Lone Wolf Terrorism: Threats, Typology, and Radicalization

Introduction

Recent terrorist episodes in the United States have largely been incidents of lone wolf terrorism. From the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995 by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols to the Charlottesville attack in 2017 by neo-Nazi James Fields, lone wolf terrorists operate within this country, and their presence represents one of the most important current domestic security concerns. This paper explains why lone wolf terrorism is a critical security concern for the US and how Internet recruitment is playing a part in the spread of violent actions by extremists.

Defining Lone Wolf Terrorism

Lone wolf terrorism is difficult to define because of the complicated nature of what makes someone a lone wolf. The theory of lone wolf terrorism holds that lone wolves are terrorists who act without any support group, network, or assistance from a terror cell or organization. Lone wolves may be motivated by an ideology shared by other people and groups, but they are not supported by those groups or given orders to act. They are not part of an overall infrastructure and do not take commands from anyone. They act entirely on their own directive (Beydoun, 2017).

An example of a lone wolf terrorist would be Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, whose manifesto revealed the extreme right-wing ideology that prompted his actions. Another example would be the New Zealand mosque shooter, who left behind ample evidence of his inspiration for the mass murder of Muslims at their place of prayer. McVeigh and Nichols can also be considered lone wolves, as can the Orlando nightclub shooter. What they all have in common is that they were operating on their own, outside of any organized terrorist cell, with their actions directed solely by themselves.

Yet lone wolf terrorists are not created in a vacuum — particularly today. Lone wolf terrorism is as much a reaction to the left-right political paradigm that has spread across the world as it is to social media influence, where extremist ideologies are communicated and fuel individuals inclined toward violent action. As Weimann (2016) notes, lone wolves actually hunt in packs and their hunting ground is cyberspace: "They are recruited, radicalized, taught, trained and directed by others" (p. 1). From Facebook to YouTube to Twitter, social media platforms are places where lone wolf terrorists can be formed in cyberspace and unleashed onto the real world.

Three Immediate Threats Posed by Lone Wolves to US National Security

Three immediate threats posed by lone wolves to US national security are: a threat to infrastructure, a social threat in that they can inspire other lone wolf terrorists, and an economic threat in that they can destabilize the country's ability to hold public events and mass gatherings out of fear that a lone wolf might strike. To address these threats, some form of content control online is clearly needed to prevent recruitment and the proliferation of radical ideas that could lead to the development of more lone wolf terrorists. Yet this idea creates conflicts within American notions of freedom, particularly as people enjoy socializing with one another online. The irony is that lone wolves can be recruited and radicalized online, and their activities can ultimately restrict socialization opportunities for everyone else. The government is therefore faced with decisions about how much freedom to allow, given that lone wolf terrorists exploit that freedom for destructive ends.

Americans are not entirely comfortable with the idea of their online activity being monitored or their words being assessed by government agents. Some feel that if their online content is judged incorrectly they could be harassed by the government, arrested, or charged with inciting violence, hate crimes, or terrorism. Monitoring the Internet and implementing controls on social media has been a complex challenge for companies like Facebook and Twitter. Social media becomes a dominant space where individuals can reinforce an increasingly radicalized worldview, even when communicating with others who do not share their violent intentions (Chatfield, Reddick, & Brajawidagda, 2015). This raises the question of whether those who communicate or share ideas with a radicalized lone wolf become complicit in that radicalization.

There are also ethical questions that must be addressed as the government seeks to respond to this security concern. The threat to America is clear and present, but at what point can the government declare that certain topics or forms of speech are off-limits? From a utilitarian perspective, one could argue that, for the common good, the government should have the authority to limit free speech on the Internet because of the risks it poses for the development of lone wolf terrorists. From a deontological perspective, however, one could argue that the government has a duty to uphold the Constitution, which protects Americans' right to free speech.

The problem is not easy to solve, given that the Internet constantly provides new platforms for users to meet and share views. The major social networking platforms represent only a fraction of the available spaces. Numerous platforms exist, and the widespread availability of instant communication as a feature of Web 2.0 technology means that this is not a process the government can easily monitor. This makes the urgency of addressing lone wolf radicalization over the Internet all the greater. There is no apparent or straightforwardly ethical solution.

The threat to infrastructure is apparent, and the economic threat follows directly from it. The implicit threat in both is that social relations will deteriorate and American society will become increasingly tribal. Tribalism can lead to a rise in terrorism, as it fosters fringe belief systems and activities that pit groups against one another in hostile and violent ways. Even tribal activity on social media — through the use of memes, for instance — can provoke and inspire terror (Costello & Hawdon, 2018).

Are Lone Wolves Really Lone Wolves?

