The Army Force Management System and the five-phase force development process

¶ … Force Management System or FMS Utility exists due to the complex array of people existing within the army. These people have one or more of an assortment of skills and access to several millions of items of equipment. An organized system for the documentation of how much is authorized and what is required is put in place to keep things in order. Taking that into consideration, the force development process and its five phases keeps coordinated efforts in order as shown in the "Gen. Odierno AUSA Winter Symposium" reading. To begin, there was a mention of Odierno having difficulty turning a "1.1 million-man Army and another 250,000 civilians in a direction"[footnoteRef:1]. [1: U.S. Army,. "Feb. 24, 2012 - Gen. Odierno AUSA Winter Symposium." Www.Army.Mil. Last modified 2016. Accessed November 8, 2016. https://www.army.mil/article/74650/Feb__24__2012___Gen__Odierno_AUSA_Winter_Symposium.]

First, it important to understand how an army runs within the five phases. The first phases 1 and 2 are to develop capabilities and design organization. Phases 3,4, and 5 are develop organizational models, determine organizational models, and document authorizations. Phases 3,4, and 5 are seen within the context of the article and require more explanation to assess the readings impact on each applicable phase. Phase three has keep players which are USASOC, USAFMA, and MEDCOM. They used the organizations designed in phase 2 following the requirements based on rules, policy, and doctrine and BOIP/TOE requirement to go into the DA Approval and then the next phase, Phase 4. Phase 4's players are the Organizational Integration Team and they follow BOIP/TOE requirements, then resourcing factors, and then aim for an affordable and balanced force structure before DA Approval and Phase 5. Phase 5 has OCS, G-37, and FMSA/USA players and aim towards an affordable, balanced force structure and then the authorization of documents. Going back to Phase 3, the holistic approach within this phase is to create requirements based on desired Army and Joint warfighting competences versus recognized deficits. With this approach, there is full consideration of Army functions and operations. Furthermore, in this phase, there is a change in desirable domain with materiel being the least needed for alteration due to acquisition schedules and expenses. There is also employment within a multidisciplinary framework to integrate capabilities to a higher degree. Phase 4 is where the DOD performs an ongoing change and upgrade in the manner it fights to maintain battlefield advantage against all enemies to accomplish complementary capabilities with other countries. Phase 5 provides final assessment via a series of seminar wargames through the capstone concept. Such concepts refine the foundation for experimentation, studies simulations, and analyses.

Odierno discusses in the article the need for the Army's formations to continue standing watch on the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula. He also notes and repeats, they continue to offer crucial executive and institutional agent support throughout the world that enables in a major way, the Joint Force. With a mission to win the country's wars, there is a need for the army to be innovative, agile, flexible, adaptive, synchronized, integrated, and lethal. There is also a need to pause for reflection to observe the various processes existing within such a dynamic and complex system. Odierno shares the new processes added that will provide information for serious decisions concerning force design soon like TRACDOC, combat modeling, and sufficiency analysis. With a decreasing military force, the three phases discussed in the previous paragraph will be affected not just be a reduction in personnel numbers, but also in the latest use of new techniques, and the need to have a high success rate. Assessment will become key along with ability to provide adaptability and flexibility.

Question F104

The first reading covers the Defense Acquisition System. It exists to assist in the management of the country's investment in programs, product support, and technologies required to support the U.S. Armed Forces and accomplish the National Security Strategy. The DOD's investment strategy must be postured to support today and tomorrow's forces, shaping the main aim of defense acquisition. This is where things can be adjusted to suit the needs of the ongoing demand.

The main objective is to collect quality products that placate user needs with marked enhancements to operational provision and mission ability within a judicious manner and at a reasonable, fair price. Getting things cheap and fast is the objective for many businesses and organizations. However, this can be difficult to achieve due to the 'pick two' dilemma. The goal of finding a 'good, fast, and cheap' tool or resource is near impossible because most the time, only two of the three objectives are fulfilled. An example the reading provides is the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Advances within the rapid acquisition area typically offered very fast and good materiel at an expensive price. Due to the budget reductions as well as the drawdown, the emphasis went from fast and very good to cheap and good, forcing the change to go towards longer lead times and deliberate planning, removing the goal of 'fast'. With continued cutbacks and ongoing reductions, the emphasis on 'good' and 'cheap' continues, impacting the way the DOD handles and makes decisions regarding acquiring materiel. The DOD has three main decision support systems that deals with cost (cheap), schedule (fast), and performance (good). Since budgetary concerns are a main concern, any decisions in the schedule aspect must go in the way of slow and take into consideration the longer than planned times to receive materiel to get them cheaply and in good working order. Adjustments must then be made to plan long-term for the Defense Acquisition System and allow the JCIDS and PPBES continue planning for cost-efficient, good condition, materiel acquisition. There is no need at this point in time to adjust the emphasis on acquiring materiel at the prototype or mature stage as this ensures it can meet the 'good' requirements. Neither is the aim to find versatile affordable materiel. The adjustments must fall within the area of equipping units and soldiers with required equipment in a manner that meets deadline, but takes into consideration longer wait times.

