U.S.–Canada Border Security Changes After September 11

Introduction: The September 11 Shock and the Call for Change

September 11th shocked and enraged many people in the United States and around the world. With that shock came a cry for change — a tightening of the open and free society in which we live. September 11th was an unprecedented occurrence, leaving many people personally affected and still others traumatized by the severity of the events and the seemingly senseless act against civilians. As one observer noted: "What happened on September 11 is unparalleled by anything we have ever known. The attacks killed more than 5,000 people, injured tens of thousands more, and caused economic hardship and grief to hundreds of thousands more. From the New York attacks alone, more than 10,000 people lost a parent." (O'Brien, 2001, p. 425)

This paper attempts to analyze the real circumstances of change at the border between the U.S. and Canada since September 11th. It addresses several questions associated with potential or real changes in border crossing and security comparing the pre- and post-September 11th periods. Nearing the close of 2003, having just recognized the second anniversary of the terrorist attacks, and following the conclusion of active combat in Afghanistan and Iraq in the so-called War on Terror, many pressing questions demand answers. The most urgent of these is whether anything has changed, whether our borders are safer, and whether our government — both national and local — is better equipped to deal with future breaches in national security. One of the most fundamental questions is simply: are our borders safer than they were before September 11th?

Prior to terrorism becoming the main focus, protection at U.S. borders and all other entry points into the country was based solely on issues of illegal immigration and contraband, including illegal drugs and related concerns (Cornelius, 2001, pp. 661–680; Dunn, 2001, pp. 7–18).

Pre-9/11 Border Security: Immigration, Contraband, and the Absence of Terrorism

A review of the literature on border security prior to September 11th makes evident that the word and concept of terrorism rarely, if ever, entered researchers' agendas (Nevins, 2001, p. 136). When it did, the most pressing concern was possible losses of civil liberties rather than the threat itself (Reinares, 1998, p. 351).

It is also safe to say that terrorism would not likely have come to the forefront of scholarly or popular thought had something so severe not occurred. This can be evidenced by the earlier terrorist events of the last twenty years in the U.S. and the lack of lasting effect they had on public and governmental opinion. Consider the earlier bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the foiled west coast bomber, who in retrospect breached the very border examined in this work. It is only in retrospect that these issues return to the forefront, and even retrospect can be short-lived. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center parking garage became old news quickly, just as the 1920 bombing of the financial district in New York had done so many years before (Macneal, 1993, p. 469). It is unlikely that many readers of this work were even aware of the 1920 predecessor to the 1993 and 2001 attacks.

Even the Oklahoma City bombing — an act of internal rather than international terrorism — lost media airtime tragically soon, despite the profound loss of life and liberty. Most lasting press coverage focused on the character, identity, and trial of the convicted bomber, Timothy McVeigh (Esposito, 1998, p. 22), or on the IT, banking, and communication lessons learned from the devastation in Oklahoma City (Dozier, 1998, pp. 13–17; "Lessons learned from the Oklahoma City terror bombing," 1996, pp. 12–17).

Some scholarly work on international terrorism had touched upon the broader threat, but even the focus of government agencies such as the CIA and FBI remained primarily on the threat that technological advances posed to national security. As one researcher observed:

"Now, the technology of transportation about the planet has advanced to the point where it has become increasingly easy to plan and implement highly destructive terrorist actions in the territory of another state, whether the technique of destruction is by electronic or kinetic intervention, or by conventional explosive, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons." (Reisman, 1999, p. 3)

In retrospect, this scholar had a far better grasp of potential threat than did the average American — including those in high-ranking protective positions. Yet none truly grasped how easy it would be to stage an attack using only the technology of transportation. When Americans thought of terrorism in the past, they imagined nuclear weapons, fertilizer bombs, and sophisticated technology, not civilian aircraft turned into lethal weapons. It is for this reason, among others, that it became increasingly important for individual people — rather than their weapons — to become the object of scrutiny, not because they carry explosives but because they may possess knowledge and convictions that threaten the long-standing physical and psychological security of the nation.

