Saudi Arabia vs. Iran: The New Cold War Proxy Conflict

Introduction

Debates over the rightful succession to Muhammad have spawned centuries of ideological and physical battles between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Although not the only source of conflict in the Middle East and Western Asia, the Sunni/Shia divide has undergirded political turmoil throughout the region. Cleavages between Sunni and Shia parallel other geopolitical problems, both within individual nation-states and between them.

A current manifestation of this centuries-old clash is the proxy war taking place between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. Referred to as a "new Cold War," these proxy wars carry tremendous geopolitical implications beyond the immediately affected regions (Saxena & Dews, 2014). As Saxena and Dews (2014) point out, there is far more to the proxy wars than the Sunni-Shia ideological divide alone. Religious fervor and fanaticism certainly fuel commitment to various groups and causes; yet conventional political realism is more likely what motivates Iran and Saudi Arabia. Quite simply, regional instability creates power vacuums, and Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two dominant Muslim powers. Just as the United States and the Soviet Union were the two political poles during the Cold War, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two poles in this new Cold War.

That cold war is now heating up, threatening to escalate into a more direct confrontation between nation-states. Lebanon — long considered a barometer of the region and internally divided along Sunni and Shia lines — has been destabilized by the resignation of its Prime Minister. While some of the Iran-Saudi proxy conflicts appear to be regional sectarian disputes, the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri was overtly and directly connected to the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Malley, 2017). Indeed, Fraihat (2017) argues that all recent conflicts in the Middle East — "whether in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen" — share a "common factor" in the "rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia" (p. 1).

The rivalry manifests in sectarian violence — for example, in Yemen, where Shia Houthi rebels are engaged in an ongoing conflict. On the surface, the conflict appears to concern only the Houthis and Yemen. However, when sources of funding and clerical alliances are traced, it becomes clear that Tehran backs Shia rebel groups precisely like the Houthis and Hezbollah. When such rebel groups become firmly established in official positions of power within nation-states — as Hezbollah has in Lebanon — the conflict could potentially draw in the entire world.

Whenever instability emerges within the boundaries of an official nation-state, as with the recent resignation of the Lebanese Prime Minister, the resulting power vacuum enables Iran and Saudi Arabia to move in and establish dominance. This pattern has persisted since the Arab Spring, during which both Iran and Saudi Arabia have attempted to exploit power vacuums throughout the region by funding proxy conflicts in newly destabilized areas (Fraihat, 2017). The hot spots include Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria.

Iran and Saudi Arabia are acting in politically and economically expedient ways to serve their own interests. These two nations are both causing and capitalizing on regional destabilization. The central hypothesis of this paper is that special interest groups within each nation have been funding non-state actors to achieve political goals. Using various instruments of power — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic — Saudi Arabia and Iran are attempting to build new regional alliances. Given the global implications of the conflict, including the disaster in Syria and the pending destabilization of Lebanon, improved international diplomacy strategies are imperative (Cotter, 2017). A further hypothesis advanced here is that Saudi Arabia and Iran are actively subverting the very concept and structure of the nation-state in order to achieve their goals.

Methods

Without access to classified documents, it is impossible to prove these hypotheses with empirical certainty. However, it is possible to present circumstantial evidence that both Saudi Arabia and Iran are subverting the modern nation-state concept. Examples include government officials indirectly funding terrorist organizations through either faith-based or private-sector intermediaries. Where paper trails are unavailable, the evidence is drawn from published literature, including scholarly sources, think-tank analyses, and official government sources. Media sources may also be useful for additional contextual analysis.

Particular attention will be paid to the ties between the official governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia and regional terrorist groups. These alliances are often difficult to prove because funds are diverted through informal networks of middlemen. Alliances between heads of state and non-state actors represent the most critical strategic element of the proxy wars. Any available literature on Iran-Hezbollah connections, or between Saudi Arabia and ISIS, will further bolster this research. A deeper understanding of the issues surrounding the New Cold War is expected to contribute to more informed and pragmatic foreign policy.

Literature Review

This review of the literature explores prevailing political analysis of the New Cold War, contributing to the discussion by offering suggestions for future research and public policy. Thus far, American foreign policy has remained indecisive regarding the New Cold War. Writing for the Council on Foreign Relations, Khurshid (2013) points out that close economic and political ties to Saudi Arabia have generally led the United States to side more with Riyadh. Saudi Arabia had been supporting many of the regimes that fell during the Arab Spring — regimes that, while brutal, maintained a degree of political stability in North Africa (Khurshid, 2013). In Foreign Affairs, Miller and Brodsky (2017) note that more recent American policy has been relatively conciliatory toward Iran, which has in turn exacerbated tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Feeling sidelined, Saudi Arabia has been "acting uncharacteristically boldly" in Yemen and actively supporting anti-Assad Sunni groups — "some of which are close to al Qaeda" — especially in Syria (Miller & Brodsky, 2017).

