presidency and still rankled at having been fired from his post in the Communist Party by Gorbachev years earlier. Valenty and Feldman (2002) report that, "Gorbachev's problems in reforming the Soviet Union were compounded by Boris Yeltsin's inflammatory rhetoric and divisive policies" (p. 17). These challenges were exacerbated by Yeltsin's rising domestic popularity during a period when Gorbachev's was plummeting (Valenty & Feldman, 2002).

Other forces were also at work that appear to have convinced Gorbachev that his former leadership style was no longer appropriate or effective. In 1990, the so-called "Black January" took place, wherein Gorbachev declared martial law and sent Soviet military forces to Azerbaijan to restore order (Stroilov, 2011). The outcome of this intervention was far more severe than even Gorbachev likely expected: more than 120 protesters were killed by Soviet troops and approximately 700 more were injured (Stroilov, 2011). Although Gorbachev subsequently labeled his actions in Azerbaijan a "mistake," the Azerbaijani government officially called the intervention an "action of aggression" and seriously considered placing Gorbachev on trial for crimes against humanity (Stroilov, 2011).

On January 13, 1991, Gorbachev dispatched Soviet troops to Lithuania and assumed control of media outlets and other governmental buildings (Francis, 1991). Bloodshed followed there as well. According to Stroilov (2011), "Soviet troops, sent by Gorbachev, fired on the crowd, killing 15 protesters and wounding hundreds. Gorbachev remained silent for about a week, then denied he was responsible and blamed the military" (p. 37). Gorbachev took this drastic measure in an attempt to remain in power as Soviet president and general secretary, but the consequences were swift and severe. As Francis reports, "The European Community condemned Moscow's violent crackdown in Lithuania and warned that $1 billion in promised aid might be endangered" (1991, p. 8).

The election of Yeltsin as Soviet president in June 1991 — this time with more than one candidate on the ballot — reduced Gorbachev's role to that of general secretary. By August 1991, the situation in the Soviet Union had deteriorated to the point where Gorbachev's position was no longer tenable, and a failed coup attempt spelled the death knell for his political career and for the Soviet Union itself. According to the BBC, "In 1991 reactionary hard-liners in the Communist Party, fearing the collapse of the Soviet Union, attempted to remove Gorbachev" (Mikhail Gorbachev, 2017, para. 4).

Under house arrest in his Crimean dacha, Gorbachev was forced to listen to events unfold on the radio as elements of the military sought to take over the Russian parliament. The combination of mass protests and President Yeltsin's efforts served to quell the coup attempt, but Gorbachev recognized that Yeltsin now held the real power in the Soviet Union — at least for the few months before the country disintegrated into a series of independent republics (Stroilov, 2011). These outcomes may appear predictable in hindsight, but the dynamic nature of world events during Gorbachev's tenure proved too much for either his transformational or transactional leadership style. Because hindsight is always clearer in retrospect, however, it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of his behaviors in each political capacity by drawing on contingency theory, discussed below.

Although even his harshest detractors conceded his charisma and apparent political acumen as a statesman, Gorbachev did exercise his presidential powers in less-than-admirable ways on more than one occasion. Some of these actions are less well known, but they provide clear indication of the shift in his leadership style, including the following:

• He continued to use the KGB in its traditional role as the instrument of Communist rule.
• He presided over the brutal Soviet occupation of, and genocide against, Afghanistan.
• He ordered the murderous assault of Soviet troops on unarmed civilians at Vilnius' television station — Lithuania's equivalent of the Tiananmen Square massacre.
• He concealed documents showing Soviet responsibility for the Katyn Woods massacre of 15,000 Polish military officers.
• He supported Ethiopian communist dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam's horrendous reign of torture, genocide, and forced famine (Jasper, 2011, p. 19).

Contingency Theory Evaluation of Leadership Effectiveness

The main tenets of contingency theory are especially appropriate for evaluating Gorbachev's behaviors as general secretary from 1985 through 1991 and as president from March 1990 through June 1991. According to Swatos (1994), "The theoretical perspective of contingency theory provides an appropriate organizing framework. The contingency perspective is useful in this context for focusing attention on the importance of organizational environments" (p. 163). Contingency theory is particularly useful for evaluating Gorbachev's behaviors given the hostile environment he faced throughout his tenure. As Swatos adds, "This focus is especially crucial when the environment is turbulent or hostile. In a rapidly changing environment, whatever accommodations may have been made with hostile elements in the environment that allowed the organization to survive are likely to be called into question" (1994, p. 137).

