Kantian Ethics
Conceptual relativism is a thinly distinguished relativism in which what prevails is opposed to epistemic patterns or ethical considerations. In conceptual relativism, ontology is made relative to conceptual themes, science structures, and categorical definitions. The anti-realist thesis is what drives this type of relativism. Antirealism claims that the world does not come to us already made for use, but we are the one who keeps providing various ways of classifying it and conceptualizing it. Sometimes we even provide incompatible schemas for this conceptualization (Baghramian, 2015). Kantian-based ethics only renders minimalist duty. It dismisses the actions which are explained incoherently since they do not constitute actions by its interpretation. It may allow critical crimes if the proponent is fanatical enough. There is nothing in the development of the theory by Kant that supposes that the agents discussed are humans. It applies just as well to other creatures, or computers which have been made intelligent enough to play agents. The expectation we should, therefore, have is one of a skeletal theory. Practically, individuals who look for ethical guidance are not biased. To them, Kantian views assist them in organizing their thoughts. Such a position is a welcome relief in a world of relativism and ethical nihilism (Hooker, 1996). However, there has been consideration and conclusion that the mind of humans isn’t passive. It is not just preoccupied with representing independent reality; instead, it plays an active role in constructing, or at least, shaping the reality. Conceptual relativism postulates that humans may build reality in various ways as a result of using different cultures and languages (Baghramian, 2015).

Ethical Import of Autonomy

There is a contrast between values and facts, and between synthetic and analytic, for the positivists. The first one is between values and “facts,” while the second one contrasts tautologies with “facts.” The intuitive contrast between “what ought to be” and “what is” highlights a critical vacuum between clear domains. Sometimes the gap is defined as what differentiates “values” and “facts.” To prevent misunderstanding, there is a critical gap that can be thought to prevail even when values double up as special facts (Vayrynen, 2016).

The bottom-line is that normative and evaluative explanations guide the course of action and commend. On the other hand, non-evaluative statements do not play such a role. The resultant view that there is no inference of reason to any evaluative conclusion from premises of non-evaluative nature is often referred to as “ethical autonomy.” There have been deep concepts thought to leverage arguments in various debate forums relating to the nature of evaluative thinking. They highlight questions such as whether a robust distinction of fact-value exists, and whether the claims exhibit some notable objectivity of how classifications of evaluative nature relate to those that are of non-evaluative nature....…key consideration to answering such a question, the control one has over the development of their character, and the influence of their actions on their behavior (Mitchell, 2015).

Aristotelian Virtues and Kantian Duties

Normative ethics apply virtue ethics to a large extent. It could be classified as the one that insists on virtues, as opposed to the method that insists on duties and rules (deontology) or what emphasizes action consequences – consequentialism. Suppose it is apparent that a needy person should be assisted? One should be informed that their face was left with the aftermath of their sneeze. According to a utilitarian, the effect of such an action will enhance wellbeing. Deontologists will point out that such action is aligning to the moral rule demanding that you only do unto others what you would wish to be done unto you. A virtue ethicist will, on the other hand, view such help as an act of benevolence or charity (Hurthouse, 2016).

The virtue ethicists, when adopting Aristotle’s thoughts, draw a clear line between “continence” and perfect virtue ( Hurthouse, 2016). The two philosophers, Kant and Aristotle, do not differ on how they rank characters, as far as preferability is concerned, but only in their estimate of the level to which a human is expected to rise. In this scenario, someone moral would prefer to think that they should handle other people as they wish to be…