Prisoner's Dilemma and the Fight Against Global Warming

Introduction: Global Warming as a Political and Social Problem

Global warming has reached alarming levels, and governments from all over the world need to gather in a united front to fight the process. Sooner or later, all countries will be obliged to enter this fight, leaving all divergences and competing interests aside, as global warming affects everyone to varying degrees. While some might expect that the largest difficulties in fighting global warming involve financial and technical factors, the problem actually depends more on political and social factors.

All domains are known to be affected by global warming, with economic and social stability being destabilized by the fact that Earth's temperature is constantly rising. Even though the global warming process accelerated in the second half of the twentieth century with advances in technology and industry, people have raised questions about the Earth undergoing a warming process ever since the end of the nineteenth century.

The solution to the problem of global warming is, in principle, clear: major international players must voluntarily set aside their present concerns in favor of cooperating with one another in order to slow and eventually stop global warming. The process is advancing slowly but surely, and there is no other solution but for countries all over the globe to get actively involved in the fight against it. Climate change will inevitably occur in the long term, as global warming cannot be stopped immediately — even if all countries were to decide simultaneously to take part in fighting it. However, most are reluctant to do so, especially after observing that others are not expressing interest in solving the problem.

Apparently, there is little use in attempting to punish a country because it is unwilling to join the fight against global warming. Instead, in order to get other countries to cooperate, some must discover what behavior they can display so as to convince others to change their position on the subject.

The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Logic of Cooperation

Two individuals are most likely to refuse to cooperate in a situation that requires them to set their own interests aside. What is more troubling is that these two individuals would probably continue to refuse even when they learn that their cooperation would prove beneficial for both of them.

Game theory contains a foundational problem called the Prisoner's Dilemma, which involves several players who are given the chance to cooperate in order for all of them to gain benefits from the act. Nevertheless, this structure also makes it possible for a certain player to take advantage of the others, or for none of the players to take action (Axelrod, 1984, p. viii).

The Prisoner's Dilemma is best explained through the example involving two persons arrested by the police. The police do not have enough evidence to convict the two and resort to offering the same deal to both of them. The prisoners are presented with the choice of either turning their accomplice in or remaining silent. If both remain silent, they receive only a minor sentence; if they both testify against each other, they are both convicted. If one chooses to testify while the other remains silent, the one who testified is set free while the other serves the full sentence. The prisoners are tempted to turn each other in, as the police assure them that their testimonies will remain secret until the investigation is over (Cline, 1992, p. 325).

One of the key elements of the Prisoner's Dilemma is that, until the round finishes, none of the players knows what the others have done. Even so, each prisoner is aware that if he or she defects, they would receive the highest individual benefit. The problem is that if both choose to turn the other in, they both end up far worse than if they had cooperated.

If all the players in a game choose to cooperate, they will all be rewarded with significant benefits. However, even though cooperation produces the highest collective outcome, it also carries the highest individual risk: a player who cooperates alone may end up with the lowest score. In reality, it is genuinely difficult to determine when it is the right time to cooperate and when it is not. Selfishness always seems to be the safer way out of any situation.

As in any game, most players can observe the actions performed by their opponents in previous rounds. These past actions can influence one's moves in subsequent rounds. It is natural for players to be less inclined to cooperate, as they are mainly interested in their own outcomes rather than in the well-being of their opponents. Of course, cooperation would be tempting if players knew it would reliably bring benefits.

Since early history, people have been convinced that cooperation is unlikely to occur in a world dominated by self-interested individuals. The absence of any central authority to enforce collective behavior only reinforces this conviction. People are primarily interested in their own concerns; only secondarily do they attend to the interests of others. Even though self-interest partially crowds out cooperation, it is also well established that cooperation has occurred repeatedly throughout history and that civilization itself is largely owed to it.

In Axelrod's view, one of the most compelling — if admittedly subjective — explanations of cooperation is offered by Thomas Hobbes. The English philosopher held that selfishness is a fundamental feature of humanity and that it was held in check only with the appearance of governments. In his view, cooperation cannot occur without a central authority to control the population (Axelrod, p. 4).

