US-Led Intervention in Somalia: Humanitarian vs. Political Interests

Introduction

Since the start of a civil war in Somalia in 1991, at least half a million people have been killed and countless others have been injured and/or displaced, making this one of the worst humanitarian crises of the late twentieth century. Despite a series of U.S.-led humanitarian interventions involving tens of thousands of military and support personnel from 1992 through mid-1995, Somalia is still widely regarded as a failed state today. To determine how this country reached this grim outcome, this paper examines how the tension between humanitarian purposes and political interests played out in the U.S.-led intervention in Somalia.

To this end, the paper presents a review of the relevant literature to develop timely and informed answers to two guiding research questions: (1) Did political interests and factors undermine humanitarian purposes and outcomes in this case, and if so, in what ways and to what extent? (2) What are the most important lessons that should be drawn from this case about using military force to protect civilians from mass atrocities? A summary of the research and important findings is presented in the conclusion.

Humanitarian Intervention and Political Tensions

Because humanitarianism involves the expenditure of national treasure, and military humanitarian interventions require the expenditure of both treasure and blood, it is not surprising that multiple key tensions are involved. One of the most significant is the extent to which the general public supports such expenditures. One outcome of the concept of American exceptionalism is the notion that the United States should serve as a sort of "Salvation Army" to the rest of the world, because it possesses the material wealth and democratic ideals needed to bring peace to troubled regions, and the American public generally supports humanitarian interventions (Loewen, 1995). This level of support, however, has not always translated into successful outcomes. As Coady (2002) points out:

"One of the ironies of the humanitarian intervention debate is that Americans who have been strongly critical of their country's past interventionist record (in Latin America, for instance) are often loudest in their demands that the U.S. take the lead, or act unilaterally, with its military might in humanitarian causes." (p. 35)

Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the basic mindset of the American public was that they had little to fear from U.S.-led humanitarian interventions, even those involving military force, anywhere else in the world — after all, they were "good guys doing the right thing" and the good guys always win. The attacks of September 11 combined with the relentless efforts of terrorist groups around the world since that time, however, caused both the American public and policymakers to reassess their views about humanitarian actions in a hostile world. In this regard, Coady (2002) adds that, "As Americans have begun to realize since September 11, the dominant power of the United States is an ambiguous asset. It can help to solve problems, but, if used incautiously, it can have the effect often created by bulls in china shops" (p. 35).

As a result of these and other conflicts of national interest, tensions between humanitarian intervention and politics are invariable, due in part to the potential violations of national sovereignty they entail (Ayoob, 2002). An interesting point made by Hehir (2013) concerns the fact that, notwithstanding any provisions of the UN Charter to the contrary, violations of national sovereignty for humanitarian military interventions are illegal under relevant international laws. Hehir (2013) reports that, "One of the primary sources of controversy surrounding humanitarian intervention is its legal status. While there is some disagreement over the legality of humanitarian interventions, the majority of legal scholars consider it to be illegal at present" (p. 24). Because human lives are at stake and time is of the essence when humanitarian interventions are required, intervenors may not be required to observe legal niceties in order to violate a nation's sovereignty to deliver desperately needed aid. As Hehir (2013) stresses, "This does not necessarily have implications for the legitimacy of the intervention; indicatively, NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was judged by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo to have been 'illegal but legitimate'" (p. 24).

Many of these tensions stem from the critical and urgent life-and-death nature of the enterprise, as well as the unexpected exigencies that always follow military operations of any kind. Even when such exigencies are anticipated, the potential for tension between stakeholders always exists. To optimize the effectiveness of any humanitarian intervention, it is typically essential to obtain the support — or at least nominal consent — from existing powers, including local, regional, and national governments and even representatives of the belligerents involved. A study by Blackstone (2009) on the implications of U.S.-led humanitarian military interventions cited this tension in particular, along with the need for "every soldier to be a diplomat" in negotiations with local stakeholders when conducting so-called stability operations and support operations (SOSOs). Based on his analysis of the U.S.-led intervention in Somalia, Blackstone (2009) identified three main factors that future interventions should take into account: (1) all such missions involve both political and military interests; (2) it is essential to develop a careful balance between the warrior ethos needed to win wars and the friendly relations required to win hearts and minds; and (3) even low-ranking military service members who have received adequate appropriate training for military interventions can achieve SOSO missions. Blackstone (2009) concludes that "only soldiers can successfully 'do' SOSO, for only they can supply the security necessary to reassure the population [and] success depends on how well soldiers balance the security mission with the political mission" (p. 40).

