Judicial Dissent in the Voice of John Austin

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal law that prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Act applies to all employers with 15 or more employees, and it covers a wide range of employment practices, including hiring, firing, promotion, and compensation. Title VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who complain about discrimination. If an employee believes that he or she has been the victim of discrimination, he or she can file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC will then investigate the claim and, if it finds evidence of discrimination, it may take legal action against the employer.

Thus, it must be agreed by all that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The legal positivist interpretation of this law is that it should be read narrowly to only prohibit intentional discrimination by employers. This means that an employer cannot refuse to hire someone or give them a promotion because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. However, this interpretation does not extend to cases of unconscious bias or disparate impact. For example, if an employer has a policy that disproportionately impacts people of a certain race, they would not be violating the law under this interpretation. Critics of this interpretation argue that it is too narrow and does not adequately protect employees from discrimination. They argue that the law should be interpreted more broadly to encompass all forms of discrimination, intentional or not.

The legal positivist viewpoint holds that the law is what the legislature says it is, and that court decisions are only authoritative insofar as they are based on the text of the relevant statutes. Applying this approach to the question of whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, it is clear that the answer is no. The text of the Act does not mention sexual orientation, and there is no controlling Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Act to prohibit such discrimination. As a result, any...…1964 would be an unjustifiable violation of the rule of law.

The better approach to the case of Bostock would be to lobby legislators to once more amend the law. That is the correct legal process for change. It is not the duty of the Supreme Court to make such changes. The Court exists to interpret the laws passed by Congressnot to change the laws by adding new definitions or meanings to them based on contemporary need.

The majority opinion in the ruling of Bostock is therefore in the wrong. It cannot be supported legally, although some may wish to support the ruling morally. Morality, however, should have nothing to do with the job of a justice of the Supreme Court. It is not the duty of such a justice to bring morality to any case. It is only the duty of such a justice to interpret the text of the law as it is writtenno more, no less. Thus, the dissenting opinion must conclude that there is no justification for Bostocks appeal: Title VII does not warrant such justification, nor can this Court give it. Nor ought this Court give…