Across time, however, nations have interacted without being controlled by any overarching authority, which explains the conflicts that have frequently emerged. Conflicts arose mainly from nations' need for security: some nations considered that their people's security was worth rendering others underprivileged as a result.

Most individuals choose to cooperate in the hope that it will bring benefits in the near future. When two companies are doing business together, for example, one company is likely to favor the other, expecting reciprocal treatment when the next business opportunity arises.

In its basic form, the Prisoner's Dilemma involves only two individuals and one round. In this form, each individual has only one opportunity to choose whether to cooperate — remaining silent — or to defect and turn the partner in. In a multiple-round game, matters would be considerably different. The Prisoner's Dilemma changes significantly when several rounds are involved: individuals can influence their partner's next move through threats, promises, and by building a reputation for cooperativeness.

Just as players would benefit most from cooperating in a single-round game, they benefit from cooperating across a multi-round game. Robert Axelrod sought to find the best game strategy that would encourage players to cooperate with one another. To do this, he gathered game theorists from around the world and asked them to submit programs encoding the best strategy for a Prisoner's Dilemma situation. The programs needed to track the history of interactions up to a given moment and use that history to guide the player's next decision.

The best strategy proved to be the Tit-for-Tat approach. The strategy involves several players who begin by cooperating and then mirror whatever move they observe from their opponents. Impressed by the strategy's simplicity, Axelrod organized a second tournament, which produced the same result: Tit-for-Tat offered the best strategy. Out of the two hundred programs submitted at the tournament, Anatol Rapoport's Tit-for-Tat strategy proved to be the most effective approach for a Prisoner's Dilemma situation (Kubilay Geckil and Anderson, 2009, p. 40). Tit-for-Tat is effective only in multiple-round Prisoner's Dilemma games; it would be useless in a single-shot game.

In a Tit-for-Tat game, the first player begins by cooperating, a move intended to trigger the same response in opponents. All players continue to cooperate until one defects, which in turn causes the others to defect. Communication is crucial: a player who misreads another player's move can inadvertently trigger a cascade of defection and ruin the entire round.

Prisoner's Dilemma situations are more common than many realize, appearing frequently in everyday life. Given his background in political science, Axelrod observed that the Prisoner's Dilemma is frequently encountered in the U.S. Senate. Senators are accustomed to helping colleagues, fully aware that this assistance will be reciprocated. The help that senators provide to one another ranges from trading votes to attracting voters. One can reasonably claim that reciprocity is one of the most important factors in the operation of the U.S. Senate (Axelrod, p. 5).

Interestingly, matters in the Senate were not always this way. Just a few decades ago, senators appeared more inclined toward deceit and self-promotion than toward mutual assistance. Senators eventually became willing to cooperate as a result of pursuing their own interests and realizing that collaboration was the best method for achieving them (Axelrod, p. 5).

By understanding what motivates individuals to cooperate despite their self-interest, one can apply these principles to other situations — including persuading nations to cooperate for their own long-term well-being. Cooperation between individuals without the guidance of a central authority has been demonstrated to be possible, even when it seemed implausible. Individuals appear compelled to cooperate by their own interests, recognizing that they would end up with nothing in the long run if they do not.

Cooperation can be driven by a range of motives. While it might seem that particular people cooperate out of genuine concern for others, they may also do so to satisfy their own interests: "If a sister is concerned for the welfare of her brother, the sister's self-interest can be thought of as including (among many other things) this concern for the welfare of her brother" (Axelrod, p. 7). In the broader picture, a country may assist another out of apparent concern, but in reality this help can stem from the benefits the first country expects in return. Cooperation cannot be reduced solely to altruism; it is primarily driven by the interests of each player.

If all players on a football team were to follow their own interests — say, each trying to become individually famous — the team would have fewer chances of qualifying for the final. However, if they recognized that the team's reputation would automatically benefit each of them, they would be more inclined to support their teammates so that the team scores as many points as possible.

