The War on Terror: Goals, Enemies, and Prospects for Victory
This paper examines the United States' War on Terror from its origins in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks through the evolution of the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Drawing on official documents, scholarly articles, and government reports sourced from EBSCOhost and Google Scholar, the paper addresses three core questions: what the War on Terror means, who the enemy is, and whether victory is achievable. The analysis finds that the major objectives of the strategy—dismantling al-Qaeda and fostering global democratic norms—have largely not been met, and that certain U.S. actions may have inadvertently increased sympathy for terrorist organizations. The paper concludes with recommendations for refocusing efforts on democratic education, community-level outreach, and homeland security investment.
- Introduction and Background: Origins of the War on Terror post-9/11
- Problem Statement and Research Purpose: Why this research matters and its aims
- Research Design and Methodology: Sources, search terms, and research model
- What the War on Terror Entails: Defining U.S. counterterrorism objectives
- The Enemy in the War on Terror: Three factions of radical Islamic opposition
- The Possibility of Victory: Evidence that core U.S. goals remain unmet
- Recommendations and Conclusions: Steps toward democratic outreach and security
✍️ How to write this paper — guide, tools & examples ▾
What makes this paper effective
- The paper frames its analysis around three clearly stated research questions, giving the argument a focused and testable structure throughout.
- It draws on a diverse range of sources—official government strategy documents, academic journals, and policy reports—lending credibility to its claims.
- The paper avoids oversimplification by dividing the enemy into three distinct factions, demonstrating analytical nuance rather than treating terrorism as a monolithic force.
- The recommendations section connects directly back to the research findings, making the prescriptive advice feel grounded rather than speculative.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates systematic policy evaluation: it identifies stated governmental objectives (from the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism), surveys available evidence on outcomes, and then assesses the gap between goals and results. This evidence-to-conclusion structure is a standard technique in public policy and security studies research papers.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with historical background on the origins of the War on Terror, then states its problem and research questions. A methodology section explains the data sources and search approach. The analysis is organized thematically—defining the war, characterizing the enemy, and assessing prospects for victory—before concluding with practical recommendations and a summary of findings. This four-part (introduction, design, data, analysis) framework mirrors a standard research report format.
Introduction and Background
On August 23, 1996, Osama bin Laden publicly declared war against the United States via an Islamic decree (fatwa). The major difference between this war and the previous conflicts the U.S. had been involved in is that the enemy in this case was motivated solely by religion. Almost two years later, on February 22, 1998, Osama bin Laden issued another fatwa, this time enjoining every Muslim to take up arms and kill American civilians and military personnel, as well as their allies. In August 1998, al-Qaeda fighters simultaneously attacked U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing over 200 people and injuring many others. These fighters believed that by their actions they were initiating a jihad to protect their faith. They also held the notion that America had been the initial aggressor in this conflict and had struck the first blow years before the September 11 attacks, in which hijacked planes were crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
America responded to the September 11 attacks by declaring war against al-Qaeda and terrorism broadly. In early February 2003, the American government under President Bush released the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which was subsequently revised in September 2006.
The first time the phrase "war on terror" was used was in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. On September 20, 2001, while addressing a joint session of Congress, President Bush stated, "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."1 From that moment, the phrase "war on terror" was adopted by the public, the media, and the government itself, and it came to represent the counter-strategies put in place by the Bush administration, as well as the new sectors of military activity and intelligence gathering established through newly developed anti-terror legislation.
Although this phrase has been used broadly to describe a wide variety of aims, policy guidelines, and actions, the major moves made specifically under that banner are far more complex than mere words suggest. Even though the basic aims of the war on terror have been pursued vigorously, several years later the story of the war is filled with controversial accounts and unconfirmed reports of immoral conduct. With accounts of torture and other illegal acts becoming increasingly common, there has been a growing demand for accountability that can no longer be ignored.
The 9/11 attacks on America's Pentagon and World Trade Center did not provoke a reaction from the United States alone. The attacks caused a global awakening to the menace of terrorism, and a concerted war on terror was launched with the United States at the forefront. This war has involved battles in Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and thousands have lost their lives as a result.2
The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on the unique set of problems posed by terrorism and aims to address them through two strategic actions. The short-term action involves the total dismantling of al-Qaeda. In this regard, the United States and its allies have achieved considerable success in capturing and killing al-Qaeda leaders and operatives, and have driven the group underground. Nonetheless, this terrorist organization bears certain similarities to the mythical Hydra: the successful elimination of one member of the network only leads to two others taking that person's place. The long-term aim of the U.S. strategy is therefore to foster a global atmosphere intolerant of terrorism and its activities.3 The identified path toward realizing these goals is to encourage democracy in Islamic nations—a move intended to bring about genuinely progressive leaders who can supply the basic needs of the millions of Muslims who have rejected terrorism but still seek improved standards of living.
For over two years immediately following 9/11, al-Qaeda was struck on all sides: leaders, followers, and sympathizers alike. Apart from the overthrow of the Taliban and numerous killings and imprisonments worldwide, a number of al-Qaeda leaders were arrested, their finances were frozen, and several further attacks were thwarted.4 Despite these efforts, al-Qaeda was still able to meet, plan, and sometimes successfully carry out attacks that demonstrated a higher level of sophistication than before 9/11. For this reason, it would be erroneous and misleading for the U.S. and its allies to claim the upper hand in the war against terror, especially when considering the rise of the Islamic State and the broader turmoil in the Middle East more than sixteen years after 9/11.
Create your account
Always verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.