Severe Tornado Outbreak in the Southern United States

Interagency Cooperation of Incident Management

Severe Tornado Outbreak in the Southern United States, April 2011

Brief Description

On 27-28th April 2011, America witnessed its severest tornado outbreak since the year 1974. The month became one among the most devastating, active, and fatal tornado months recorded for the nation, serving as a potential benchmark for future months. SPC (Storm Prediction Center) information reveals a total of 875 preliminary tornadoes were reported in that month, with the final count of tornadoes approaching an all-time high of 542 following completion of storm surveys (NOAA, 2011). The prior record for April was a total of 267 tornadoes in April of 1974, with the highest for all months being May 2003, which witnessed 542 tornadoes (NOAA, 2011). Regarding April tornadoes, the 3-decade average was 135 (NOAA, 2011). In April, a large number of major, multi-day outbreaks of tornadoes impacted the nation, with the regions being hit the hardest being the Southeast, Southern Plains, Mid-Atlantic region, and Ohio River Valley (NOAA, 2011).

Importance of the disaster

The 2011 tornado outbreak had been a severe climatic disaster that could be compared to, and possibly even surpassed, the outbreak on April 3–4, 1974. While the overall tornadoes in one day (199) were greater in number as compared to that of 1974 (148), the percentage of area covered by the 2011 outbreak was roughly a fourth of that covered by the 1974 tornadoes, rendering the former disaster highly concentrated (Knupp et al., 2014). Thus, a significant impact was witnessed in the impacted area (AL, specifically). Another key element to remember is that super tornado outbreaks can alter the short-term climatologies of tornadoes to a great extent, as proven by Smith and colleagues’ (2012) research that covered the period between 2003 and 2012.

Analysis of the emergency operations center at the local government level

The NWS (National Weather Service) had, for several days, been observing, with progressive alarm, the unsteady meteorological conditions that were developing over the Southern and Western regions. On April 23, 2011, the Hydro-meteorological Prediction Center of the Weather Service warned of a potential major heavy rainfall occurs in the Ohio and mid-Mississippi River valleys with the capacity of generating moderate or heavy rainfall together with thunderstorms. It was concluded that hail, tornadoes, strong winds, and other extreme weather events could accompany the severest storms. This was the earliest tornado mention by the Center (TRAC, 2012).

Everything didn’t go wrong on April 27; rather, a great number of things did go right, which was a positive starting point when it comes to considering preparedness. There weren’t power outages in every place the tornadoes struck, and the utility crews were able to restore service to major sectors quickly. Further, some edifices in the path of the tornadoes continued to stand with minimal damage. In contrast, edifices surrounding them were destroyed, sometimes on account of sheer good luck, though usually on account of the application of good construction techniques. In several cases, emergency and first-response services went as was planned. Backup generators were able to powerhouses, healthcare institutions, and companies as desired. Safe rooms and shelters were able to serve their required purposes effectively. Several individuals had adequate awareness of the disaster’s seriousness, following its advance on the radio, TV, internet, and their mobile phones, thereby heeding the traditional sirens. The NWS-certified StormReady program of the University of Alabama was able to alert students, educators effectively, and other employees using SMS and email messages to find shelter before the striking of one among the deadliest tornadoes of the day in Tuscaloosa (Riley & Krautmann, 2013).

Innumerable unwelcome challenges sprung up with numerous participants about collaborating with FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), of which one was the frequent rule changes which rendered it hard to plan and anticipate the ideal response to the disaster. Likewise, several FEMA workers deployed in the tornado region are regularly rotated and temporary, with each interpreting rules in their way and most lacking local knowledge imperative to effective situation assessment. A second dissatisfaction involved FEMA’s requirements for its hazard mitigation plan (Riley & Krautmann, 2013).

A certain degree of miscommunication is understandable and unavoidable when several entities collaborate for a short duration, even with prompt planning and previous experience. Nearly all participants cited one or more instances of overlap or confusion between non-governmental, local, state, and federal agencies (Riley & Krautmann, 2013). According to one city EM, confusion initially existed between volunteer and church groups, with one county EM citing early overlap of volunteer service regions (e.g., several groups ended up distributing meals in the very same area). Further, not-for-profit participants identified confusion, miscommunication, and repetitions as well in the area of providing meals and care to tornado-hit regions. Lastly, challenges arose concerning donation management and debris removal involving multiple jurisdictions (Riley & Krautmann, 2013).

The Homeland Security Department’s FIMA (Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration) is in charge of studying these events’ built environmental impacts. As a response to technical assistance requests from Regional FEMA offices within affected states, a MAT (Mitigation Assessment Team) was deployed for analyzing the damage done and offering technical guidance to impacted communities via Joint Field Offices instituted as a disaster response measure (FEMA, 2012). The deployment aimed at evaluating the performance of edifices, infrastructure, storm shelters, tornado refuges, safe rooms, and hardened areas impacted by these tornadoes. The team was first deployed to Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, and Mississippi on May 6, 2011, followed by being re-deployed to the state of Missouri on June 1, 2011. The team encompassed scientists, communication experts, FEMA Regional Office and Headquarters engineers, academicians, construction sector experts, practicing architects, and civil engineers (FEMA, 2012).

The interface between the public and private sectors

The disaster’s hallmarks were the torrent of local community support, both nationwide and worldwide. This attention proved advantageous to impacted regions, though it did simultaneously generate challenges such as handling great quantities of donations and a flood of volunteers. Several EMs teamed up with non-profits, such as churches having established connections with interested volunteers (Riley & Krautmann, 2013). According to a city EM, regional volunteer management directives for disasters, created based on experiences with a 2010 tornado event, offered the basis for working with volunteers. The plan partially encompasses looking at non-government organizations’ and the city’s key competencies and ascertaining who already performs necessary activities, instead of establishing novel organizations for performing them. However, proper plan staffing proved tricky (Riley & Krautmann, 2013).