Soviet Perspective of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Soviet Perspective of the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban missile crisis -- that is also referred to as October crisis in Cuba as well as the Caribbean crisis within the Soviet Union -- was the clash between USSR/Cuba and the U.S. states for a total of 13 days. The crisis or what most people refer to as a crucial part of the Cold War at the time, primarily happened in October 1962. Prior to the clash, the U.S. government had tried to overthrow the Cuban administration leading to incidents like the Bay of Pigs and the Operation Mongoose. This was done due to the fact that the Cuban and Soviet government authorities had privately started to construct bases in Cuba for several medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) having the ability to strike the majority of the continental U.S. States. This course of action then lead to the 1958 deployment of Thor IRBMs within the United Kingdom (Project Emily) and Jupiter IRBMs to Italia and Poultry in the year 1961 -- these were primarily a lot more than 100 U.S.-built missiles that had the capacity and range to stage and complete nuclear attacks on Moscow. On October 14, 1962, a U.S. States Air Pressure U-2 plane on the photoreconnaissance mission came back with convincing data and evidence that there were Soviet missile bases being built within Cuba.

Blockades and Demands

The pivotal importance of this ensuing crisis, which can be easily ranked with other important incidents of the Cold War like the Berlin Blockade, the Suez Crisis and also the Yom Kippur War, is customarily referred to as the moment where the Cold War came nearest to turning out to be a nuclear conflict (Marfleet, 2002), or a potential WWIII, where it's believed that 100 million People in America and also over 100 million Russians might have perished if the crisis had escalated (Allison, 2012). The crisis offered the very first recorded demonstration of the practical risk of mutual assured destruction (MAD). The concept of Mad was discussed for the first time as an integral and identifying element in a significant worldwide arms agreement (ThinkQuest, 1997; Letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev, 2010).

The U.S. States considered striking Cuba through the air as well as using oceanic attacks, but made the decision on the military blockade rather, calling it a "quarantine," for legal along with other political reasons (May, 2011). The United States stated on a global front that it wouldn't permit offensive weapons to be shipped to Cuba and required the Soviets disengage the construction of any and all missile bases already being built or in the process of being built within Cuba and take away all the offensive weapons within Cuba. The Kennedy administration held merely a slim hope that their requirements and demands would be met, and expected a more aggressive or even a military response. Premier Nikita Khrushchev, representing the Soviet response, authorized, inside a personal telegram to Kennedy that his blockade (May, 2011) of navigation in global air space and seas merely instigated an aggressive response that will most likely channel mankind in the chasm of the world nuclear-missile war.

The Soviets openly gave in to the U.S. demands on the forefront, however behind the scenes communications started to present offers and strategies to solve the crisis. The clash finished on October 28, 1962 (Universal Newsreel, 1962). This was when President Kennedy and UN Secretary-General arrived at a public (on-the-record) and secret (off -- the record) contract with Khrushchev. Openly i.e. On the global front, the Russians agreed to disengage in all construction and use of their offensive weaponry extension in Cuba and send them back towards the U.S.S.R. territory, susceptible to UN verification, in return for an American public statement and contract not to invade Cuba. Privately, the United States agreed it would also disengage all U.S.-built Jupiter IRBMs used in Poultry and Italia.

A couple of weeks following the agreement, the Soviets had transported a majority of the missile systems within Cuba as well as their support gear. It took a total of eight Soviet ships and the transportation started out on November 5th and ended by the 9th. Similarly, almost a month later in the first week of December the Russian ships also transported the Soviet Il-28 bombers back to Russia. This particular blockade (May, 2011) was officially ended on November 20th, 1962. Similar patterns were exhibited by the Americans when several weeks following the agreement, the U.S. military deactivated all weapons engagement before September 1963. One more good result of the discussions that sprung out due to this agreement was the development of the Hotline Agreement as well as the Moscow-Washington hotline that lead to immediate communication networks and lucid outcomes between Moscow and Washington, D.C.

