Media Coverage of Terrorism: Effects on Public Opinion and Policy

Introduction

Acts of anti-American terrorism are becoming increasingly common, and more are occurring on American soil, according to Columbia political scientist Brigitte L. Nacos (Nacos, 1995). According to Nacos, the rise in terrorism is not primarily a matter of flawed national security. It has more to do with the success that terrorists have enjoyed in exploiting the relationships among the media, public opinion, and political decision-making (Nacos, 1994).

Nacos believes that the media is "the crucial link in the terrorist's 'calculus of violence,' particularly terrorist spectaculars — large actions aimed at Americans, like the Iran hostage crisis, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, and the hanging of hostage Lt. Colonel William Higgins in Lebanon (Nacos, 1994)." In these cases, she argues, the terrorists "exploited the free American media. They got an extraordinary amount of attention — up to two-thirds of the network evening news devoted to the events. Newspapers were similarly devoted." This manipulation of public opinion can be very harmful, she says.

According to Nacos (1995), government policy is often shaped by terrorist action, even in cases where a conflict of interest exists between the safety of hostages and the broader interests of the nation. In these cases, the media presents political leaders with a genuine dilemma.

Public opinion polls reveal that a majority of Americans agree that the government should never negotiate with terrorists, but in a time of crisis public opinion tends to flip-flop. The media's efforts usually enhance public sympathy for victims. As this demonstrates, terrorists have achieved their objective — they have coerced government officials indirectly through the media (Nacos, 1995).

This paper examines the media's influence on terrorism to determine whether the media should provide less coverage of terrorism or continue to report the news as it occurs.

How the Media Works

In order to understand how terrorists use and manipulate the media to further their cause, it is important to consider how the media operates (Morgan, 2002). For the television industry, the most important business factor is ratings. News stations rely on rating points, which are determined by how many people watch their programs. News stations earn revenue through advertisers, so maintaining high ratings is essential to attracting high-paying advertising contracts.

In the television industry, news stations experience "sweep" months, which occur during February, May, July, and November (Morgan, 2002). During these months, news stations broadcast many special reports as they compete for viewers. If news stations are unable to score enough rating points, they may replace their news departments with fresh talent.

It is ultimately up to news stations to show the public what it wants to see. Many people complain that there is too much sex and violence in the news, but the media argues that it is simply reflecting audience demand — if people did not watch it, the news stations would not show it. In many cases, even when people feel that something is offensive, some part of them still wants to see it.

News stations understand human nature and recognize that without gruesome or provocative material, ratings suffer. The success of programs like Hard Copy and Inside Edition demonstrates that a significant segment of the public wants hard-edged, dramatic news (Morgan, 2002).

Terrorists and Publicity

Many observers have debated whether terrorists are interested in publicity. The evidence suggests the answer is largely yes. In 1974, scholar Brian Jenkins famously stated that "terrorism is theatre," and terrorists themselves tend to see it in that light (CFR, 2003). Narodnaya Volya, the late-19th-century Russian anarchist group, described its violent activities as "propaganda by deed." Over the past several decades, terrorists have planned their attacks specifically to generate maximum publicity, enabling them to broadcast their messages through all available channels.

Many experts believe that the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were planned so that billions of television viewers around the world would witness that the United States is a vulnerable nation (CFR, 2003). These attacks prompted extensive global reporting on al-Qaeda and its Islamist agenda, making these groups internationally known.

On the other hand, many experts note that the nature of terrorism is transforming. According to CFR (2003), "Jenkins has famously said that terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. But the emergence of religious terror groups with apocalyptic outlooks and the availability of weapons of mass destruction may indicate that inflicting mass casualties has supplanted publicity as the primary goal of some terrorist campaigns."

Terrorists need the media because it is an effective way to capture the attention of governments and the public. Most terrorist activities are calculated acts of violence designed to deliver a political or religious message. Terrorists aim to win popular support and often seek to prompt the attacked country to act rashly — thereby attracting recruits, polarizing public opinion, demonstrating their capacity to cause pain, or undermining governments.

For these reasons, many terrorists plan their attacks to attract media attention. Timothy McVeigh, convicted of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing that killed 168 people, publicly stated that he chose the Murrah Federal Building as a target because it had "plenty of open space around it, to allow for the best possible news photos and television footage (CFR, 2003)."

