Bahrain's February 14 Movement: Threat Assessment
This paper examines Bahrain's February 14 Movement, an anti-government opposition group that emerged from the 2011 Arab Spring protests. It evaluates whether the movement merits classification as a terrorist organization, as the Bahraini government contends, or whether it is better understood as a pro-democracy advocacy group. The paper surveys the movement's origins, organizational structure, stated objectives, and alleged activities, while also analyzing U.S. strategic interests in Bahrain — particularly the presence of the Fifth Fleet. The paper concludes with policy recommendations urging the United States to maintain neutrality, refrain from formally designating the movement as a terrorist group, and quietly strengthen security around its naval assets without direct intervention in Bahrain's domestic affairs.
- Introduction: Origins and political context of the movement
- Mission of the Movement: Goals, structure, alleged activities, and credibility of claims
- U.S. Interests in Bahrain: Fifth Fleet, oil, and sectarian risk to U.S. assets
- Policy Recommendations: U.S. neutrality and quiet security upgrades advised
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What makes this paper effective
- It maintains a clear analytical stance throughout — skepticism toward the Bahraini government's terrorism designation — and consistently supports that stance with available evidence and source credibility assessments.
- The paper effectively contextualizes a domestic opposition movement within broader geopolitical considerations, linking Bahraini sectarian politics to U.S. strategic interests without overstating the connection.
- It explicitly acknowledges the limits of available evidence, particularly the unreliability of Bahraini state media as a source, which adds intellectual honesty and credibility to the analysis.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates source criticism as an analytical tool. Rather than accepting all cited sources at face value, it evaluates their credibility — distinguishing between state propaganda and independent reporting — and adjusts its conclusions accordingly. This is especially evident in the treatment of Bahrain News Agency claims versus independent assessments.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with background on Bahrain's political context and the movement's origins, then moves into an assessment of the movement's mission and alleged activities. A dedicated section addresses U.S. strategic interests and the potential threat the movement could pose to American assets. The paper closes with concrete, tiered policy recommendations — ranging from maintaining neutrality to quietly upgrading Fifth Fleet security — grounded in the preceding analysis.
Introduction
The February 14 Movement is an anti-government political movement in Bahrain. The Bahraini government has placed the group on its list of terrorist organizations (Saeed, 2014), a move not mirrored by the United States or its allies. The group began in 2011 as part of the February 14th uprising, which was itself part of the broader Arab Spring movement. The group comprises a range of pro-democracy advocates and protesters, and its efforts are primarily focused on political reform in Bahrain. By all appearances, it seems rather disingenuous to call the February 14 Movement a terrorist group, as it is neither an organization with a formal structure, nor is it engaged in terrorist acts.
Bahrain is an absolute monarchy, run by the al-Khalifa family. The family has come under criticism from observers for human rights violations on numerous occasions, and it has a reputation for using brutal tactics to repress opposition (Fisk, 1996). This repression is combined with diverse ethnicity among native Bahrainis to create a situation of simmering tensions. The ruling class are Sunni, while most Bahrainis are Shia. The Shia are split among those of Arab and Persian descent, and a similar divide applies to the Sunni population. There are very small Christian and Jewish native communities, as well as a large immigrant population. The political issues surrounding the February 14 Movement are largely concentrated among native Bahrainis.
Several anti-government movements exist in Bahrain, reflecting the interests of different disadvantaged groups. While Bahrain overall is considered a high-income country due to its oil wealth, Sunni Arabs hold a disproportionate share of wealth and political power. The Arab Spring gave rise to street protests across the region, and many Bahraini opposition figures took the opportunity to agitate for political change within their own country — an objective that most opposition figures had pursued long before 2011. It was in this milieu that the February 14 Movement, named for the protests that first broke out on February 14, 2011, rose to prominence from among the many opposition movements.
Mission of the Movement
The February 14 Movement has as its stated goal "to bring down the regime of Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa," and there are claims that the group has sought to acquire explosive devices for this purpose (TRAC, 2015). The group is shadowy, as are many opposition groups in Bahrain, given the brutal and omnipresent nature of the country's security apparatus. The movement's principals are unknown. Members organize using modern telecommunications and social media, which allows them to act more quickly. Their primary activities, beginning in 2011, are to agitate against the Bahraini regime and organize protests. Among the largest of these are those held on the anniversary of the initial mass protests on February 14 (Al Jazeera, 2015). If a formal power structure exists within the group, it is not known. The February 14 Movement is more reasonably classified as a fluid opposition movement. The goal remains consistent, and many of the participants are doubtless the same, but the group's tactics and operating style may be quite flexible.
The nature of the movement's objectives aligns it with the main opposition party, al-Wefaq, and its leader Sheikh Ali Salman. Other groups active in the country include the Ashtar Brigade and Saraya al-Muqawama. Al-Ashtar claimed responsibility for a bombing that killed three policemen, but that did not stop the Bahraini government from placing three opposition groups on its terror list and continuing its crackdown on all dissidents (Saeed, 2014).
Despite being aligned with groups that have claimed terrorist acts, and despite reports circulating about February 14 Movement members seeking to acquire explosives, there is no evidence that this group has ever committed a terrorist act, nor that it has targets beyond the al-Khalifa regime.
Bahraini state media — not exactly a reliable source — has linked members of the February 14 Movement to terrorist acts inside the country. Among them were a bombing in Hamad Town that left one Bahraini dead, a Manama bombing on November 5, 2012, that killed two Asian guest workers, and an attack on a warehouse at a Hyundai facility. Bahraini state media (BNA, 2013) specifically attributes significant ties to foreign countries, arguing that many leaders of the movement are based overseas — specifically in the UK, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran — where they raise funds. It is further argued that one of the movement's main leaders is Hadi al-Madrasi, who has promoted sectarian division (BNA, 2013).
The loose and relatively informal structure of the movement presents challenges for Bahraini authorities. They note that many of the movement's leaders operate outside the country and hint that foreign governments might be involved in lending support to the group. However, the sources making these claims function as little more than propaganda arms of the state and, as such, cannot be taken seriously in the absence of genuine evidence.
References
Al Jazeera. (2015). Protests mark fourth anniversary of Bahrain uprising. Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 19, 2015 from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/protests-mark-fourth-anniversary-bahrain-uprising-150214074700114.html
BNA. (2013). February 14 terrorist organization exposed. Bahrain News Agency. Retrieved March 19, 2015 from http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/565326
Fisk, R. (1996). Briton at the heart of Bahrain's brutality rule. The Independent. Retrieved March 19, 2015 from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/briton-at-the-heart-of-bahrains-brutality-rule-1319571.html
Saeed, F. (2014). Bahrain puts three groups on terrorism list after bomb kills three police. Reuters. Retrieved March 19, 2015 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-bahrain-unrest-idUSBREA231FC20140304
Shadid, A. (2011). In rubble-strewn Sitra, faces of Bahrain's uprising. The New York Times.
TRAC. (2015). February 14 movement/youth coalition. Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. Retrieved March 19, 2015 from http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/february-14-movementyouth-coalition
Wehrey, F. (2014). Ominous divide: Shiite Iran vs. Sunni Gulf. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved March 19, 2015 from
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