The task context in which Gorbachev exercised his power as general secretary included his attempts to implement and sustain his glasnost and perestroika initiatives, which were being rejected by many members of the Soviet Communist Party as threats to their own interests and to the Soviet Union as an institution. In reality, these reactions were predictable given the well-entrenched bureaucracy that characterized the Soviet Union during Gorbachev's tenure in both roles.

The characteristics of his followers were also operative in forcing Gorbachev to shift his leadership style from transformational to transactional, with pressure from Communist Party hard-liners and growing dissension among the leaders of the Soviet republics swirling increasingly out of control. The organizational goals of the Soviet Union also underwent substantive change during Gorbachev's first years in office, shifting from attempts to maintain military and political hegemony in Europe and counter the growing capabilities of the United States and NATO — most especially the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars" (Avni, 2014).

Indeed, Star Wars is regarded by many analysts as the final nail in Gorbachev's presidential coffin. According to Avni, "The idea of a defensive shield against missiles was no more than a fantasy at the time. Yet many analysts credited Reagan's Star Wars initiative with hastening the fall of the Soviet Union" (p. 37). At the time, however, Gorbachev believed that further attempts to compete militarily with the United States and its allies were useless and would only further weaken his country — a decision that many credit with hastening the Soviet collapse in 1991 (Avni, 2014). Nevertheless, Gorbachev's official position as general secretary held that arms reductions were in the best interests of East and West alike, and that he was positioned to help effect those reductions, including the elimination of nuclear weapons. As Trauschweizer (2015) emphasizes, "Gorbachev and Reagan were to be partners, if not always trusting ones, in the quest to abolish nuclear arms and in the friendly summit meetings from 1985 to 1988 that changed the tone in international relations" (p. 420).

There are also clear indications in the historical record concerning Gorbachev's reactions to being replaced as Soviet president in June 1991 by Yeltsin — an eventuality he worked hard to avoid and was reluctant to accept. Despite this loss of power and prestige, Gorbachev attempted to continue the same patterns of behavior that had marked his first year as Soviet president. Jasper (2014) reports that, "Gorbachev's lust for power and his sense of loss when he was no longer head of state of the Soviet Union: He loved power, and now he's suffering at having lost it" (p. 19). In his role as general secretary, Gorbachev chose to simply ignore the election results and continued to behave as if he were still the freely elected president of the Soviet Union. As Jasper adds, "The pain was such that Gorbachev would still claim to be having 'negotiations' whenever he met leading politicians in Bonn. But there was nothing left to negotiate" (p. 19). Although he would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, numerous honorary doctorates, and countless other international awards, "Gorby" was clearly no longer in charge at home (Jasper, 2014).

Conclusion

The research showed that Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power as general secretary of the Soviet Union in 1985, a position he occupied until the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. During this period, Gorbachev also served as the first president of the Soviet Union from 1990 until June 1991, when he was replaced by Boris Yeltsin. During his tenure as general secretary, Gorbachev was credited with a number of progressive reforms intended to introduce democratic institutions and rescue the faltering Soviet economy — hallmarks of a transformational leader. However, his behaviors as president were clearly transactional in nature and were far less effective in stemming the inevitable tide of change sweeping over the Soviet Union during the closing years of the twentieth century.

References

Arias-King, F. (2005, April 1). Gorbachev steered things in a constructive way. Demokratizatsiya, 13(2), 277–281.

Avni, B. (2014, November 21). Russia worries about actual new Star Wars; the Russians are anxious the U.S. is going to wage war in space. Newsweek, 163(20), 37.

Francis, D. R. (1991, January 18). The fall of the Austrian, Ottoman, and Soviet Empires. The Christian Science Monitor, 8.

Jasper, W. F. (2011, December 5). Going global with "Gorby": Since Mikhail Gorbachev presided over the dismantling of the Soviet Union, he has been lauded as a beacon of freedom, but he wants a worldwide "Soviet" global government. The New American, 27(23), 17–21.

MacKinnon, E. (2008, Spring–Summer). Grasping at the whirlwinds of change: Transitional leadership in comparative perspective — the case studies of Mikhail Gorbachev and F.W. De Klerk. Canadian Journal of History, 43(1), 69–73.

Mikhail Gorbachev. (2017). BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/people/mikhail_gorbachev

Stroilov, P. (2011, May 26). The Gorbachev files. The Spectator, 37.

Swatos, W. H., Jr. (1994). Politics and religion in Central and Eastern Europe: Traditions and transitions. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Trauschweizer, I. (2015, June). The triumph of improvisation: Gorbachev's adaptability, Reagan's engagement, and the end of the Cold War. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 45(2), 419–421.

Valenty, L. O., & Feldman, O. (2002). Political leadership for the new century. Westport, CT: Praeger.