Civil War and War

¶ … New Technology/Changes in Warfare from End of French Revolution/Napoleonic Wars to American Civil War Beginning Warfare Change in Technology In France, reforms began after the great Seven-Year-long war. The war ended in French calamity in1763. Evidently, it was important to have reforms to field soldiers that could fight for French interests and honor. The government suggested that light infantry should be increased. This later brought about initiatives for conventional infantry training in techniques for light infantry.

This training created soldiers that could fight both in open and close order. The multiple gun calibers used by the artillery unit were taken away; and they were left with only four varieties. There were new guns, which were more portable and lighter than the earlier ones. The new guns featured standardized segments and enclosed rounds.

Lidell-Hart stated that according to Jean du Teil, "light mobile guns for use in the field when used at high rates against infantry instead of counter-battery work can be significant in combat." Undoubtedly, Napoleon absorbed this principle while he was an artillery administrator under the command of Du Teil's elder brother. The soldiers carried an infantry weapon (smoothbore flintlock musket) to war. Under favorable conditions, a skilled soldier could use his weapon around two or three times per minute and if lucky, shoot a target 150 yards away.

In order to benefit from this limited range, inexact, slow shooting weapon, soldiers were usually arrayed linearly, three positions deep, in order to inflict maximum firing capability. The main thing in training back then was moving the soldiers fast from their marching columns into lines by means of fast volley fire [2]. The soldiers were warned against portraying individual initiative. Officers on the other hand concentrated on aligning the formations and directing the soldiers' fire.

Napoleonic tactics and strategy were keenly analyzed by the initial great war theorists, Carl von Clausewitz; Prussian general and Antoine Jomini; French general. On War by Clausewitz stressed the close connection between national policy and war and the significance of the doctrines of mass force economy, and the annihilation of the enemy's forces. Jomini stressed occupying the territory of the enemy through keenly organized, fast, and accurate geometric maneuvers.

Jomini's theories influenced North America and France, while Clausewitz's teachings particularly influenced the great strategies of the Prussian military in the 1800s. They included Helmuth von Moltke; who led his army successfully against the French in 1870 and Schlieffen; who came up with the Schlieffen defense plan against the Russians and French envelopment. Germans used the Schliffen plan in the Second World War.

The 1800s were years of far-reaching change in technology that greatly changed the strategy and tactics, a change experienced in the so-called first total warfare, the Civil War in the U.S.A. Steamships and railroads increased the speed, reach, and volume of conscription and mobilization. The unswerving support of the war industry turned critical. In the early years of the 1800s, between 1815 and 1848, there was a long peaceful period in Europe, and the industrial expansion was extraordinary.

In America as well, apart from their 1812-1815 war against England and the 1846-1848 Mexican War, there was political tranquility as well as remarkable national growth until the great Civil war began[footnoteRef:1]. Industrial Revolution led to civilians being responsible for providing industrial resources for war. The workshop was now an important element in the struggle; it was the battlefield. Through chemistry, there was tremendous progress during the 19th century. However, a setback emerged before most new discoveries had any effect on military technology.

Many of the ordinary present-day explosives were found back in the 1800s. Back then, there were rockets, but they were not used productively. Throughout the 1800s, advancements in steel and iron manufacturing were cumulative and steady. [1: Zapotoczny] By the end of the first half of the 19th century, the logistics in the military included both the old and new technological inventions. The railroad was used to move supplies and troops fifteen times faster than their speed when marching.

Conversely, past the railhead, troops would still march, while draft animals continued to draw supply wagons. Therefore, the rail outline started to take up the function of the strategy framework. The only soldiers that mastered the tactic of using defensive and offensive strategies together were the Prussians. Soldiers from the 1800s were clingy to the Napoleonic techniques even long after being outdated by advancements in rifled weapons. This delay was partly because of the fast rate at which the mid-century wars took place in succession.

There was little time, even for thoughtful soldiers to assess the lessons they learnt. The U.S. Civil War brought about great political and social disorder. At the same time, it brought about technological change. Military men and inventors came up with new kinds of armaments, like the submarine and repeating rifle, which permanently altered the way in which they fought3. Of even more significance were the inventions that were not meant particularly for war, such as the telegraph and railroad.

Such innovations not only changed the way wars were fought, but also the way of life away from the wars. With regard to war, many people had a hard time adapting to the new armaments, which were against customary codes of honor and conduct for the military. This was particularly true for the submarine, as it was irregular and it was reliant on deception and skulking for it to be successful.

Society continued to relate to customary warfare concepts based on individual heroism and hand-to-hand combat long after the new armaments outdated them. New destructive weapons like the dumdum bullet and machine gun did not find anticipated support and use in European nations. However, in the European colonies, they were greatly used, where they helped the fewer Europeans conquer and control larger local populations. According to Moltke (1858), "the fundamental and universal advancements in infantry arms alone brought about the need for alteration in the techniques of every branch.

The infantry platoon's firepower goes beyond the destructive effect and range of the six-pounder cannon case-shot." His reaction to this overall necessity for reform was his endorsement of a combination of the benefits of flank ambush and the strategic defensive, alluring the adversary to attack, timing when to crash his attack with overpowering firepower, and finally destroying him with a devastating counterattack3. This strategy had obvious restrictions since it needed either an enemy that was ready to make the first move or a flank available for the attacking force.

The 1800s-war lacked neither of those. Summing it up, Moltke's military career of 70 years permanently legitimized and enhanced a long forceful tradition and fashioned a whole way of thinking for the military. Before the United States Civil War, the infantry troops usually took muskets with them that only could only hold a single bullet[footnoteRef:2]. The muskets' range was around 250 yards. Nonetheless, a soldier attempting to target and fire with any precision had to be close to their target, because the weapon had an effective range of around 80 yards.

Conversely, rifles had much more range than that of muskets; rifles could fire up to 1,000 yards. In addition, they had better accuracy than the muskets. Other new weapons were used in air, such as Union spies, which went above Confederate battle lines and encampments in passenger balloons filled with hydrogen. They could send back reconnaissance messages to their leaders by means of telegraph, and could move into the sea. The "Iron-clad" warships lurked about the coast, keeping a Confederate ports Union blockade.

Even more important were the larger-scale technological inventions like the railroad4. Yet again, the Union had the decisive upper hand. During the initial stages of the war, the railroad truck occupied 22,000.