Soviet Perspective of the Cuban Missile Crisis Research Paper

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Soviet Perspective of the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban missile crisis -- that is also referred to as October crisis in Cuba as well as the Caribbean crisis within the Soviet Union -- was the clash between USSR/Cuba and the U.S. states for a total of 13 days. The crisis or what most people refer to as a crucial part of the Cold War at the time, primarily happened in October 1962. Prior to the clash, the U.S. government had tried to overthrow the Cuban administration leading to incidents like the Bay of Pigs and the Operation Mongoose. This was done due to the fact that the Cuban and Soviet government authorities had privately started to construct bases in Cuba for several medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) having the ability to strike the majority of the continental U.S. States. This course of action then lead to the 1958 deployment of Thor IRBMs within the United Kingdom (Project Emily) and Jupiter IRBMs to Italia and Poultry in the year 1961 -- these were primarily a lot more than 100 U.S.-built missiles that had the capacity and range to stage and complete nuclear attacks on Moscow. On October 14, 1962, a U.S. States Air Pressure U-2 plane on the photoreconnaissance mission came back with convincing data and evidence that there were Soviet missile bases being built within Cuba.

Blockades and Demands

The pivotal importance of this ensuing crisis, which can be easily ranked with other important incidents of the Cold War like the Berlin Blockade, the Suez Crisis and also the Yom Kippur War, is customarily referred to as the moment where the Cold War came nearest to turning out to be a nuclear conflict (Marfleet, 2002), or a potential WWIII, where it's believed that 100 million People in America and also over 100 million Russians might have perished if the crisis had escalated (Allison, 2012). The crisis offered the very first recorded demonstration of the practical risk of mutual assured destruction (MAD). The concept of Mad was discussed for the first time as an integral and identifying element in a significant worldwide arms agreement (ThinkQuest, 1997; Letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev, 2010).

The U.S. States considered striking Cuba through the air as well as using oceanic attacks, but made the decision on the military blockade rather, calling it a "quarantine," for legal along with other political reasons (May, 2011). The United States stated on a global front that it wouldn't permit offensive weapons to be shipped to Cuba and required the Soviets disengage the construction of any and all missile bases already being built or in the process of being built within Cuba and take away all the offensive weapons within Cuba. The Kennedy administration held merely a slim hope that their requirements and demands would be met, and expected a more aggressive or even a military response. Premier Nikita Khrushchev, representing the Soviet response, authorized, inside a personal telegram to Kennedy that his blockade (May, 2011) of navigation in global air space and seas merely instigated an aggressive response that will most likely channel mankind in the chasm of the world nuclear-missile war.

The Soviets openly gave in to the U.S. demands on the forefront, however behind the scenes communications started to present offers and strategies to solve the crisis. The clash finished on October 28, 1962 (Universal Newsreel, 1962). This was when President Kennedy and UN Secretary-General arrived at a public (on-the-record) and secret (off -- the record) contract with Khrushchev. Openly i.e. On the global front, the Russians agreed to disengage in all construction and use of their offensive weaponry extension in Cuba and send them back towards the U.S.S.R. territory, susceptible to UN verification, in return for an American public statement and contract not to invade Cuba. Privately, the United States agreed it would also disengage all U.S.-built Jupiter IRBMs used in Poultry and Italia.

A couple of weeks following the agreement, the Soviets had transported a majority of the missile systems within Cuba as well as their support gear. It took a total of eight Soviet ships and the transportation started out on November 5th and ended by the 9th. Similarly, almost a month later in the first week of December the Russian ships also transported the Soviet Il-28 bombers back to Russia. This particular blockade (May, 2011) was officially ended on November 20th, 1962. Similar patterns were exhibited by the Americans when several weeks following the agreement, the U.S. military deactivated all weapons engagement before September 1963. One more good result of the discussions that sprung out due to this agreement was the development of the Hotline Agreement as well as the Moscow-Washington hotline that lead to immediate communication networks and lucid outcomes between Moscow and Washington, D.C.

Soviet's perception of the Cuban Missile Crisis

In the month of May 1962, the Russian leader at the time -- Nikita Khrushchev -- was convinced by the thought of countering the U.S. States' increasing dominance in developing and implementing proper missiles by positioning Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles within the region of Cuba. He faced proper and authentic evidence in which the U.S. was perceived to possess a "splendid first strike" capacity over the U.S.S.R. In 1962, the Soviets had only 20 ICBMs that were capable to deliver nuclear warheads towards the U.S. States from the U.S.S.R. (Allison et al., 1999). Poor precision, use and toughness for these missiles elevated serious doubts regarding their effectiveness. A more recent, more dependable version of ICBMs was only on offer for use after the year 1964 (Allison et al., 1999). Hence, the Soviet nuclear capacity in 1962 placed less focus on ICBMs as opposed to the medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs). These medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles could strike the American alliances from various Soviet territories, although not from an area close to America itself. Graham Allison, the director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and Worldwide Matters, highlights, that "the Soviet Union could right the nuclear imbalance by deploying new ICBMs on its own soil. But to meet the threat it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had few options. Moving existing nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American targets was one" (Allison et al., 1999)

Another reason Soviet missiles were used within the region of Cuba was because Khrushchev desired to unite access the West Berlin region with the Soviet expanse i.e. he wanted full access within the American/British/French-administered democratic territory inside the Communist East Germany. The East Spanish people and Soviets considered western treatments for some of Berlin a dire risk to the sovereignty of East Germany. Because of this, amongst others, Khrushchev made West Berlin the central battleground for this particular section of the Cold War. Khrushchev thought when the Americans didn't do anything within the missile disengagements in Cuba, he could potentially break free into the air space from Berlin using stated missiles like a restraint to western counter-measures in Berlin. When the America democracy attempted to bargain using the Soviets after realizing the extent and expanse of the missiles, Khrushchev could demand buying and selling the missiles for and from West Berlin. Since Berlin was smartly more essential to penetrate geographically than Cuba, the trade will be a win for Khrushchev. President Kennedy recognized this as "the advantage is, from Khrushchev's point-of-view, he takes a great chance but there are quite some rewards to it" (Allison et al., 1999)

Finally, Khrushchev seemed to be responding simply towards the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles that the U.S. States had set up in Poultry throughout April 1962 (Correll, 2005).

In the beginning, the Soviet's operation required elaborate denial and deceptiveness, known within the U.S.S.R. As Maskirovka (Hansen, 2010). All the planning and preparation for moving and implementing the use and engagement of missiles were completed within the utmost mysterious approach. The troops detailed for that mission received misdirection, and were told that these missiles were going to a chilly region and fitted with ski boots, fleece-lined parkas, along with additional winter gear (Hansen, 2010). The Soviet code title, Operation Anadyr, seemed to be the title of the river flowing in to the Bering Ocean, as well as the title for the capital of Chukotsky District, along with a bomber base within the Asian region. Each one of these were designed to hide this program from both internal and exterior audiences (Hansen, 2010).

At the beginning of 1962, several members of the Soviet forces and missile engagement experts travelled with a farming delegation to the state of Havana. They attended a conference with another influential Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The Cuban leadership were built with a strong expectation that the U.S. would aim to take-over Cuba again plus they, with excitement, approved the thought of setting up nuclear missiles in Cuba. The experts within the missile engagement underneath the guise of "machine operators," "irrigation specialists" and "agricultural specialists" also arrived in the region in the summer of…

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