Soviet's perception of the Cuban Missile Crisis

In the month of May 1962, the Russian leader at the time -- Nikita Khrushchev -- was convinced by the thought of countering the U.S. States' increasing dominance in developing and implementing proper missiles by positioning Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles within the region of Cuba. He faced proper and authentic evidence in which the U.S. was perceived to possess a "splendid first strike" capacity over the U.S.S.R. In 1962, the Soviets had only 20 ICBMs that were capable to deliver nuclear warheads towards the U.S. States from the U.S.S.R. (Allison et al., 1999). Poor precision, use and toughness for these missiles elevated serious doubts regarding their effectiveness. A more recent, more dependable version of ICBMs was only on offer for use after the year 1964 (Allison et al., 1999). Hence, the Soviet nuclear capacity in 1962 placed less focus on ICBMs as opposed to the medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs). These medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles could strike the American alliances from various Soviet territories, although not from an area close to America itself. Graham Allison, the director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and Worldwide Matters, highlights, that "the Soviet Union could right the nuclear imbalance by deploying new ICBMs on its own soil. But to meet the threat it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had few options. Moving existing nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American targets was one" (Allison et al., 1999)

Another reason Soviet missiles were used within the region of Cuba was because Khrushchev desired to unite access the West Berlin region with the Soviet expanse i.e. he wanted full access within the American/British/French-administered democratic territory inside the Communist East Germany. The East Spanish people and Soviets considered western treatments for some of Berlin a dire risk to the sovereignty of East Germany. Because of this, amongst others, Khrushchev made West Berlin the central battleground for this particular section of the Cold War. Khrushchev thought when the Americans didn't do anything within the missile disengagements in Cuba, he could potentially break free into the air space from Berlin using stated missiles like a restraint to western counter-measures in Berlin. When the America democracy attempted to bargain using the Soviets after realizing the extent and expanse of the missiles, Khrushchev could demand buying and selling the missiles for and from West Berlin. Since Berlin was smartly more essential to penetrate geographically than Cuba, the trade will be a win for Khrushchev. President Kennedy recognized this as "the advantage is, from Khrushchev's point-of-view, he takes a great chance but there are quite some rewards to it" (Allison et al., 1999)

Finally, Khrushchev seemed to be responding simply towards the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles that the U.S. States had set up in Poultry throughout April 1962 (Correll, 2005).

In the beginning, the Soviet's operation required elaborate denial and deceptiveness, known within the U.S.S.R. As Maskirovka (Hansen, 2010). All the planning and preparation for moving and implementing the use and engagement of missiles were completed within the utmost mysterious approach. The troops detailed for that mission received misdirection, and were told that these missiles were going to a chilly region and fitted with ski boots, fleece-lined parkas, along with additional winter gear (Hansen, 2010). The Soviet code title, Operation Anadyr, seemed to be the title of the river flowing in to the Bering Ocean, as well as the title for the capital of Chukotsky District, along with a bomber base within the Asian region. Each one of these were designed to hide this program from both internal and exterior audiences (Hansen, 2010).

At the beginning of 1962, several members of the Soviet forces and missile engagement experts travelled with a farming delegation to the state of Havana. They attended a conference with another influential Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The Cuban leadership were built with a strong expectation that the U.S. would aim to take-over Cuba again plus they, with excitement, approved the thought of setting up nuclear missiles in Cuba. The experts within the missile engagement underneath the guise of "machine operators," "irrigation specialists" and "agricultural specialists" also arrived in the region in the summer of 1962 (Hansen, 2010). Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, who was the Soviet Rocket Forces Chief at the time, brought a market research team that arrived within Cuba. He told Khrushchev the missiles could be hidden and camouflaged through the palms (Correll, 2005).

The Cuban leadership was further upset as September came along as the U.S. States Congress accepted the U.S. Joint Resolution 230. This resolution basically stated that Congress's solution to evade the development of an externally-assisted military structure (Bligh et al., 2002). On the day that, the United States introduced a significant military exercise within the Caribbean, titled the PHIBRIGLEX-62, Cuba denounced globally that this move was like a purposeful aggravation and proof the U.S. having the intention to once again take over the region of Cuba (Blight al, 2002).

Khrushchev and Castro decided to place proper nuclear missiles privately in Cuba. Similar to the perspective of Castro, Khrushchev felt that the potential of U.S. taking over Cuba was looming, and thus to get rid of that link for Russia from Cuba to the western territory would do great injury to the communist cause, particularly in Latin America. He stated he desired to face the American democracy "using more than mere words, and instead use an aggressive action and the most logical aggressive action was the use of missiles (Weldes, 1999). The Soviets were able to sustain the level of secrecy by encoding their overall plans and getting approval from Rodion Malinovsky as well as Khrushchev for those plans across the first week of July.

