Spanish Irish relations in the sixteenth century

Spanish-Irish Relations (17th Century)

To give some historical perspective to the battle / siege at Kinsale in 1601, it should be pointed out that the English pretty well controlled Ireland at that time. Author Paul State explains that Queen Elizabeth had attempted to put a stranglehold on Ireland going back ten years. Indeed by the 1590s, England had succeeded in "subduing Ireland, with one outstanding exception," and that was the heartland -- the province of Ulster (State, 2009, p. 104). Ulster remained Gaelic in its culture and government, and the most powerful families in Ulster were the O'Neill family and the O'Donnell family, allies to be sure and in the eyes of the English they were a huge threat.

Queen Elizabeth worried about the Ulster "lords" (i.e., O'Neill and O'Donnell) breaching English security in the rest of the country. On page 105 State explains that by 1595 Hugh O'Neill had rallied other rebel forces from around Ireland, believing that "…in the end, only by expelling the English from the entire island could he make his title secure." Hence, attacking the English with "musketmen, cavalrymen, and pikemen in imitation of the English," along with "gallowglasses from Scotland" (gallowglasses were mercenary warriors), O'Neill ambushed and harassed the columns of English soldiers (State, 105).

The greatest victory that O'Neill can claim credit for was the defeat of the English at Yellow Ford on August 14, 1598, at which point the English fully recognized the "formidable opponent they faced," State explains (106). An angry Queen Elizabeth sent an army of 17,000 soldiers -- led by Sir Robert Devereux -- to Ireland in April 1599 but that force was not effective, meeting "defeat on every occasion," State continues. When the Queen sent Baron Mountjoy and his forces in 1600, he used "…ruthless, scorched-earth tactics" such as "burning crops and houses" to attack the rebels led by O'Neill.

Meantime Philip IV of Spain -- a long time enemy of the British -- decided to intervene on behalf of the Irish Gaelic rebels. When Philip's forces arrived at Kinsale, O'Neill's rebel ally O'Donnell marched south to Kinsale to protect the Spaniards from the English forces that were led by Baron Mountjoy. The bottom line, according to State (106) is that on Christmas Eve, 1601, O'Neill and O'Donnell's forces together could not beat Mountjoy's troops; even though Mountjoy's forces were battling the Spaniards and the Irish rebels simultaneously, Mountjoy was able to "completely defeat both Irish and Spanish" (106). The following narrative describes the Kinsale battle in detail.

The Siege at Kinsale

The Spaniards arrived at the Irish port at Kinsale on the 21st of September in 1601. Their visit was not a friendly one since they were there to attack the English on behalf of the rebels under O'Neill. The Spaniards arrived with twenty-eight ships and 3,300 men, led by General Don Juan del Aquila. Their arrival was not altogether a surprise because in June 1601, Irish intelligence had spotted up to 5,000 Spanish soldiers gathered at Lisbon, Portugal (Spain controlled the entire Iberian Peninsula at that time). The twenty-eight ships were actually a whittled down version of the armada that had in fact sailed from Portugal to Ireland; a terrible storm had driven an additional thousand soldiers back to Portugal, according to John McGurk (McGurk, 2001, p. 16).

McGurk reports that the Spaniards had not intended to make port at Kinsale -- not at all. They had been aiming to land at Killybegs, Galway or Limerick, and Kinsale "…was never mentioned for, of all the Munster ports, it was the worst choice" to battle back against an attack from the British (McGurk, 16). Kinsale was located in a hollow with "poor walls" but the Spaniards had landed in that spot due to the viciousness of the storms. But there was no beefed-up garrison of English military at Kinsale, in fact the small garrison that had been there "fled" and that left an open door for the Spaniards, McGurk continues (16).

Meanwhile the leader of the Irish rebellion was, as mentioned above, O'Neill, who was fearful at that time of leaving Ulster without protection; hence he had not brought his troops south to the port where the Irish had suspected the Spanish fleet would land. Meanwhile English Lord Deputy Mountjoy "…locked up the Spaniards in Kinsale, seized the forts around the harbour, and sealed off the haven," McGurk explains on page 17. In doing so, Mountjoy had left important strategic locations in Ireland unprotected, a risk, but that notwithstanding, O'Neill and "his ally O'Donnell" -- whom Mountjoy had referred to as "the two vipers of the kingdom" -- eventually came south, McGurk continues, to battle the English. Seeing he was in need of reinforcements to stave off Mountjoy, del Aquila asked the Spanish leadership for more men, more ships, more food, munitions and money.

Author John J. Silke writes that del Aguila's request for more men and supplies was met with a positive answer by Philip, but on the other hand, "…How was a bankrupt Spain to do so?" (Silke, 1965, p. 308). Funds needed by del Aquila were also needed desperately by Spain's soldiers in Lisbon, who were "in sore want" themselves (Silke, 308). Moreover, Silke explains that Aquila's pleading for resources apparently was justified because Aquila's troops (now only 2,500 men) were "…ill-clad and ill-fed" and they were "…falling sick every day" (308).

According to McGurk, on October 23, 1601 -- three weeks after the Spaniards had arrived -- O'Donnell set out for Kinsale, and a week later O'Neill also led his forces south to Kinsale. By the time O'Neill and O'Donnell joined forces in Brandonbridge (December 15), the reinforcements that del Aquila had requested from Spain had arrived. Mountjoy had been relentlessly bombarding the Spanish at Kinsale, but when O'Neill arrived with more than 4,000 horse and foot soldiers, and O'Donnell showed up with 4,000-foot and 3,000 cavalry -- and Captain Richard Tyrrell of Brenockton, County Westmeath arrived with 600 veteran soldiers -- the bombardment ceased temporarily (McGurk, 18).