How can these adjustments to DAS be made? The reading provides a pre-systems acquisition, systems acquisition, and sustainment parts of the DAS system. Notable changes to process include the introduction of novel program procedures and structures better custom-made to the leading features of the acquired product as well as unique program conditions like urgency and risk. This led to creation of six product-tailored, novel acquisition models. The one to be adjusted is Model 4: Accelerated Acquisition Program. This is because the emphasis on 'good' and 'cheap' is further pressed due to budgetary concerns. Therefore, the model can stand to include non-materiel solutions. Non-materiel solutions may help address time-sensitive matters without having to spend more on new materiel solutions. Non-materiel solutions may involve repair, maintenance, or recapitalization. Part of recapitalization is keeping the same model, but injecting it with new life, or getting a new model. In conclusion, the army must deal with new problems every day. The DOD handles acquisition of materiel and has a system in place to help acquire materiel that is 'cheap, good, and fast'. However, recent times have demanded focus on 'cheap and good' and therefore, inclusion of non-materiel solutions may provide the adjustments needed to continue delivering.

Question F106

The continual force reductions and budget cuts has led to some changes within the United States Army. Some of those changes may lead to a decision on whether to continue relying on contract support or not. Mitigation strategies may come into play to support an increased/decreased reliance on contract support. The historical use of contractors has existed since the American Revolution with a ratio of 1:6 contractors per soldier to a ratio of 1.28:1 during the war in Afghanistan. This is an important thing to note because contractors on the battlefield have led to dependence on complex services that contractors provide, especially during conflicts that require greater complexity of effort. Services like laundry, maintenance, construction, sanitation, intelligence, and security are some of what contractors offer for nation/building and/or longer deployment. If mitigation strategies can help with satisfy the need for complex services, then reliance of contract support may see a decrease. However, there may never be a decrease in reliance on contract support. Perhaps mitigation strategies then must lend to increasing contract support amidst growing budgetary concerns.

Why are contractors used in the army? Contractors provide services and perform certain functions well. These functions are availability (willing and ready to work wherever and whenever), fast reaction to place resources to meet developing necessities, and quick response to requirements. Army contracts have various areas that are used to meet the needs of the Army. For example, they have as part of the contracts, theater support (Gravel, Furniture, Local Trucking CO), systems (Apache, Fox Patriot), and external support (Commo, LOGCAP, Linguist). Theater Support for example are frequently used for services, minor construction, and goods. Keeping this in mind, when contractors become part of an operation, the nature of ideas like risk analysis and international considerations change. This all adds up to what to look out for in terms of mitigation strategies to decreased reliance on contract support. The decrease on the reliance of contract services should be considered because soldiers no longer understand their job duties and responsibilities due to heavy dependence on contractors. To cut back on reliance of contractors, the Army needs to find a way to use less FSRs or Field Service Representatives, which are contracted. FSRs appear to be the indefinite solution due to the Army not developing an organic EW sustainment capability in combination with IEWS fielding/development. Any mitigation strategy must then be used to increase contract support because of the lack of available functions and processes in place to decrease it. The Army's existing force structure and method to OCS overlooks major capability gaps along with key tasks at the macro operational level. By continuing to continue maturing and growing the Army's contract management capability and utilization of the OCS is the only option. In fact, the future of contract support may fall into making contracting a core capability leading to mitigation strategies to better bridge the gap among support and supported.

While contract support leads to dependence and decrease performance by soldiers, it may be too costly to implement a new strategy to decrease dependence on contractors. Contractors provide everything that can help soldiers perform their tasks. Any mitigation strategies must attempt to provide a better connection to contractors and allowing them to support soldiers in an easier, faster way. For example, the passing of the bill from the 112th Congress, 1st Session S1145 could help commanders by giving them the authority to hold contractors to U.S. and UCMJ laws. This will allow for better management of contractors. Better handline of host-nation laws and international agreements can also fall within that category leading to a definite need to increase contract support and provide soldiers with the help they need to carry out objectives.