The Soviet leadership was sure of the fact that, according to their thought of Kennedy's insufficient confidence throughout the Bay of Pigs Invasion, he would evade any form of clash and recognize the missiles like a fait accompli (Absher, 2009). On the eve of September 11, the U.S.S.R. openly cautioned that the U.S. strike on Cuba or on the Soviet ships transporting supplies towards the island would be interpreted as an invitation to war (Absher, 2009). The Soviets continued on with their Maskirovka program to hide their actions in Cuba. They frequently refused that the use and engagement of weapons within the region of Cuba was aimed to be offensive in character. On September 7, the Soviet Ambassador stationed within the U.S. States -- Anatoly Dobrynin assured the U.S. States Ambassador for the UN -- Adlai Stevenson -- that the U.S.S.R. was delivering a range of merely defensive weaponry within Cuba. On September 11, the Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (which is a Soviet News Agency also known simply as TASS) stated expressively that the U.S.S.R. didn't have any aims or requirements for introducing an offensive nuclear missiles strike on the state of Cuba. On October 13, Dobrynin was asked by former Undersecretary of State -- Chester Bowles -- about the aims and intentions of the Soviets for placing the offensive weaponry and gear within Cuba. He refused to have any aggressive plans (Blight et al., 2002). And again on October 17, the Soviet embassy representative Georgy Bolshakov sent President Kennedy a "personal message" from the Russian leader -- Khrushchev -- where he reassured him that "on no account would surface-to-surface missiles be delivered and/or engaged in Cuba" (Blight et al., 2002).

As soon as the month of August in 1962 started, the U.S. States suspected the Soviets of creating missile facilities in Cuba. Throughout that month, its intelligence services collected details about sightings by ground experts of Russian-built MiG-21 martial artists and Il-28 light bombers. There was evidence of a number of U-2 spy planes found S-75 Dvina (NATO designation SA-2) surface-to-air missile industries that work coherently placed and working across eight differing regions in Cuba. The CIA director at the time -- John A. McCone -- grew suspicious with this chain of activity. Delivering antiaircraft missiles into Cuba, he believed, was logical only when Moscow intended for their services to defend basics for ballistic missiles targeted in the U.S. States (Allison et al., 1999). On August 10, he authorized a memo to President Kennedy by which he stated his suspicions of the Soviet networks and their intention to probably planning the engagement of ballistic missiles within Cuba (Correll, 2005). On August 31, Senator of the state of New York at the time -- Kenneth Keating -- who most likely attained all his evidence and confirmation date from the Cuban exiles within Florida (Correll, 2005), cautioned on the Senate meetings that the U.S.S.R. might be creating a missile base within the vicinities of Cuba for aggressive purposes (Absher, 2009).

Air Pressure General Curtis LeMay showed a pre-invasion strike plan and intention to President Kennedy in the month of September, while, on the other, the spy plane tickets and smaller military clashes for the U.S. forces at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were the topic of frequent Cuban diplomatic protests to the federal government (Absher, 2009).

The fact was that the very first consignment of R-12 missiles surfaced on record around the evening of September 8, then another on the day of September 16. The R-12 missile had been the very first fully-functionaly intermediate-range ballistic missile for the Soviets. It was also the very first missile that was mass-created at that expansive level and, it was also the first Soviet missile used that had a thermonuclear warhead. It had been just one-stage, transportable, surface-released, storage liquid propellant fuelled missile that may bring or transport a megaton-level nuclear weapon (Correll, 2005). The Soviets were in the process of constructing a total of nine different sites, six of which were being constructed for the R-12 medium-range missiles (NATO designation SS-4 Sandal) and three designated sites for R-14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (NATO designation SS-5 Skean). The former would be spread across 2,000 kms (1,200 mi) while the latter would be spread across 4,500 kms (2,800 mi) (Correll, 2005).

The political and military motivations of the United States

The American Democracy feared the Soviet growth of Communism, however for a Latin American nation to freely support using the territory of USSR was regarded as unacceptable, because of the Soviet-American clash. This kind of participation would also openly challenge the Monroe Doctrine a U.S. States standard which, while restricting the U.S. States' participation with European colonies and European matters, alleged that European forces should not have participation with states within the Western Hemisphere.