Iran, on the other hand, officially supports Assad as well as Hezbollah in Lebanon, a position that contributed to the resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri on November 4, 2017. Malley (2017) describes Lebanon as a "testing ground for periodic bouts of Saudi-Iranian coexistence" (p. 1). In a Brookings Institution (Saban Center for Middle East Policy) analysis paper, Abdo (2013) demonstrates how Lebanon and Bahrain, in addition to Syria and Yemen, have become critical battlegrounds for proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Like Khurshid (2013), Abdo (2013) suggests the results of the proxy wars could entail a redrawing of geopolitical boundaries. The long-term indirect effects extend beyond map changes to include ongoing threats to security in Europe and North America, backlash against Muslim communities on both continents, and instability driven by disagreements over immigration and border policy (Khurshid, 2013).

To address these immediate issues, Dubowitz and Takeyh (2017) argue that the United States should designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization, placing it alongside Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS. Nevertheless, dialogue remains the solution most analysts recommend. Abdo (2013) stresses the importance of the United States serving as a mediator, engaging allies such as Bahrain first through a form of proxy diplomacy before facilitating more direct talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Fraihat (2017) similarly states, "As difficult as it is for Iran and Saudi Arabia to speak to one another, this is still the best way for both powers to avoid war" (p. 1). In addition to high-level diplomacy, practical tactics may include working directly with sectarian communities in affected regions. Carpenter's (2014) analysis of Sunni, Shia, and mixed neighborhoods in Iraq shows that collective agency and local organization build community resilience and prevent infiltration by external agents aligned with either Iran or Saudi Arabia. The literature thus provides ample circumstantial evidence to support the hypothesis that Iran and Saudi Arabia are subverting state power by relying on non-state actors as proxies in their ongoing fight for regional dominance.

The literature also illustrates that the methods and tactics employed in the proxy wars span financial, political, and military strategies. In Syria and Bahrain, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have deployed forces on the ground (Abdo, 2013; Khurshid, 2013). In Yemen, Saudi Arabia has relied heavily on airborne attacks (Khurshid, 2013). In 2015, tensions escalated when Iran attempted to violate a Saudi-backed blockade by landing aircraft in Yemen, prompting Saudi Arabia to destroy airport runways in retaliation (Fraihat, 2016).

Financial assistance to sectarian groups is what makes the New Cold War a true proxy conflict — one in which the actual fighters unofficially represent the principles and ideologies of Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. The literature confirms that both nations have sent billions of dollars to various groups serving their political and economic interests, particularly in Syria (Khurshid, 2013). Cyberattacks are also becoming an increasingly integral tool. Wehrey (2012) notes that Iran has already launched successful cyberattacks on Saudi Arabian business interests by assisting Shia groups within Saudi Arabia to carry them out.

One reason sectarian groups have been so willing to fight these proxy wars is that marginalized minority communities in many Middle Eastern nation-states face systematic discrimination. This existing motivation for uprising makes it relatively easy for Iran and Saudi Arabia to recruit supporters and arm proxy fighters. In a Foreign Affairs article, Wehrey (2012) notes that even within Saudi Arabia, Shia communities experience economic and political marginalization, though internal uprisings in the kingdom are readily suppressed. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia fund local groups sympathetic to their respective causes, even as ideology likely serves as a distraction from the underlying political and economic drivers of the proxy wars.

Many susceptible countries exhibit what amounts to a form of apartheid, in which "political power is held by a sectarian minority" (Khurshid, 2013). Bahrain is often highlighted in the literature as a near-perfect illustration of this problem: the ruling Al Khalifa family is not only Sunni but maintains "strong ties to Saudi Arabia," while governing a Shia majority comprising 70–75% of the population (Mabon, 2012, p. 84). Bahrain's geographic location also makes it vulnerable to interference from both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Were Iran to successfully arm the Shia majority in Bahrain, the consequences could extend well beyond Bahrain's borders, threatening Saudi Arabia's own domestic security. Significantly, Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province contains "the majority of Saudi oil reserves," yet the Shia population there "has yet to benefit economically" (Wehrey, 2012, p. 1). Social and political instability create dangerous conditions for the escalation of sectarian violence.

Conclusion

Since the Arab Spring, the proxy wars between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran have gone far beyond the centuries-old Sunni/Shia divide. Although religious ideology continues to be invoked to demonize the opponent, the stakes are considerably higher than sectarian righteousness. Access to strategic oil reserves, for example, fuels the ongoing discord that produces terrorism, sectarian violence, and outright war. The implications of the proxy wars are far-reaching and demand further diligent research.

As analysts across the political spectrum have noted, dialogue and diplomatic engagement between Saudi Arabia and Iran represent the most viable path toward de-escalation. Understanding the underlying economic and political motivations — not merely the sectarian rhetoric — is essential for crafting effective foreign policy responses. The international community, and the United States in particular, must engage with this conflict in its full complexity if lasting stability in the region is to be achieved.