General Lee, Mission Command and Chancellorsville

Introduction

GEN Lee and LTG Jackson had a great deal of trust for one another, and that led to a victory at Chancellorsville. However, that victory came with a cost: the loss of LTG Jackson, a much beloved leader throughout the South. While initially the flanking maneuver authorized by GEN Lee appeared to be a good one, based on competence, mutual trust, shared understanding and risk acceptance, by the end of the day the soldiers were skittish and failure to communicate adequate mission orders led to a chaotic and tragic ending for the Confederacy. This paper will discuss the mission command principles at the heart of the Battle of Chancellorsville and how these principles were used effectively and ineffectively.

Mission Command Principles

Mission command is defined in the Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 as the exercise of authority and direction by thecommanderusing missionorders to enable disciplined initiative within thecommander'sintent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.[footnoteRef:2] The principles of mission command are: [2: McBride, D. & Snell, R. (2017). Applying mission command to overcome challenges. Retrieved from https://www.army.mil/article/179942/applying_mission_command_to_overcome_challenges]

1. Competence

2. Mutual trust.

3. Shared understanding.

4. Commanders intent.

5. Mission orders.

6. Disciplined initiative.

7. Risk acceptance.[footnoteRef:3] [3: ADP 6-0 (Mission Command) July 2019, 1-7.]

General Lees Demonstration of Mission Command Principles at Chancellorsville

First of all, Lee demonstrated superior competence at Chancellorsville. He understood that the morale of Hookers army was likely low, coming off a defeat at Fredericksburg just a month prior. Hooker had organized his army to take the offensive but then gave up that objective and took up a defensive posture. This essentially placed the ball in GEN Lees court and GEN Lee chose to engage. The idea to strike while the iron is hot was not lost on him, and he therefore organized his men to determine whether there was any way to attack Hookers army.

This organization showed that GEN Lee was also able to demonstrate the principle of shared understanding, for it was during the evening of May 1-2 that he and LTG Stonewall Jackson met to confer. During the meeting, intelligence arrived that Hookers right flank was exposed. This represented a vulnerability that GEN Lee could use to his advantage. It was clear to all that the force left behind at Fredericksburg was not going to do much good, so GEN Lee gave the order for his army to take the offensive and attack. LTG Jackson was given orders to lead the attack and Jeb Stuart was ordered to screen the flanking assault.

GEN Lee also had established mutual trust between himself and his men,...

GEN Lee knew the risk of dividing his army in the face of a force twice as large. Yet he trust LTG Jackson to accomplish the objective set out at the meeting, and LTG Jackson trusted the reconnaissance report from his own cartographer Major Hotchkiss, who had found the open road to Hookers exposed right flank. LTG Jackson told GEN Lee he wanted to take his whole corps with him to attack that flank. GEN Lee gave permission. There was no quarreling or doubting: the trust across the board was complete. GEN Lee would keep his two divisions back in order to deceive Hooker while LTG Jackson marched his whole corps 12 miles in secrecy to the open right flank and attack.

Here, GEN Lee also demonstrated the principle of acceptance of risk. GEN Lee knew the risk of allowing the force to be divided and yet he accepted that risk based on well-reasoned understanding of the facts. Hooker, who had settled his five corps into a...

…orders may have prevented LTG Jackson from putting himself in harms way. But then he likely also trusted his own men not to attack him upon his return. Here, the trust appears to have been misplaced, particularly given the circumstances. Thus, on the one hand, trust enabled the flanking maneuver to be a success, trust proved to be a problem area when LTG Jackson sought to advance his men and continue the attack against Hooker. In this regard, poor utilization of the principle of trust was used by LTG Jackson, and poor utilization of the principle of mission orders was used by GEN Lee. GEN Lee did not like to micromanage, but he should have been clear with LTG Jackson about what the orders were by the end of day so as not to take on any added risk such as friendly fire accidents occurring. [5: Sears, Stephen W.Chancellorsville. HMH, 2014.]

Conclusion

The idea of a flanking maneuver was a good one and GEN Lee made a competent decision to authorize it. There was mutual trust between himself and LTG Lee as well as between himself and MG Early in the rear. The overall action went well; a shared understanding had been established, and the accepted risk was seen to be worth taking. At the end of the day, however, mission orders became confused as LTG Jackson hesitated with respect to whether to continue the assault on Hookers flank. He rode forward to assess the situation himself and was fired upon during his return. The risk had been accepted, but the lack of clarity in orders led to tragedy by the end of the day of the attack. Had mission orders been more carefully communicated and executed, LTG Jackson might not have died and the war might have ended differently.

Bibliography

ADP 6-0 (Mission Command)…