"The diffusion of modern technology, the astonishing proliferation of information about the ways and means of conducting terrorist actions, and the amplification of the damage that terrorists now seem capable of wreaking, seem likely to make terrorism more attractive to would-be users and, as a result, of vastly heightened concern to an increasingly large class of potential targets." (Reisman, 1999, p. 3)

Some have argued in favor of greater drug enforcement policies on the grounds that drug profits have historically funded terrorist organizations. One need only recall the anti-drug, anti-terrorism advertisements that began shortly after the attacks at the urgency of the president. Yet it is not difficult to assume that this also represented an attempt to persuade the public to continue focusing attention on anti-drug funding, since such programs had long been one of the most effective vehicles for maintaining projects sensitive to national security (Cornelius, 2001, pp. 661–680).

Organizational Failures and the Creation of the Office of Homeland Security

Since September 11th, the central concern has shifted to identifying who, among those entering the U.S. in record numbers, poses a threat to life and property within the country's borders. Changes — however minor — have caused human rights and civil liberties advocates to resist any erosion of freedoms. Many argue that the most precious civil liberty, the right to privacy, is being unduly challenged. Others maintain that the safety of the nation and its people justifies a degree of personal sacrifice.

The events of September 11th, combined with several earlier terrorist threats traced back to border crossings along both the U.S.–Canadian border and the southern border with Mexico (Dunn, 2001, pp. 7–18), brought both borders under tough and critical analysis. Yet most observers agree that calls for continued scrutiny and heightened vigilance remain far from satisfied.

"There is more than enough evidence to demonstrate the lack of collaborative activity. Interorganizational capacity does not arise as a natural product of government organization based on a functional division of labor. Public administration analysts have long pointed out the gaps in integration in many fields, from human services to drug control." (Wise, 2002, p. 134)

The government's greatest efforts accordingly focused on improving communication and information sharing to accelerate responses to possible threats. An initial determination was made by the president that sufficient organization was woefully lacking. He established the Office of Homeland Security by executive order on October 8, 2001, less than one month after the attacks. The establishment of that office — headed by the new Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and involving the new Homeland Security Council — did not end scrutiny and debate over the appropriate organizational system needed to meet terrorist threats (Wise, 2002, p. 134).

Both immediately after the attacks and in the ensuing years, questions about the fitness of the U.S. government were raised across a broad range of areas: domestic flight security, international flight security, cargo flight security, seaport security, biological terrorism preparedness, and border security. One of the major concerns involved the staffing of border check stations between Canada and the U.S.

"The events of September 11 have prompted vastly heightened scrutiny of many aspects of government functioning, as major wars and national cataclysms have done in the past. Few aspects, perhaps, have received more attention than the question of whether government in general, and the federal government in particular, has the right organizational structure to meet the requirements for homeland security." (Wise, 2002, p. 134)

Before September 11th, the security situation at the northern border was already deeply problematic: "U.S. Border Patrol had just 330 agents supported by a single analyst to intercept illegal border crossings along the 4,000-mile land and water border with Canada — 200 fewer agents than it had 20 years ago. U.S. Customs has routinely had half the existing inspection booths closed solely because of understaffing." (Wise, 2002, p. 134) It is therefore safe to say that the public outcry for change, despite early indicators of financial and personal commitment by the U.S. and Canadian governments, has not necessarily translated into real security improvements along the Canadian border — particularly given the continued disproportionate focus on the southern border with Mexico, driven by its international reputation for laxity and by concerns about trade delays that increased security might cause.

Conclusion: Lasting Change or Unfinished Business?

Though all the issues addressed by policymakers and the public alike have received significant attention, it remains to be seen whether real change has or will take place at the border between Canada and the U.S. Emphasizing technology, financial implications, and the social impact of possible security solutions — though very important — will not by itself reduce future loss of life. Yet real work is being done, and with sustained public pressure, changes will continue to be implemented within the agencies that govern border safety.

The fundamental questions posed at the outset of this paper — are our borders safer, and is government more capable of preventing future attacks? — remain, at this point in time, genuinely open. The staffing deficits, interagency communication failures, and institutional weaknesses documented in pre-9/11 research were not remedied overnight. Initiatives such as the Smart Border accord and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security represent meaningful steps, but the lasting effectiveness of those measures will depend on sustained political will, adequate funding, and the difficult work of building genuine interorganizational collaboration across the many agencies responsible for national security.

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