Lone wolf terrorists are never truly alone, just as ISIS is not truly alone. That organization has a number of affiliates around the world and has been able to "flourish in regions plagued by weak governance, porous borders and inept security forces" (Intel Brief, 2019). Such organizations often appeal to individuals who turn to the Internet for guidance and direction. These individuals may be dissatisfied with their society or government and may seek out like-minded people who can offer supportive reinforcement. They may not be living in nations plagued by weak governance, but they are individuals beset by weak internal governance — lacking the discipline or education to resist falling into the trap of radicalization. They seek it out because they have no psychological or social barrier to deter them from that course. The Columbine shooters are a comparable example: they acted on their own, yet were radicalized to a degree by their exposure to online content, and their actions were largely planned online (Costello & Hawdon, 2018).

It is also worth considering whether lone wolves are truly lone soldiers or whether they are part of the organizational networks of foreign terrorist organizations. Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter of 2009, is a compelling example of a lone wolf terrorist radicalized in cyberspace. He might more accurately be called a lone soldier, since he was inspired and guided by a radical Islamic terrorist operating in the Middle East. Although it was never proven that he was ordered to open fire at Fort Hood, Hasan was certainly radicalized by a Muslim terrorist online and led to believe that waging holy war was his only means of pleasing Allah. Hasan was a US Army major and psychologist who had been in contact with Yemen-based cleric Imam Anwar al-Awlaki, with whom he exchanged emails in the period leading up to his attack on the military base, which killed 13 people and wounded 30 others (Breed & Plushnick-Masti, 2013).

Hasan openly admitted afterwards that he had been radicalized and had come to believe he was working for the enemy, and that he had to fight back against what he perceived to be an evil American foreign policy killing his people in the Middle East. He identified with Middle Eastern Muslim radicals and sought vengeance against the American military as an act of retribution. He was not legitimately or officially acting on behalf of any organized terrorist group — but, as Weimann has demonstrated, he was shaped by those people. He was initiated into their ideological worldview by way of cyberspace. As Meleagrou-Hitchens (2015) notes, Hasan was "a self-identified member of the global jihad movement who took it upon himself to contribute to the struggle in the most effective way at his disposal." He saw himself as an actor in a larger movement but received orders from no one. Another example is the Orlando nightclub shooter, who also believed he was waging war for Allah. He too had been radicalized online and, though he had no formal marching orders, could be said to be part of a larger network of terror that inspires individuals to fight independently against the evils they perceive in society.

Typology of Lone Wolf Terrorists

The lone wolf typology generally consists of an individual — usually male, aged 18 to 45 — who is considered a loner in the sense of not having a strong social network of friends or companions, who is regarded by those who know him as holding radical beliefs, and who has undergone a fundamental change in personality, psychology, or outlook in recent months. The lone wolf tends to be isolated or withdrawn and typically holds radical views about mainstream society that differ markedly from the majority norm.

Hasan exemplifies the Lone Soldier typology: a lone wolf with a military background and weapons training, who holds a fundamentally different view of society from the group to which he belongs and sees his role as one of war. He wages that war through terrorism — which is precisely what Hasan did when he declared himself engaged in holy war and attacked the American military base as an act of armed combat.

The Loner typology describes a kind of lone wolf who has no meaningful social connections whatsoever — no group membership, no specialized training, no social identity, no bonds or interests. An example of the Loner type would be Adam Lanza, who opened fire on his elementary school, killing dozens of children. He had shown signs of mental illness from a young age. His parents were divorced and his mother homeschooled him. He had no friends and no social activities that gave him any sense of connection to the world. His frustrations with his own life led him to destroy what was most precious to others. Another example would be the DC snipers, John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, who drove around the DC beltway shooting at random people, killing ten and injuring three others. They were social outcasts who acted in isolation from broader society, placing them firmly in the Loner typology.

The Lone-Follower typology describes individuals who are radicalized by following terrorist leaders — usually online — but who engage in terrorism independently, inspired by those leaders rather than directed by them. The Boston Marathon bombers are an example of Lone-Follower lone wolf terrorists. They were brothers who had been radicalized and who followed from a distance the terrorist leadership of Al-Qaeda. They were not leaders of any group, nor were they acting on orders from any specific terrorist commander. They bombed the Boston Marathon as young fanatics acting on their own, inspired by the ideology they had absorbed.

Conclusion

Lone wolf terrorism is a relatively new feature of the American security landscape. It is also a contested subject, as some researchers argue that genuine lone wolf terrorists do not exist in any meaningful sense.

While it is true that some lone wolf terrorists do operate entirely independently of any group or leader — as Stephen Paddock appeared to do in Las Vegas in 2017 — many others are inspired by or acting out of allegiance to terror cells or groups, even if they are not formal members. The Boston bombers, the Orlando nightclub shooter, and the Fort Hood shooter all exemplify this pattern. Each was motivated by a sense of belonging to a terror group they regarded as righteous. Lone wolf terrorists tend to be radicalized through the Internet, but media, peers, and social groups are all influential in that process — which is precisely why preventing lone wolf terrorism is so difficult.

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