Is the War on Terrorism Justified? A Critical Analysis

Introduction: A New Kind of War

On September 11, 2001, two airliners loaded with passengers were flown into the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. This was soon followed by a similar act in Washington, D.C., that destroyed part of the Pentagon. Passengers on another plane attempted to retake it from hijackers, and that plane crashed into the Pennsylvania countryside, undoubtedly preventing a fourth attack.

By the time the second plane flew into the south tower of the World Trade Center, it was clear these were deliberate attacks. By the time the Pentagon had been struck, there was a widespread perception that the United States was at war. Spokespersons and reporters drew comparisons to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

However, there are troubling differences between the attack of December 7, 1941, and September 11, 2001—particularly in identifying who the enemy was in each situation. In 1941, there was no doubt. Japan planned the attack, sent the carriers, trained the pilots, and dropped the bombs. Japan had signed a pact with Germany and Italy, and the three countries had agreed that an attack on one was an attack on all. The United States was instantly cast into war in two theatres against three countries, and the enemy was clearly defined. As Pipes (2002) noted, "With whom, or what, is the United States at war? The answer to this question has far-reaching implications for strategy, for public diplomacy, and for foreign and domestic policy alike. It may seem that the answer is obvious; but it is not."

Since September 11, 2001, these issues have not been nearly as clear. This was the first time the United States viewed itself as being in a state of war without being at war with another country.

Certainly some form of retaliatory response, followed by a plan to prevent future assaults, was appropriate and necessary. However, one could argue that a war represents a more extended and deliberately planned response. The goal of a war is to defeat the enemy. But can we say who the enemy is in this case? If we cannot define who the enemy is, justification for acting against them seems tenuous. And if the identity of the enemy shifts over time without any new attacks, expanding the range of targets becomes questionable.

Defining the Enemy

In the first weeks after September 11, President George W. Bush repeatedly referred to the targets of the war as "evildoers" or "the evil ones" (Pipes, 2002). Eventually this was clarified to mean the Al-Qaeda terrorist network led and funded by Osama bin Laden—but this precision was blurred by the revelation that the network had cells in many countries around the world.

Those who questioned the direction the war might take fully understood the horror of September 11. They knew that nearly 3,000 people died in New York City, and they recognized that no rational person could justify attacking civilian buildings with no military significance. They also acknowledged that the attack on the Pentagon underscored that the hijackers made no such distinctions. The universally accepted standard for warfare—agreed upon by virtually all nations—holds that wars should not be initiated by sneak attacks. Pearl Harbor was not supposed to be a sneak attack, at least in technical terms.

One major concern, even in the face of the senseless horror that started this "War on Terrorism," is that no clear way has been established to define exactly who the enemy is, or how and when the war will be considered finished. This is new and uncertain territory. One can go to the library and find photographs of national leaders signing armistice documents with both Germany and Japan, signifying mutual agreement that a war was over. History books record specific dates, and those dates appear on calendars. No such moment exists for the War on Terrorism. As the fighting in Afghanistan waxed and waned, government officials debated who the next targets of military action should be. The fight against Al-Qaeda would continue; the United States was also assisting the Philippines in their fight against terrorists. But a clear focus was lacking.

One way to gain focus is to identify an individual as the face of what is being fought against. In World War II, Hitler served that role. As Stephen (2001) observed, we still tend to focus national anger on individuals: "A couple of decades ago, the man every American loved to hate was Colonel Gaddafi; ten years later, it was Saddam Hussein; now Osama Bin Laden is the devil incarnate about whom every American has become an instant expert, courtesy of CNN."

The Challenge of Victory

Even Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld acknowledged that it was unrealistic to believe the United States would eliminate terrorism "from the face of the earth" (Pipes, 2002). Victory in this war has been described as an environment in which Americans can live in freedom, in a country where others cannot "adversely affect our way of life" (Pipes, 2002). As Pipes noted, that is "hardly an objective to hand to a general and say, 'Accomplish this'" (2002).

President Bush and other government spokespersons stated repeatedly that the terrorists in Afghanistan and their protectors would not be the only targets. Yet defining what success would look like—and when it would be achieved—remained elusive. Without a clear endpoint, the justification for continued and expanded military action becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.

The Case for Military Action in Afghanistan

The United States government did a creditable job of identifying the enemy as precisely as possible given the circumstances. There were, of course, no identifying marks on the planes used in the attacks. Military leaders could not simply observe and conclude, "Those are Al-Qaeda warplanes—now we know who to attack." Nevertheless, the government built a strong case that the Al-Qaeda terrorist network was responsible for the attacks.

Because of ongoing intelligence work regarding terrorist organizations, it was already known that Al-Qaeda was training and operating freely in Afghanistan. The military goal was never to conquer Afghanistan as a country, but to destroy Al-Qaeda's camps there. As more intelligence was gathered, it became evident that Al-Qaeda and the ruling government of Afghanistan—the Taliban—were so tightly intertwined that both had to be removed (Pipes, 2002).

This goal was largely achieved, though fighting continued. Pockets of Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters remained in Afghanistan, and the stated intent was to eliminate them entirely. It is well documented that Osama bin Laden planned the attacks, making action against his Al-Qaeda network defensible by any standard. The Taliban did everything in their power to prevent retaliation for those attacks and, as it emerged, had remained in power largely because bin Laden financed them. Most observers rapidly concluded that the Taliban, too, was a legitimate military target. As Albom (2001) observed of the terrorists who attacked the United States, "We are dealing with an enemy that speaks only the language of death." Negotiation was never a viable option.

Conclusion: Justification Requires Clarity

The government expressed interest in expanding the war to Iraq. On October 9, Rumsfeld was asked whether the United States would attack countries in addition to Afghanistan. His response was direct: "I have no doubt in my mind." The public was told repeatedly that the war would not be restricted to Afghanistan. Yet the country waited for clear reasons to act against any additional nation—the same quality of evidence that had justified the campaign in Afghanistan.

This does not argue against the War on Terrorism. It argues only for prudence and for the capacity to provide compelling reasons for future actions. The initial military response to the September 11 attacks was justified. Whether that justification extends to broader and as yet undefined future campaigns remains an open and critically important question.

Bibliography

Albom, Mitch. Oct. 15, 2001. "Battle Must be Joined as Surely as Peace." Los Angeles Business Journal.

Author not available. Dec. 2001. "Iraq, Anthrax, and the Hawks." The Progressive.

Pipes, Daniel. Jan. 2002. "Who Is the Enemy? (Analysis of United States War on Terrorism)." Commentary Magazine.

Stephen, Andrew. Sept. 24, 2001. "The War that Bush Cannot Win." New Statesman.