Ukraine Crisis Through International Relations Theories

Introduction: The Ukraine Crisis in Context

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine provides an opportunity to gain insight into international relations theories. The conflict is rooted in history, particularly with respect to cultural identity. Ukraine has for much of its history been under imperial rule — either the Habsburgs or the Russians — and as such has an emerging national identity. The nation of Ukraine was created from the Ukrainian SSR when the Soviet Union collapsed. Much of its territory was occupied by ethnic Russians rather than ethnic Ukrainians, creating internal political conflict since independence. The Crimean Peninsula was especially contentious because it had only been ceded to Ukraine in the 1950s, having been Russian for a couple of centuries prior to that (Thompson, 2014).

In the wake of a political crisis in Ukraine, Russia moved its troops into Crimea and annexed the peninsula. Russia had already maintained a naval base at Sebastopol for the entire period, having leased it from Ukraine. The conflict is ongoing, with Russian troops agitating in the Russian-dominated east of the country, and an ongoing threat exists to extend Russian territorial reach through the south via Odessa to the unrecognized breakaway republic of Transnistria (The Economist, 2014).

Further backdrop to this issue is that ethnic Ukrainians have long sought closer ties with the West rather than with Moscow and are considered Western-aligned. The EU, however, is dependent on Russian natural gas, and where it should be playing a lead role in the conflict it has instead preferred silence. Thus, the conflict continues with the Ukrainian government receiving virtually no support for its territorial integrity. Some analysts have also noted NATO's conflict in Serbia against Russian-backed Slobodan Milosevic as a possible contributor to the West's inaction in Ukraine (Schlesinger, 2014).

Key Issues Driving the Conflict

Several key issues inform this problem. The first is the overt conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which has included the annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia. This is the central surface issue — not only because of Crimea but because of current Russian agitation in the east, the threat of further territory seizures in the south, and the risk that the conflict will worsen considerably before it improves.

The second issue concerns the power dynamic between the West and Russia. This has long served as a backdrop for conflict in Europe, with the current situation representing essentially an extension of the Cold War. The West holds a large sphere of influence and was drawing Ukraine into it, particularly after pro-Western leadership overthrew pro-Russian leadership a few months before the Crimea intervention. Ukraine was moving in the direction of full Western alignment — toward joining the EU and possibly NATO. This comes at a time when Russia is seeking to expand its own sphere of influence, leveraging its hydrocarbon wealth. Russia's bargaining power is currently high due to European dependence on Russian natural gas. Not only is Europe's bargaining power weak, but two costly military engagements have diminished American appetite for further conflict, making U.S. intervention — despite its lack of economic dependence on Russia — minimal. Ukraine is essentially being torn apart along the fault lines of two competing spheres of influence, with the Russian intervention motivated by Ukraine's turn toward the West.

The third issue is that of national identity. Ukrainians are among the European peoples who did not develop a strong national identity for much of their history. Under the Habsburgs they were known as Ruthenians, and their cultural homeland did not extend much beyond Kyiv, nor significantly to the south. This means the internal conflict in Ukraine is largely about ethnic identity: Russians living in the country were pro-Russia, while Ukrainians sought to assert their own national identity and were firmly pro-Ukrainian, with most favoring alignment with the West. The national identity question has significantly inflamed tensions throughout this conflict.

The fourth issue is the role of international intervention. Intervention is often employed in conflict situations by the international community. One key principle holds that internal matters should remain as such; however, in this case Russia has intervened in direct contravention of international law. The annexation of Crimea represents a clear violation of Ukraine's sovereignty, even in breach of treaties Russia itself had signed. The structural integrity of the international legal system — and the international community's capacity to enforce it — is therefore at stake in this conflict, with implications far broader than Ukraine alone.