It should be mentioned that for Mountjoy and his military -- plus the other English commander, the Earl of Thomond -- the winter had taken a severe toll. Mountjoy's army of 7,000 "…was being wasted by cold, sickness, and desertion" and his horses and men had not received adequate nutrition in the bitter, 10-week siege (McGurk, 18). Given that reality, and the fact that the arrival of O'Neill and O'Donnell had virtually cut off Mountjoy's forces "between the Spaniards and the Irish," it seemed a fortuitous time for the Irish rebels to attack the struggling English contingents, McGurk explains on page 18. So by abandoning his "customary caution" O'Neill agreed with O'Donnell that it would be bold but a worthy strategy to attack both English encampments simultaneously (McGurk, 18).

Hence, on Christmas Eve morning, 1601, the strategy was for Tyrrell to position his 600 men near the Earl of Thomond's camp, and when a musket was fired (the pre-determined signal), that sound was intended for de Aquila's men to "…sally forth to meet them in the attack" ("sally forth," or "sally out" means a sudden surprise attack) (McGurk, 19). At that time, the main force of Irish rebels was supposed to attack Mountjoy and his forces in the second English encampment. According to McGurk's account of the dynamics on that day, there was a "lack of unity" between O'Neill and O'Donnell; that is, O'Neill would have preferred to starve Mountjoy's forces out, isolate them and expose them to "famine and exposure" rather than attack right away (19).

At dawn on Christmas Eve day, Mountjoy's scouts spotted O'Neill's troops prior to Tyrrell having a chance to get into position for de Aquila to "sally out of the town"; hence, Tyrrell's forces stayed where they were and now Mountjoy could dictate the strategy. A series of moves and counter-moves by both sides ensued, with the Spaniards still holding fast -- de Aquila deciding not to sally out -- and O'Neill joining forces with Tyrrell while O'Donnell in the rear, "sharp musketry engagements followed" (McGurk, 19). Incidentally, Silke explains on page 310 that del Aguila said he was "…fearing an English trap" hence he had "not come out to join the battle" (Silke, 10).

Mountjoy's strategy to get O'Neill out in the open ground was the perfect move, and in time, "after a sharp fight," O'Neill "fled the field" and his troops were followed by the English cavalry as they retreated. The English "butchered them without mercy for a mile and a half," McGurk explains (20). As for Tyrrell's forces, they did attempt to help O'Neill but saw the futility in that effort so they retreated as well. When O'Donnell's saw the carnage being visited upon O'Neill, they were "demoralized" and notwithstanding their leader's commands "…to turn and fight" they fled (McGurk, 20).

The body count -- taken by Mountjoy's secretary, Fynes Moryson -- added up to 1,200 Irish rebel bodies "dead in the field" -- and that was apart from the slaughtered troops in O'Neill's regiment that perished in the two mile chase (McGurk, 20). About 140 Irish rebels were drowned as they tried to cross the Blackwater, and another 200 Irish were "lost in the river Moy and at Owen Abbey" (McGurk, 20). The defeat of the Irish rebels took just two hours, according to McGurk's reckoning, and clearly the English had prevailed which made Mountjoy a hero because so many previous English attacks had failed. Notwithstanding their victory, the English lost a reported 8,000 men (some by sword, others because of hunger, disease and the bitter cold winter in Ireland) (McGurk, 20).

In addition to the bloodshed and the embarrassment of the beating the Irish took, there were unanswered questions left behind, McGurk notes. Was that battle at Kinsale the official end "…of the Gaelic order in Ireland?" And was the Spanish effort so half-hearted that it really amounted to a fraud -- too little, too late? (McGurk, 21). The question regarding del Aquila seems the most pertinent in the aftermath of the routing the Irish took: "Was not Don Juan del Aquila a cowardly and incompetent commander?" Another good question in hindsight is, was O'Neill forced into an "unequal and inevitably fatal struggle" due in part to the failure of the Spanish commander to hold up his end of the bargain? (McGurk, 21).

The answers to these questions depends on which historian is providing the narrative, but it does seem that two things happened that tipped the scales toward Mountjoy's forces. One, del Aquila did indeed fail to provide the support he was sent there to provide, albeit the facts show that his men were not fed properly nor were they clothed comfortably in the brutal cold Irish winter. And two, the decisions O'Neill made at dawn on Christmas Eve -- having his forces, along with O'Donnell's forces, attack Mountjoy at the same time -- were not, in hindsight, the strategically wisest.

Back in Spain following the defeat at Kinsale, del Aquila offered "three causes" as to why things turned out as they did. One, he assured Philip that is was indeed possible to "take any port in Ireland" but it was "not possible to defend it with an undermanned expeditionary force" like he had in Kinsale (McGurk, 21). Secondly, del Aquila claimed his second in command, Zubiaur, did not obey orders to "join O'Neill"; and thirdly, del Aquila asserted that when Admiral Brochero (the Spanish commander at sea) returned to Spain from Kinsale with the transport ships, he had plenty of time to come back "…with reinforcements" for the del Aquila part of the strategy, but he did not come back (McGurk, 21).