The U.S. States had been embarrassed openly through the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961 that was lead by President Kennedy against the CIA-trained masses of Cuban exiles. After, former Leader Eisenhower told Kennedy that the failure from the Bay of Pigs will encourage the Soviets to behave differently and more defiantly (Absher, 2009). The half-hearted strike had also encouraged the likes of Nikita Khrushchev and the advisors with the idea that Kennedy was indecisive, youthful, intellectual, and ill-prepared for making decisions in emergency situations (Absher, 2009). U.S. covert procedures that were ongoing in the year 1961 were primarily using the futile structure of Operation Mongoose (Absher, 2009).

Additionally, Khrushchev's perception of Kennedy's limitations was completed and supported through the President's soft response throughout the Berlin Crisis of 1961, especially regarding the issue of the Berlin Wall. Talking with Soviet authorities as a direct consequence from the crisis, Khrushchev understood several reasons why Kennedy did not have a powerful background, nor, in most cases, did he possess the courage to endure a significant challenge. Also, he told his boy Sergei that on Cuba, Kennedy will most like first create a fussy interaction, take it a few notches, but then, finally agree to the terms that Khrushchev would set (Rodriguez, 1989).

In the month of January 1962, General Edward Lansdale referred to the intentions to overthrow the Cuban Government inside a top-secret report (partly declassified 1989), addressed to President Kennedy and authorities associated with Operation Mongoose (Absher, 2009). CIA agents, specialists or "pathfinders" within the Special Activities Division may be transported into Cuba to handle damage and association, inclusive of aspects of radio broadcasts (Rodriguez, 1989). In Feb 1962, the U.S. States released a blockade against Cuba (Rodriguez, 1989), and Lansdale also exhibited a supporting 26-page, highly-classified timetable for implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban Government, mandating that guerrilla procedures were to be practiced from August and September. This timetable also stated that in the very first few days of October the intention was to freely revolt against and overthrow the Communist government in the region " (Absher, 2009).

The missiles in Cuba permitted the Soviets to effectively target almost the whole continental U.S. States. The planned toolbox was forty launchers. The Cuban population willingly observed the appearance and deployment from the missiles and 100s of daily reports and news arrived at Miami. U.S. intelligence received numerous reviews and reports regarding several that were of dubious nature or perhaps laughable, and many of which might be ignored as explaining defensive missiles. Only five reports eventually bothered the U.S. experts. They referred to large trucks passing through cities during the night transporting very lengthy canvas-covered round objects that may not make turns through cities without copying and controlling. Defensive missiles might make these turns. These reviews couldn't be satisfactorily ignored and hence were monitored by the U.S. intelligence (Interview, 1999).

Half a century later

Since the Cold War has ended, its history has turned into a growth industry, though in reality there is no great shortage of historic analysis whilst the war was happening. Today, however, you find a particular generational divide as possibly the salient sign of the event even happening (Blanton, 1997).

Really conscious of the contingent character from the new sources, these youthful historians evade embarrassment with the traditional, philosophically separated schools of Cold War history. To generalize radically, the conventional school of Herbert Feis and Arthur Schlesinger, Junior., blamed the Cold Fight against the U.S.S.R. The unorthodox school of William Appleman Williams put all the blams on the need for the American economic development aimed to bully or degrade the global stature of the Soviets. The "post-revisionists," school primarily designed by John Lewis Gaddis, put forth a logic and practice based amalgam of these two sides, simply to talk and critique this event from a different viewpoint. The post-revisionist retort ended up being to dub the three aforementioned schools as "hawks," "doves," and "owls" (Blanton, 1997).

A couple of senior students and researchers during these debates also have dared to grapple using the current (previously unknown) evidence. None have been able to do so more convincingly than Gaddis himself. Gaddis, a historian at Ohio College now moving east to Yale, has created an amazing, provocative, as well as in no small degree a likeable revision of the Cold War historical account with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The job is appreciated and respected because, in subjecting the mistakes of prior governments and histories, Gaddis concentrates frequently on his own perceptions as opposed to countering others. The careful readers of footnotes may judge his approach and his notes to become the building blocks of the new school of Cold War history: auto-revisionism (Blanton, 1997).