Theoretical Frameworks: Realism vs. Neoliberalism

This conflict illustrates the collision of two distinct theories of international relations. Russia has consistently operated as a realist state, while Europe has moved strongly toward neoliberalism through the second half of the twentieth century. These competing ideologies inform our understanding of how this conflict developed and what may happen going forward. Realist ideology holds that the international system is defined by anarchy — that there is no central authority. Relations between states are governed by coercion and consent. The only variable of primary interest is state power, which states use to pursue their objectives (Slaughter, 2011).

In this instance, Russia has perceived the West as generally weak relative to its own position. As a nuclear power, Russia has always commanded some measure of strength. Its natural resources, and European dependence on Russian natural gas in particular, further increase its bargaining power. The conflict in Syria — where Russian support proved sufficient to prevent Western intervention on behalf of rebels — demonstrated to Russia that it holds considerable strategic leverage and that the West has little appetite for open confrontation. Recognizing all of this, Russia identified weakness in both Ukraine and the West, and was able to retake Crimea. Realist theory predicts this outcome clearly. Russia's bargaining power is high, and it has a specific strategic interest in Crimea, where its major naval base on the Black Sea is located. Sevastopol in particular is of critical importance as the best harbor in the region and the most direct Russian access to the Mediterranean, short of a blockade at the Bosphorus. Crimea is also approximately 70% ethnic Russian. The West was therefore likely, given these realities, to avoid intervening on the Crimea question. The larger issues now involve Eastern Ukraine and Transnistria — the latter of which sits adjacent to the EU at Romania, separated only by the narrow strip of Moldova.

Realism also explains the American position on Ukraine. Strategically, incorporating Ukraine into the EU and NATO would be advantageous, but the U.S. recognizes that going to war over the country makes little sense. From a broad geopolitical standpoint, the West wants to expand strategic influence. It may, for example, be willing to see Ukraine partitioned so that the pro-Western half can join the EU and NATO — effectively expanding Western influence as far as would otherwise have been possible. The United States sees little value in open conflict because its strategic interests in the region are insufficient to justify the risk. Even with further territorial expansion, Russia would not substantially increase its sphere of influence or overall power.

The EU, for its part, embodies neoliberal ideology. Under this framework, states remain important actors but can be subordinated to overarching governance structures, and state behavior reflects diverse individual interests rather than a single unified will. Europe's response is therefore predictable: it is willing to sacrifice Ukraine in order to preserve peace and maintain its hydrocarbon supply from Russia. The individual actors driving European policy have far more use for the status quo than they do for Ukraine. This effectively leaves the conflict to Ukrainians alone, as they are the only party with a direct interest in confronting Russia. The EU may also view the Russian-majority regions of Ukraine as fundamentally uninterested in a move westward, making the defense of their sovereignty under a pro-Western government in Kyiv a losing proposition. Neoliberal views further support internationalism — the idea that international law is governed by supranational bodies. The United Nations Security Council, for example, would theoretically have some sway over events in Ukraine. That the UNSC is effectively toothless when confronted with conflicts between the interests of permanent member states is, however, often lost in the discussion.

Conclusion

The situation in Ukraine is, in many respects, already decided. The actors involved — save perhaps the Ukrainians themselves — are quite well aware of how this will play out. Russia will take more territory, but doing so will not substantially expand its sphere of influence. The West will gain influence over a staunchly nationalist, if smaller, Ukraine. The only real uncertainty is whether Russia will interpret this moment as an opportunity to push further, which carries the genuine risk of open conflict with the West. Unlike Ukraine, EU and NATO territory is not something the West would be willing to cede — and that distinction is ultimately what contains the crisis.

References

Schlesinger, J. (2014). The problem with Ukraine's history, the Russian version. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved April 30, 2014 from http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/the-problem-with-ukraine-s-history-the-russian-version-1.2561394

Slaughter, A. (2011). International relations, principal theories. Princeton University. Retrieved April 30, 2014 from http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf

The Economist. (2014). A rising Russian tide. The Economist. Retrieved April 30, 2014 from http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/04/eastern-ukraine-0

Thompson, M. (2014). What can history teach us about the unrest in Ukraine. PBS NewsHour. Retrieved April 30, 2014 from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ukraine/