When a skilled player finds himself on an amateur team, it may seem better to pursue individual glory by scoring as many points as possible regardless of what teammates do. Such a player might conclude that satisfying his own needs requires following his own interests rather than the team's. By contrast, an equally skilled player who chooses to cooperate instead of seeking all the glory will likely end up with few individual points, while the first player becomes celebrated.

Prisoner's Dilemma situations are not supposed to produce a winner and a loser in the traditional sense — rather, one player simply accumulates more points than the other. Moreover, one player's success does not depend on the other's failure. The best method of scoring as many points as possible is to adapt to one's partner's behavior.

When two players engage in a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a known, limited number of rounds, both will be inclined to defect on the final move, because it is the safest and most individually beneficial option once no further moves remain to influence each other's behavior.

During any Prisoner's Dilemma game, players quickly see the opportunity to take advantage of their opponents. This is partially beneficial, as they may receive assistance from their partners in scoring points. However, they are unlikely to achieve a great result overall, because "the reward for mutual cooperation is greater than the average of the temptation and the sucker's payoff" (Axelrod, p. 10). Cooperation is most likely to emerge when the game has an indeterminate number of interactions. Before making a move, every player must study the history of interaction with the other players in order to improve their ability to predict future moves.

Certainty is never present in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, as no one can ever be sure that a particular player will make a particular move at a particular time. Moreover, a player cannot predict another's move by studying that player's interactions with third parties. A trustworthy reputation can only be assessed through direct interaction with another player, not through observing that player's conduct toward others.

Tit-for-Tat Strategy and International Climate Politics

Taking the Prisoner's Dilemma into consideration, the best strategy for a country faced with the decision of addressing global warming would be to cooperate from the outset. Such a country expects little to no cooperation from others and is aware of the risk it is taking. In the first round, it is most likely that other countries will not express any interest in joining the effort, as they are unwilling to bear the initial risk.

When it chose to fight global warming largely on its own, the European Union was aware that several other world powers would not behave similarly (Cline, p. 332). However, its choice was based primarily on the expectation that others would follow its example sooner or later. In a Prisoner's Dilemma game, cooperation is more likely to occur when the game involves multiple rounds.

The European Union appears to have adopted a tit-for-tat strategy when it began reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Its move can be considered one of the best available, as it went directly for the high score by cooperating. Another factor supporting this interpretation is that the fight against global warming has no predetermined number of rounds.

If one wants cooperation to be possible, one must first accept the likelihood of losing in the first round, with the other player defecting. One of the reasons the European Union has partially lost several rounds against other world powers is that it failed to issue a sufficiently severe reprisal — one that would have compelled other players to join the fight. Some countries saw this as an opportunity to exploit the Union and maintained their position on global warming. The European Union may have foreseen this outcome, but it is possible it chose not to retaliate because of its determination to achieve long-term cooperation. International players are most likely to join the fight against global warming sooner or later, as they come to recognize the benefits of cooperating.

Because of its commitment to fighting global warming, the European Union has applied the tit-for-tat strategy in a manner that refrains from defecting, even when other superpowers express a desire to do so. The fight against global warming has proven to be a stable endeavor, as evidenced by the fact that some international players defected in the first round yet the process has continued. In the long run, all countries tend to discover that it is not worthwhile to try to exploit those who are fighting global warming.

One difficulty in fighting global warming is that numerous international players are expected to join at different times. This staggered entry makes strategies such as tit-for-tat harder to sustain because of the emerging complexity. Those engaged in combating global warming can threaten non-participants through various means; however, putting these measures into practice risks harming third parties that bear no responsibility for the problem.

Governments around the world are presently faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to fight global warming or to collect limited short-term gains by doing nothing. For some, the best approach seems to be to support the rhetoric of reducing greenhouse gas emissions while doing nothing significant in practice. Governments recognize that they can collect the benefits of fighting global warming even when they take no real action. In the present, everyone seems determined to stop global warming; yet most limit their involvement to simply talking about the issue while doing nothing notable to address it.

It is natural for countries initially to express little interest in fighting global warming. As matters progress, players gradually become involved — either because they are influenced by others or because they fear retaliation for not cooperating.

