Virtue and Liberalism: Character, Freedom, and Democratic Life
This paper examines the complex and often contentious relationship between virtue and liberalism in American political thought. Drawing on scholars including Peter Berkowitz, Stephen Macedo, and Michael Rossiano, the paper traces how both classical and modern liberals have approached the question of civic character and moral cultivation. It surveys the arguments made by prominent political figures and academics for and against integrating virtue into liberal governance, explores liberalism's internal tensions between individual freedom and the civic conditions that sustain it, and considers how freedom of choice, personal responsibility, and the common good might be reconciled within a coherent liberal framework.
- Introduction: Virtue in American Political Discourse: Politicians and academics revive virtue in liberal politics
- Liberal Objections to Virtue: Modern liberals reject virtue for several principled reasons
- Classical Liberalism's Enthusiasm for Virtue: Classical liberalism saw virtue as essential to liberty
- Freedom, Choice, and Civic Responsibility: Liberal society emphasizes choice but neglects responsible freedom
- The Decline of Ordered Liberty: Modern liberalism abandoned classical ordered liberty tradition
- Liberalism With Spine: Macedo's Contribution: Macedo argues liberalism requires citizens with civic virtue
- The Task for Modern Liberalism: Modern liberalism must reconcile virtue with individual freedom
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What makes this paper effective
- It surveys a range of prominent voices — politicians, academics, and public intellectuals — to demonstrate that the virtue debate cuts across ideological lines, lending breadth and credibility to the argument.
- The paper maintains a clear dialectical structure, presenting liberal objections to virtue before methodically working through classical liberalism's enthusiasm for it, allowing the argument to build logically toward a synthesis.
- It grounds abstract philosophical claims in concrete political examples, such as Clinton's "New Democrat" platform and Bennett's Book of Virtues, making theoretical distinctions accessible and relevant.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates effective use of scholarly synthesis: rather than relying on a single authority, it weaves together sources from political science, philosophy, and public policy to construct a multi-perspectival argument. This technique shows that a claim can be strengthened by triangulating across disciplines and ideological traditions rather than depending on one school of thought.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens by establishing the contemporary relevance of virtue in political discourse, then pivots to the strongest objections modern liberals raise against it. It next recovers classical liberalism's more favorable view of virtue, examines how modern emphasis on unconstrained choice has displaced that tradition, and closes by proposing — via Macedo and Berkowitz — that a robust liberalism must reintegrate civic virtue to remain coherent and self-sustaining. The argument moves from problem to historical context to proposed resolution.
Introduction: Virtue in American Political Discourse
For several decades, many politicians and professors have been promoting the belief that the fate of liberal democracy in America is correlated with the quality of citizens' character (Berkowitz, 1999). President George W. Bush campaigned as a compassionate conservative, promising to restore honor and dignity to the Presidency. In 1992, former President Bill Clinton sought to set a new tone for the Democratic Party, campaigning as a New Democrat — devoted not only to the protection of individual rights and the promotion of the social and economic bases of equality, but also to the principle of personal responsibility. Clinton's campaign was inspired by the ideas of William Galston, a professor of political science and fellow member of the Democratic Leadership Council, whose writings discussed "liberal virtues" and defended the propriety of a liberal state that cultivates qualities of mind and character that form good and decent citizens.
In addition, former Reagan Secretary of Education William Bennett published the best-selling A Book of Virtues, which was geared toward the moral education of society's young people (Berkowitz, 1999). Bennett's former Chief of Staff, William Kristol, had long argued for the importance to American politics of a "sociology of virtue." Kristol envisioned a systematic study of the various voluntary associations within civil society that foster qualities of character that help citizens fulfill the daily demands of maintaining a liberal democracy.
This rediscovery of virtue by leading Democrats and Republicans occurred in sync with a renaissance in virtue studies in the universities. Today's liberals include communitarians and deliberative democrats who are directing their attention to questions about virtue and how it can be cultivated in a liberal democracy. According to Berkowitz (1999), "Feminist thinkers champion an ethics of care that stresses the virtues of compassion and connectedness, and Aristotelians and natural law theorists have been arguing their traditional positions with a renewed vigor and self-confidence. Virtue thus has attracted the attention of leading figures inside and outside the academy."
Liberal Objections to Virtue
Many modern liberals still reject the study and practice of virtue, arguing that it induces a prudish nineteenth-century Victorian morality that equates virtue with the chastity of women (Berkowitz, 1999). For others, virtue conjures up musty metaphysical doctrines linked with Aristotle and Aquinas. Many are unable to separate virtue from the chauvinistic and martial ethic that exists in the civic republican tradition. Many modern liberals believe that virtue threatens the liberal principle of separation of church and state by introducing inherently religious and unavoidably divisive notions into the public arena. Finally, "there are those who regard the very idea of virtue as an oppressive tool that stultifies experiments in self-creation by imposing on human affairs a degrading conformity" (Berkowitz, 1999). While these considerations are not equally compelling, the collective force of these modern liberal characterizations weighs against virtue's reputation.
The aversion to virtue has roots in common liberal principles: limited government, respect for individual choice, and belief in the equality of human beings. Many modern liberals believe that each citizen is the best judge of what is best for him or her, and that the government's job is to protect each citizen's right to make his or her own choices about how to live while avoiding the use of state power to favor particular choices. In this light, a set of virtues that constitutes a decent or good life may be seen as a threat to individual choice.
For example, according to Rossiano (2003), "Alexander Hamilton's conception of human nature grounds his political thought. His predominantly and radically liberal conception of human nature is based on Locke's concept of liberty, Hobbes's concept of power, and Machiavelli's concept of the 'effectual truth.' It thus stresses the necessary relation between self-interest and republican government and entails the repudiation of classical republican and Christian political ideals. But Hamilton's love of liberty is nonetheless rooted in a sense of classical nobility and Christian philanthropy that elevates even while contradicting his liberalism. The complex relation between liberty, nobility, philanthropy, and power in Hamilton's conception of human nature, in effect, defines his thought, reveals its assumptions, constitutes its strengths, and poses urgent problems. That complexity forms the spirit of his liberal republicanism."
Classical Liberalism's Enthusiasm for Virtue
According to Berkowitz (1999), liberalism's enthusiasm for virtue has been less well documented. Classical liberals understood that liberty, as a way of life, is an achievement that has certain preconditions. From this perspective, liberty demands of individuals specific virtues — specific qualities of mind and character — including reflective judgment, sympathetic imagination, self-restraint, the ability to cooperate, and toleration. These virtues and qualities require training and cultivation. Classical liberalism's enthusiasm for virtue is rooted in the liberal state's need for citizens "who can effectively and fairly administer liberalism's characteristic political institutions, who can keep government within limits, who can exercise their rights in a manner respectful of others and in harmony with the common good, and who can sustain the voluntary associations that compose civil society." However, in this light, the doors are wide open for an overconfident government to take matters into its own hands in order to foster all the virtues deemed necessary to promote individual liberty and sustain democratic self-government.
The aversion to and the enthusiasm for virtue create two opposing tendencies that arise within liberalism today (Berkowitz, 1999). Both sides present a seemingly distorted image of the liberal spirit and create rigid prescriptions for political life. However, some forms of liberalism consider both tendencies, which represents the right approach. Liberalism, as a political doctrine, has as its primary goal "to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom." Personal freedom is a right that liberalism seeks to extend equally to all. "To establish and secure the personal freedom of all, the liberal tradition has elaborated a characteristic set of practices and institutions including toleration, liberty of thought and discussion, representation, and the separation of governmental powers."
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