This need also means that military leaders of humanitarian interventions may be compelled to collaborate with all sides of a conflict, regardless of their political and religious ideologies, simply to ensure that assistance is allowed to proceed. According to Modirzadeh, Lewis, and Bruderlein (2011), "The core mission of humanitarian organizations is to provide lifesaving assistance to populations in need in times of armed conflict. To deliver this assistance, humanitarian organizations must, operationally and under law, seek the consent of the relevant party or parties" (p. 626). As noted above, however, humanitarian military interventions may be illegal while still being legitimate, even if such consent is not obtained, although the process is clearly facilitated when peacekeepers succeed in these negotiations.

Obtaining such consent from all relevant parties may appear to be a straightforward affair to many observers in the West who have never personally experienced the ravages of civil uprising or armed conflict, especially since the overarching goal is to deliver humanitarian assistance where it is needed most. Even the most benign humanitarian assistance, however, can be viewed as aid and comfort to the enemy by opposition leaders, even when provided in the most equitable and altruistic manner possible (Mallavarpau, 2015).

Against this backdrop is the ever-present potential for humanitarian military intervenors to use such interventions as cover for other, potentially nefarious intelligence or covert operations. According to Hehir (2013), "Whether an intervention must be inspired by humanitarian motives to qualify as a 'humanitarian intervention' is a highly contentious issue. It is clear, however, that the motives behind humanitarian interventions are almost invariably mixed" (pp. 23–24). Indeed, countries with longstanding economic interests in their former colonies may have multiple reasons for positioning themselves at the head of a military intervention coalition.

This type of tension also means that both government and opposition leaders may attempt to limit, divert, or otherwise sabotage humanitarian assistance when they regard it as a tactical military or political advantage (Modirzadeh et al., 2011). From a strictly pragmatic perspective, this tension is readily understandable, since humanitarian assistance can easily be diverted for use by armed insurgents. Modirzadeh and his associates (2011) conclude that, "Humanitarian assistance delivered in times of armed conflict and its corollary — the autonomous negotiation between independent humanitarian organizations and all parties to conflict — have often come under pressure from security and political demands" (p. 624).

Political leaders have an array of reasons for subverting humanitarian assistance, especially if it is viewed as helping armed opponents persist in their resistance. In some cases, political subversion may begin at the highest levels. Coady (2002) emphasizes that, "The UN Security Council is also a cumbersome mechanism for achieving justice since the existence of the veto means that powerful states are in a position to block humanitarian interventions that do not serve their interests" (p. 26).

This tension involves a cost-benefit analysis weighing the value of human lives lost due to inaction against what might happen if humanitarian assistance is provided. Given the life-and-death nature of this calculus, decisions to proceed with humanitarian assistance are generally made with the goal of minimizing additional human suffering. More than a century and a half has passed since the first international humanitarian laws were enacted, all with a view toward providing such assistance even in the midst of armed hostilities (Barnett, 2011). Modirzadeh et al. (2011) note that, "International humanitarian law has sought to balance the security interests of the parties to an armed conflict with the humanitarian interest of ensuring that life-saving goods and services reach civilians and others hors de combat ['out of action due to injury or damage'] even in the midst of fighting" (p. 624).

Conclusion

Today, Somalia is widely cited as a classic example of a failed state that has been unable or unwilling to respond to massive efforts by the international community to stop the violence and provide all Somali people with the guarantees of the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights. The research was consistent in showing that a constellation of political interests and factors undermined the humanitarian purposes and outcomes of the U.S.-led interventions in Somalia to the point where the country is worse off today than before U.S. involvement began.

Some of the most important lessons that should be drawn from the Somali case about using military force to protect civilians from mass atrocities include the harsh reality that there may not be other viable alternatives, that political leaders may subvert humanitarian interventions if it serves their best interests, and — most importantly — that military interventions do not address the fundamental causes of humanitarian crises. These lessons remain highly relevant for international policymakers and military planners considering future humanitarian interventions in failed or fragile states.

References

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