The repeated Prisoner's Dilemma that countries confront today is far more complex than its basic form, but it is also potentially more beneficial for all players involved. Unlike two suspects being questioned by police, countries have the opportunity to negotiate, which can enhance the efficiency of their collective efforts. Countries are also aware that cooperating is the best long-term solution.

Most international players are presently inclined to join the fight against global warming not necessarily because they feel pressured by those already engaged, but because they recognize that they too will suffer from the consequences of global warming. Ultimately, all countries will suffer from global warming regardless of their current position. The question is: how much suffering are certain countries willing to endure before they actively engage?

The tit-for-tat strategy applied to the fight against global warming involves a series of complicating factors. For some countries, defection is a better short-term choice than cooperation in certain situations. For example, if one country is likely to become unable to sustain its anti-global-warming efforts in the near future, another country may be discouraged from cooperating with it — partly because countries are also interested in the broader relationships that come with cooperation and the future benefits those relationships may bring.

Other international players expressed initial reluctance to cooperate with the European Union most probably because they believed such a campaign would be costly and futile. This is another reason why players can resist being influenced by others. Factors such as trust and creditworthiness lose their value when a player appears to be making poor strategic decisions.

It is very difficult to achieve reciprocal cooperation in a society where individuals are constantly preoccupied with satisfying their own interests and are aware that defection tends to pay off in the short run. Matters are different, however, when it comes to global warming. If only a limited number of states engage in fighting the process, chances are that they will succeed only in slowing it down rather than stopping it. In the future, everyone will suffer the consequences of insufficient action against global warming.

The best outcome that non-cooperative countries will achieve from their free-riding is that they did not spend their money. Conversely, the money they saved would almost certainly be spent rapidly afterward in attempts to repair the damage caused by global warming. In order for the tit-for-tat strategy to be effective, other countries need to embrace the approach and recognize its value.

If several players in a game use the tit-for-tat strategy, they are predisposed to scoring the highest cumulative points. Similarly, if some countries fight global warming using the tit-for-tat approach, they have a strong chance of benefiting from the effort. The best method of succeeding through tit-for-tat is to use it in interactions with players who also favor the strategy. Cooperation guarantees success in the long run, and one's interests are best served when all interacting parties are disposed to cooperate.

Politicians continuously raise global awareness about the importance of stopping the planet from overheating. However, most are among the least who have actually done anything to improve the situation. Clearly, many believe it is better to take advantage of others' efforts rather than getting involved themselves. Considering the confusion triggered by global change, the general public is unsure of what to think, having grown accustomed to influential figures exploiting every available means to advance their own agendas.

Works Cited

Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

Baert Wiener, J. (1999). Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context. Yale Law Journal, 108.4.

Behreandt, D. (18 September 2006). "Global Warming Too Hot or Not? The Theory of Global Warming Proposes That Man's Activities Are Causing the Earth to Heat Up, but There Is Compelling Scientific Evidence That Does Not Support This Conclusion." The New American.

Clemons, E. K. and Schimmelbusch, H. (2007). "The Environmental Prisoners' Dilemma or We're All in This Together: Can I Trust You to Figure it Out?" Retrieved May 6, 2010, from the Wharton School Web site: http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~clemons/blogs/prisonersblog.pdf

Cline, W. R. (1992). The Economics of Global Warming. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

Gardiner, S. M. (2004). The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto Protocol. Ethics & International Affairs, 18.1.

Gibbs Pleune, J. (2008). Is Scalian Standing the Latest Sighting of the Lochner-Ess Monster? Using Global Warming to Explore the Myth of the Corporate Person. Environmental Law, 38.1.

Paterson, M. (1996). Global Warming and Global Politics. New York: Routledge.

Uzawa, H. (2003). Economic Theory and Global Warming. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

"Global warming: Yes, it Is Very Real." The Register-Guard (Eugene, OR), 20 January 2008: B15.

"Global Warming: Both Sides." The Wilson Quarterly, Spring 2003.

"Playing games with the planet." The Economist, 27 September 2007.