Probably the most long lasting phrase summing up the Cuban Missile Crisis -- the climax from the Cold War and also the nearest the planet ever found itself to a nuclear Armageddon -- goes to Secretary of Condition Dean Rusk where he said that the clash was that between two stubborn forces and one buckled before the other to determine who came out on top. Thus was created the parable of adjusted brinkmanship -- the fact that should you stand tough in order to win backed up by nuclear brilliance and superiority -- which will be the difference at the 11th hour of the crisis. This myth has had untold effects in the planning of the Vietnam War and also the global nuclear arms race (Blanton, 1997).

Half a century later, we can see that "a different story began to emerge in 1969, when Thirteen Days, the posthumous memoir of Robert F. Kennedy, revealed that the resolution of the crisis (Khrushchev's withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba) came after a series of secret meetings in which RFK offered the Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin not threats of nuclear retaliation but an old-fashioned diplomatic deal: a pledge of no U.S. invasion of Cuba, plus the withdrawal of U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The terms, according to the memoir, were that this could not be an explicit quid pro quo and that the deal would never be publicly acknowledged by the United States. Further revisions of the myth emerged in the early 1980s, when former Kennedy aides Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, alarmed by what they saw as President Ronald Reagan's embrace of brinkmanship, warned the public that the Cuban Missile Crisis had not been resolved by America's nuclear superiority but by its conventional superiority in the Caribbean, which enabled restraint and the quarantine of Cuba" (Blanton, 1997).

Next was the trickling release of numerous declassified U.S. government reports and letters that were exchanged within the mid-eighties, including notes and transcripts from the conferences of John F. Kennedy's top advisors. The moment when the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted that they couldn't ensure the devastation using air strikes on all of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, Kennedy made the decision to complete whatever policies and strategies he could to prevent an invasion of Cuba along with a war over what he referred to as old-fashioned missiles within the region of Turkey. Later Rusk himself revealed Kennedy's readiness to surrender on the issue, if the crisis endured considerably longer, to propose a public Turkey-Cuba trade with the UN (Blanton, 1997).

The entire face of what the Cuban missile crisis was in 1962 has thus changed and the overall historical accounts and analysis are no longer relevant or complete without a complete review of all the declassified documents and the facts of interactions that they revealed between and amongst the Cubans, Americans and the Russians (Blanton, 1997). The importance of these new facts is expressed by Blanton in his review where he writes:

"Many of these revelations first saw the light of day at a series of conferences organized by James Blight and Janet [sic] Lang of the Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Held between 1987 and 1992, these "critical oral history" sessions included Kennedy aides, Soviet participants, and finally Cuban veterans (among them Fidel Castro), and they produced more revelations: that along with intermediate-range missiles, the Soviet arsenal in Cuba included tactical nuclear warheads that might have been used if the United States had invaded; and that Cuba was very much an actor in its own right Castro at one point telling an increasingly alarmed Khrushchev to "use 'em or lose 'em" (Blanton, 1997).

Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro: the alliance between Cuba and Russia

In this section, we will discuss the relationship that existed between Khrushchev and Castro, who was the leader of Cuba at the time. We will discuss their relationship in the light of a letter that was exchanged between the two after an American plane was shot down in violation of the Cuban airspace. The message sent by Khrushchev on October 27 to Kennedy enables for the question of missile engagement to be settled to benefit and protect Cuba from an invasion and stop a break out of warfare. Kennedy's reply was then shared between Castro and Khrushchev, where Kennedy offered assurances the U.S. States won't invade Cuba using its own forces, nor would it permit its allies to handle an invasion. Khrushchev believed that by doing this the leader from the U.S. States had positively clarified Khrushchev's messages originally sent on October 26 and 27, 1962 (Khrushchev, 1962).

Khrushchev then drafted a reply to this message that was broadcast over the radio and thus not directly shared with Castro but Castro was informed before hand by Khrushchev as they were both in a secret alliance. The relationship between the two was that of mutual political respect and the alliance stood strong as they were able to design their way around the crisis by attaining agreements from the Americans that would mutually benefit Russia and Cuba. With this particular motive Khrushchev would consistently exchange recommendations with Castro, as well as alternations all through the crisis, and their exchange shows how they advised each other to not be caught up by sentiment and also to show firmness. Khrushchev was also very understanding of emotions of indignation that Castro felt toward the aggressive activities and strategies of the standards and norms of worldwide law for the U.S. States (Khrushchev, 1962).

