Human Rights and Poverty

¶ … Moral Obligation to Help Reduce World Poverty There is little doubt that global poverty is a significant issue, creating hardship and suffering for many people. The statistics are astounding; every day 34,000 children under the age of five years die due to poverty, this equates to 11 million children a year (Eskelinen 11). Furthermore, 1,000 million people lack access to clean drinking water (Ord 178), and 2,000 million people lack access to essential drugs.(Pogge 1).

The statistics are not in question, and clearly demonstrate the harm of poverty, but the reactions of those who have resources that could be used to help is a more controversial; what moral obligations should exist. It is the argument of this paper that there should be, and is, a moral obligation on the rich to help the poor. Philosophers such as Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge have written on this issue.

Singer argues that there is a clear obligation to help the poor, but notes that many people place a greater importance on helping those in their home nation states rather than those in other countries due to the presence of reciprocity (Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization 169). Pogge notes that while governments pay lip service paid to global poverty, the rhetoric does not sufficiently transform into meaningful actions (Pogge 2).

In both cases it is apparent that the populations' perceive the concept of helping to poor as a humanitarian or charitable act, not as a way of providing social justice, or the result of moral obligations (Pogge 2). Indeed, there appears to be a purposeful approach in which governments are avoiding the acceptance of a moral obligation to alleviating poverty.

At the World Food Summit, the US government declared "the attainment of any 'right to adequate food' or 'fundamental right to be free from hunger' is a goal or aspiration to be realized progressively that does not give rise to any international obligations" (Pogge 3). This is a very clear statement of intent, while the government accept there is a need for improvement, there is a clear rejection of the presence of a moral obligation. The underlying approach is that human rights only concern negative rather than positive actions (Pogge 3).

This may be seen as a shield for governments and the rich, who may argue that in gaining their wealth they have not caused others to be poor (Pogge 3). If they have not caused the problem, this approach to human rights undermines the perception of any obligation existing to rectify or adjust the situation (Pogge 3).

When looking at this scenario, it may be argued that there is some merit to the argument, especially when it is applied to individuals rather than nations states; why should one person, who has worked hard for their income, be morally required to give some of it away to rectify income inequality? Indeed, many may argue that the actions of one person, especially if those actions result on only a modest level of income redistributed will make very little difference.

However, on a larger scale, where more people aid, or governments make a significant contribution, there is a much greater potential to make a difference. However, this can still be considered in the context of humanitarian aid and charity, rather than a moral obligation associated with social justice. Singer looks at this from a different perspective, stating that "If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it" (Singer "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" 231).

This article was written in response to the famine in Bengal, to support more international aid (Ord 182). The call was placed into a context with the argument that if one is walking past a shallow pond, and sees a child drowning, there is a clear moral obligation to save the child; the action does not put the passer-by at any risk, and results in the saving of a life (Singer 231).

This is referred to as the principle of sacrifice, it would be judged wrong to allow the child to drown, as failing to make a relatively small sacrifice prevents a very bad thing from occurring (Ord 179). The analogy can easily be applied to the situation of world poverty, in this instance the child in the shallow pond are the 34,000 children dying everyday due to poverty, with the action of the passer-by being the provision of a donation, which would result in only an insignificant loss to the donor.

Of course, if this is applied on only a small scale, the difference made is minimal. However, if it becomes a moral obligation, the action is undertaken by many millions of people in the developed world, the scale of the aid would result in significant poverty alleviation. The application of the sacrifice principle would also allow for repeated donations to be made, until the point where donating money would become a real sacrifice (Ord 183).

With the amount of wealth in the developed world, maybe argued that the point of alleviation is likely to occur before significant hardship is suffered. In an interesting variation, Singer also looked at the way in which major donations have been made by donors such as Warren Buffet and his $31 billion donation, and the $30 billion from Bill and Melinda Gates (Singer, "What Should a Billionaire Give - and What Should You?" 2).

In this article there is a recognition that had these billionaires given at a much earlier stage in their careers, they may not have been able to make such a large donation, and the donation may have hindered the business development, potentially leading to a passion where the level of wealth created may have been reduced. In other words, by the current billionaires being allowed to keep and invest their money they.