What is needed, then, is a concept of free will that can effectively counter the claims of naturalists that there is no physical basis for free will. It requires a different kind of free will that permits moral responsibility to be leveled squarely at the individual without ignoring the reality that sometimes there are external causes to internal decisions. In fact, some philosophers have even used the conceptual tools of the naturalists to make the argument that free will can exist in a deterministic world. Daniel Dennet argues that the deterministic universe provides the reliable framework of reality by which informed, individual choices can be made (Bailey par. 14-17). Without some determinism in the universe, it would be impossible for free will to functionally exist, because no one would ever be able to make a rational choice in a purely chaotic world. So free will requires some level of determinism.
But determinism is not the same thing as fatalism. The latter states that an event will happen no matter what one does, while the former posits that one's actions are dependent on what happens. Human beings, Dennet explains, are choice machines instead of situation machines like other creatures in the universe. We consider the options available and consequences of actions, and then act accordingly, our actions influenced by outside factors but not controlled by them. This is in opposition to situation machines, such as animals, that can only respond in particular ways to particular...
27-29). True free will and volition requires this kind of conceptual knowledge of the world, instead of simple, automatic responses (Rand 21).
In fact, this is not so dissimilar from the
position of some naturalists such as Baron D'Holbach, who take the position that man cannot be a free agent because he is moved by causes, not by a will that is independent of those causes (D'Holbach 333). In fact, the will must be independent of exterior causes, at least insomuch as the individual is independent of the world around him. True, that individual can be influenced by the world, as can his or her will. But the world, contrary to the assertions and claims of D'Holbach and the naturalists, does not provide the final say on the choices and behaviors of the individual. That responsibility, that moral responsibility, can only be placed on the individual and the strength of his or her free will.
It would seem, then, that free will is not only necessary from an ethical standpoint, but that it is entirely consistent with the world that we experience around us. Free will can be influenced by the outside causes, but these causes are not the end to the story of choice and volition as the naturalists would claim. Rather, the individual possesses the ability to interpret and choose based on those influences -- and any other internal or external factors -- and make decisions wholly independent of the world. That is the basis for free will, which will remain the core of ethical and moral responsibility for human beings.
Works Cited
Bailey, Ronald. "Pulling Our Own Strings." Reason May 2003. 3 Mar. 2007 http://www.reason.com/news/show/28782.html.
Clark, Tom. "Is Free Will a Necessary Fiction?"
Naturalism.org. Nov. 2005. 3 Mar. 2007 http://www.naturalism.org/fiction.html.
D'Holbach, Baron. "We Are Completely Determined." In Philosophy: The Quest for Truth. 6th ed. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006: 333-338.
Frost, S.E. Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers. New York: Anchor Books, 1989.
Rand, Ayn. "The Objectivist
Ethics." In the Virtue of Selfishness. New York: Penguin Books, 1964: 13-39.