Khrushchev and Castro were also aware of the fact that they needed to keep their mutually beneficial analysis a secret because, instead of law, what dominates may be the senselessness from the militarists in the U.S. Government. Since a contract was at sight during the Cuban Missile Crisis, they were aware that the U.S. Government was hunting for a pretext to frustrate this agreement. For this reason it was organizing the provocative plane tickets. Hence, they knew that their alliance was meant to be a secret. Furthermore, history also shows that Khrushchev consistently advised Castro on aerial shoot down of American spy planes especially when they shot one down flying lower over their territory. Khrushchev made sure that Castro was aware of the fact that such a step so close to an agreement could make the aggressors make the most of this type of step for their own reasons. The following excerpt from the letter exchanged between Castro and Khrushchev on October 28th, 1962 exhibits the closeness of their alliance and relationship:

"I would like to advise you in a friendly manner to show patience, firmness and even more firmness. Naturally, if there's an invasion it will be necessary to repulse it by every means. But we mustn't allow ourselves to be carried away by provocations, because the Pentagon's unbridled militarists, now that the solution to the conflict is in sight and apparently in your favor, creating a guarantee against the invasion of Cuba, are trying to frustrate the agreement and provoke you into actions that could be used against you. I ask you not to give them the pretext for doing that ... On our part, we will do everything possible to stabilize the situation in Cuba defend Cuba against invasion and assure you the possibilities for peacefully building a socialist society... I send you greetings, extensive to all your leadership group" (Khrushchev, 1962).

In response to this, Castro sent a letter to Khrushchev explaining the reasons behind shooting down the planes and also stated that "I appreciate extraordinarily the efforts you have made to keep the peace and we are absolutely in agreement with the need for struggling for that goal. If this is accomplished in a just, solid and definitive manner, it will be an inestimable service to humanity" (Castro, 1962).

Khrushchev and Kennedy: the relations that developed

Here, we will discuss the relationship that developed between Khrushchev and Kennedy. We will use a single incident of a shoot down of a U.S. plane in the Cuban air space as the foundation to describe all aspects of the interaction between the two leaders. The following excerpt is obtained from the ciphered telegram sent in the Dobrynin Cable towards the Soviet Foreign ministry on October 27th, 1962 (Cable, 1962):

This was perhaps the most crucial period of the relationship that was developing between Khrushchev and Kennedy during the Cuban Missile crisis. The overall role that Kennedy played here, despite the threat of an aggressive response to aerial strikes against planes, was a subservient and submissive one. This was interpreted as a weak approach by Khrushchev as has been stated above. However, in hindsight if we look at the approach Kennedy took, it can easily be marked as the silent and intellectual approach. The fact is Khrushchev and Castro were very adamant on getting certain demands met, and on the surface, there was no danger to the U.S. In accepting those demands fully. Having said that, if and when their demand would be fully met by the American government, the result would have clearly been exactly what it was -- a peaceful transition from a cold war into a negotiable stage of conflict. The important aspect to note here is that if and when Kennedy had chosen to get aggressive with Khrushchev, the situation which, as aforementioned, was on the brink of the break of a nuclear war could have certainly escalated into just that; but, Kennedy's subservient and accommodating approach really helped achieve a peaceful negotiation.

Another aspect that must be noted here is that while the excerpt above is an aggressive one, it is not actually sent to the Russians who, might have expected such a response, but did not get any confirmation of such aggressive responsive plans from Kennedy. He merely chose to warn Khrushchev of the consequences that the aggressive breakout might have for both countries i.e. Cuba and the U.S. One more important aspect that played a huge role between the relationship that developed between Kennedy and Khrushchev was that Khrushchev had successfully managed to keep his relation with Castro a secret from the rest of the world. Khrushchev was aware of the fact that if and when Russia built sites within Cuba for their missile engagements, they would not be able to hide these sites for long from the international eye; however, he knew that the U.S. government under Kennedy's rule would continue to remain subservient if they viewed Cuba and Russia as separate entities as opposed to alliances. Had Kennedy known the extent of their alliance as is revealed now by the declassified reports and letters, the approach that he would take could have been somewhat different. There is, of course, no guarantee of that but one can safely assume that the aggression that was missing from Kennedy would probably have been present in negotiations even if it was in the background.