Alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol Climate Change

Alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol

Climate Change

The effort to bring about effective changes in energy policy worldwide began with the emergence of scientific evidence showing greenhouse gas concentrations and global surface temperatures had both increased over a geologically short period of time, to unprecedented levels within the last 20,000 years (Betsill, 107). This evidence fueled a series of conferences during the last half of the 20th century. Midway through this series the first target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions was defined in Toronto, Canada, at the 1988 World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere (Betsill, 106). The "Toronto Target" set a goal of reducing worldwide CO2 emissions to 20% below 1988 levels by 2005.

The Toronto conference may have set the first goal for mitigating rising surface temperatures, but getting countries around the world to agree has been extremely difficult. The structure within which global negotiations for reducing greenhouse gas emissions has occurred, has been defined by United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC). This structure brought together over 185 countries to ratify the 1992 UNFCCC convention, which established the goals, considerations, and responsibilities for reducing emissions (Betsill, 109). When a subset of the participants expressed the need to set binding timetables and goals, the United States balked, citing the potentially catastrophic consequences this would have on world economies (Betsill, 112). At the time, the United States was the top producer of greenhouse gases in the world and conference attendees chose to make concessions rather than force the United States to walk away from negotiations.

At subsequent UNFCCC meetings, participants realized the concessions that were made to keep the United States involved were unrealistic if they hoped to bring about emissions reductions that could reduce global warming. A series of annual meetings culminated in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which stated an explicit goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2012 (Betsill, 113). A number of mechanisms for bringing this about were also outlined and negotiated over subsequent years. The first attempt to ratify the Kyoto protocol occurred in 2000, but failed because negotiations for several technical issues had not been resolved.

In a remarkable display of unity the rest of the participants pushed ahead and finalized negotiations on the unresolved issues by the end of 2001 (Betsill, 113). Article 25 in the Protocol declared ratification would occur once 55 or more countries signed the Protocol, as long as they represented 55% of 1990 sources of greenhouse gases. The newly-elected President of the United States, George W. Bush, called the Kyoto Protocol "fatally flawed" and withdrew from the negotiations (Betsill, 113). This left Russia, who was responsible for 17% of 1990 emissions, as the last remaining hope for ratification. Then President Putin signed the Protocol in 2004, reportedly after a careful assessment of how the Russian industrial sector could benefit, rather than out of any interest in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The Limited Success of the Kyoto Protocol

Despite overwhelming support by the vast majority of countries in the world, the Kyoto Protocol has failed to reign in greenhouse gas emissions. Betsill (118-120) argues that the biggest benefit of establishing a worldwide climate change regime has probably been making global warming a recognizable term the world over and giving credibility to the theory that the rise in surface temperatures is the result of fossil fuel consumption. In addition, major polluters like the United States are increasingly engaging in programs to reduce emissions and speaking in ways that suggest reducing emissions is official domestic policy. The formation of an international climate change regime has therefore legitimatized the theory that greenhouse gas emissions are causing global warming in most countries of the world.

Despite this limited positive assessment of UNFCCC's value, Haas takes a much harder line and argues that the resources expended on negotiating and ratifying the Kyoto Protocol have diverted needed attention away from other environmental issues like biodiversity and water quality (3). In fact, Haas suggests that the rhetoric that countries now use when speaking about controlling greenhouse gas emissions belies a 'business as usual' domestic policy that does little to address climate change (3). Haas goes so far as to suggest the global climate change regime process did not work and that real change will only come with more local efforts. Suggestions include meaningful government investment in research and development programs that produce alternative energy sources, k-12 education programs, and regional, national, state, and local autonomous efforts to limit and reduce emissions (5-6).

The truth probably lies somewhere in between, since it would be hard to separate the influence of the global climate change regime over the past half century from the emergence of state and regional efforts to reduce emissions. In spite of this difference, both Betsill and Haas express pessimism about the chances that the Kyoto Protocol will realize any of its goals. An explanation for its failure can be found in Arild Underdal's "law of least ambitious program," which states the least interested party or parties determines the terms of any agreement (Victor, 90). With respect to the Kyoto Protocol, this would be the United States and its insistence on the broad use of "flexible mechanisms" to achieve CO2 emission targets (Betsill, 112). Flexible mechanisms consist of legal transactions that allow the exportation of emission reduction responsibility through carbon trading and clean energy investments in other countries (Betsill, 114).