The Italian leftist Red Brigades launched attacks on Saturdays so that they would make the Sunday newspapers, which were read by larger audiences (CFR, 2003). The Palestinian group Black September took a group of Israeli athletes hostage at the 1972 Munich Olympics because its leaders knew that people around the world were watching the games on television.

Had this group carried out the attack anywhere else, it would not have received the same level of coverage — television cameras and reporters from around the world were already on location. The event instantly commanded the attention of the global media and its viewers; approximately 800 million people watched the live coverage. As Jeffrey D. Simon wrote in The Terrorist Trap: "Terrorism was ahead of television technology at this time. The global sporting event was instantaneously transformed into a global terrorist event" (Simon, 1994, pp. 263–64).

Terrorist groups understand the power of the media well, and many operate their own media outlets. The Colombian leftist group FARC, for instance, broadcast its own radio programs, and many groups maintain websites to spread their message.

It is difficult to determine whether media coverage actually benefits terrorists. Many observers argue that any publicity is good publicity — even if an attack is unsuccessful, media coverage can raise awareness of the terrorists' cause. Terrorism, which commands a large share of news coverage, can also push neglected issues to the top of the political agenda. For example, a series of attacks in the 1970s and 1980s advanced the cause of Palestinian nationalism. Terrorism also sparks policy debates and public discussion, as the radical views of terrorist groups and the anger of victims and their families become widely publicized.

However, many experts doubt that media coverage reliably aids terrorists (CFR, 2003). Many terrorist attacks result in deaths and injuries that can alienate potential supporters and sympathizers. Furthermore, different terrorist activities carry different meanings for different audiences, making it impossible for terrorists to fully control how their actions are covered or perceived. When the media labels an event "terrorist," it focuses attention on the group's methods rather than its message, which often turns the group into a public enemy.

The Effect of the Media on Government Policy

While the democratic nature of the United States offers citizens more freedom and choices, it also places considerable pressure on the government to respond to public demands. President Jimmy Carter's failure to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979–80, for example, contributed to his defeat in the 1980 presidential election (Morgan, 2002). Many Americans had watched him on television during coverage of the crisis and concluded that he was an ineffective negotiator and leader.

Many researchers argue that media coverage pressured Carter into launching a poorly planned rescue mission, despite military estimates putting the probability of success at only 65%. This illustrates how the media can influence the government's response to terrorism and how terrorists exploit that influence to shape the behavior of decision-makers (Nacos, 1994, pp. 140–41).

The United States maintains a strict policy prohibiting negotiation with terrorists (Morgan, 2002). However, the media creates a vulnerability that terrorists exploit to pressure the government into prioritizing the welfare of a few over the broader interests of the nation. Gary Sick, the principal White House aide on Iran during the hostage crisis, once observed: "The media contribute to the process of transforming an international issue into a domestic political crisis for the president. There is perhaps no other type of situation that subjects the president to such intense public scrutiny, and the president is aware that his image as a decisive and effective leader is constantly at risk" (Sick, 1990, p. 242).

Conclusion

The media often plays a decisive role in the outcome of terrorist events, and that role can be either positive or negative. Prolonged coverage of a hijacking, for instance, can protect hostages' lives by generating international sympathy for their plight. Conversely, it can extend a hostage situation if terrorists hold out until media attention fades.

When a terrorist attack receives extensive television coverage, the government is pressured to find a solution more quickly — sometimes prematurely, with dangerous consequences. Media coverage can also disrupt counterterrorist operations: it enables attackers to monitor how their operation is unfolding and may even warn them of an impending rescue attempt. Yet media coverage can also lead to arrests. The decision by newspapers to publish the Unabomber's political manifesto — after a lone serial mail bomber had evaded capture for 17 years — ultimately led to his identification and apprehension.

It cannot be denied that the media wields enormous power, and that power undoubtedly influences terrorism. Even though most news agencies strive to be objective, subtle messages are constantly sent to the public. The sheer amount of airtime devoted to a story signals its perceived importance: a terrorist attack may dominate coverage for hours, while a robbery merits thirty seconds. The words chosen, the tone of voice, and the inflection of the anchorperson all send subtle interpretive cues to the viewer.

Rather than censoring the media, experts generally recommend that leaders educate the public during times of terrorist crisis and that transparent, consistent messaging is preferable to contradictory communications. Nacos (1994) cites the example of President Reagan, who publicly declared that the United States would never negotiate with terrorists while his aides were simultaneously arranging an arms-for-hostages deal with Iranian extremists — a stark illustration of how inconsistency undermines both public trust and national security.

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