Exxon Valdez the Oil Tanker

Exxon Valdez

The oil tanker Exxon Valdez hit at a reef in the Prince William Sound of Alaska on March 24, 1989 and it was considered as a nightmare that not only brought revolutionary change in Prince William Sound but made the world to think twice about the belief of the assurances from corporations that their operations are safe. (The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Disaster) None have any idea of the mishap when the Exxon Valdez left the Alyska Pipeline Terminal at 9:12 PM, Alaska Standard Time on March 23, 1989. The Exxon Valdez a 987-foot ship was the second newest out of the 20 tanker fleet in Exxon Shipping Company. It was then loaded with 53,094, 540 gallons of North Slope crude oil moved for Long Beach, California.

For more than 8700 times during the corporations had already transported oil through the Prince William Sound during the 12 years prior to occurrence of this accident. However, after less than three hours, the Exxon Valdez grounded at Bligh Reef, puncturing eight of its 11 cargo tanks and spreading some 10.8 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. Till the disaster of Exxon Valdez occurred the system of transiting about 2 million barrels of North Slope oil to West cast and Gulf Coast markets daily had worked pretty well. Such complacency and efficacy were shattered when the Exxon Valdez ran hard aground soon after the midnight on March 24. (Details about the Accident)

Almost a total of 11,000, 000 gallons of Alaska North Slope crude oil spilled from the ruptured hull of the ship. It spread over 470 miles to the southwest rapidly within two months. The cleanup at the beginning of the accident prolonged for three years involving a cost of over $2.1 billion. The Federal Government of Alaska and the Exxon entered into an agreement on October 8, 1991, on both criminal charges and civil damage claims. To acquit it from the civil charges Exxon was directed to pay the State of Alaska and the United States $900 million over a 10-year period. This money was proposed to be utilized for restoration and was to be operated by the six government trustees; three federal, three states. As a settlement of the criminal charges, Exxon would make payments of a fine of $250 million. It established two restitution funds each consisting of $50 million grouped under Victims of Crime Act account of $13 million and the North American Wetlands Conservation Fund of $12 million. (The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Disaster)

The Federal Court passed a punitive damages verdict of $5 billion against Exxon on September, 16, 1994. At the time the Exxon Valdez ran aground, Joseph Hazelwood was the captain. Irrespective of his confession that he had taken at least three drinks prior to boarding the ship, Hazelwood was acquitted in the year 1990 of the charges of operating the tanker while drunk. He was only convicted of the misdemeanor offence of illegally discharging oil. Exxon Valdez sill engaged in transporting oil around the globe being renamed as Sea River Mediterranean. However, it has been barred from entering Alaskan water again. The accident of Exxon Valdez disaster led to promulgation of stringent environmental regulations on many industries. The most significant regulations trying to safeguard against recurrence of an event has become modern paradigm for the carrier tanker ships that imposes to build those ships with double hulls so that while the outer skin is punctured no oil will come out. (The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Disaster)

The Exxon Valdez had arrived at Alyeska Marine Terminal at 11:30 PM on March 22 for taking the cargo. It had a crew of 19 plus the captain. Third Mate Gregory Cousins, those became a pivotal figure in the grounding that was relieved of watch duty at 11:50 PM. The crude oil onto the tanker was loaded by the terminal crew until it reached its full rate of 100, 000 barrels and was being supervised by James R. Kunkel. The day March 23, 1989 was a rest day for some crew members of the Exxon Valdez crew. The crew officers including Capt. Joseph Hazelwood, Chief engineer Jerry Glowacki and radio officer Joel Roberson left the Exxon Valdez about 11:00 A.M. While leaving the terminal the officers anticipated that the sailing time to be 10 pm that evening. However, the fixed sailing time was changed, however, during the day, and when the party returned back at the ship at 8:24 PM they could know that the sailing time had been rescheduled to be at 9 pm. (Details about the Accident)

Much time was spent by Hazelwood in performing the business of the ship, shopping and as per the evidence filed before National Transportation Safety Board, in drinking alcoholic beverages with other officers of the ship in at least two Valdez bars. The Radio officer Roberson while conducting pre-voyage tests could discover that none in the group going ashore had anticipated the ship to be ready to depart as soon as they returned. The inquiry evidenced that the captain appeared to have drunken with watery eyes but had no odor of alcohol on his breath. However, the report of Oil Spill Commission concluded that the grounding at Bligh Reef indicates much more than the mistakes of a probably drunken skipper.

The report indicated this as the consequence of the plodding degeneration of lapses and safety experiences that had been devised prior to 12 years to protect and backstop the inevitable mistakes of human beings. The ship was under the control of pilot Murphy, who indicated that irrespective of the fact that Exxon Company Policy necessitates two officers of the ship to remain on the bridge during transit of Valdez Narrows, Hazelwood left the bridge soon after it crossed the mooring line and did not return until about 11:10 P.M. With the return of Hazelwood Murphy got off at 11:24 PM with assistance from Third Mate Cousins. Cousins was assisting Murphy and then assisting stow the pilot ladder and Hazelwood was alone on the bridge and there was no anxiety to find out whether one more is necessitated to assist him. (Details about the Accident)

Hazelwood indicated the Vessel Traffic Center at 11:25 PM that the pilot had left and that he was raising the speed to sea speed. He also indicated that looking at the radar it may be possible to change from the Traffic Separation Scheme and end up in inbound lane if there is no conflicting traffic. The traffic separation scheme is chalked out to isolate incoming and outgoing tankers in Prince William Sound and maintain them in clear, deep water during their transit. It is inclusive of inbound and outbound lanes, with a half-mile-wide separation zone between them. Since small icebergs from the nearby Columbia Glacier sometimes enter the traffic lanes, the Captain had the liberty to divert from their lanes if traffic permitted. The report of Hazelwood and the approval of the traffic center of Valdez implied the ship would vary course to leave the western outbound lane, surpass the separation zone and if necessary enter the eastern inbound lane to avoid floating ice.

Hazelwood intimated the Valdez traffic center at 11:30 PM that he was attempting to turn the ship toward east on a heading of 200 degrees and reducing speed to wind my way through the ice. At 11.39 Cousin could find out the ship to be at the middle of the traffic separation scheme. Hazelwood instructed a further course change to a heading of 180 degrees and instructed the ship to be placed on autopilot. However, the change of course for the second time was not informed to the traffic center of Valdez. The Exxon Valdez surpassed the traffic lanes easterly boundary at 11:47 PM traveling at approximately 12 knots. The ship was then instructed to load program up over a period of 43 minutes and would enhance the speed from 55 RPM to sea speed full ahead of 78.7 RPM. Explaining about the ways to return the ship to its designated traffic lane, Hazelwood left the bridge at 11:53 PM. (Details about the Accident)

At this moment Cousin had already been on duty for six hours and was planned to be relieved by the Second Mate Lloyd LeCain. However, Cousins, acknowledging the fact that LeCain had worked long hours during the loading operations during the day, he had indicated the second mate he could take his time in relieving him. Cousins did not awake LeCain or the shift midnight to 4 am rather remaining in duty throughout. It is a sheer violation of the policy of the company that Cousin was the only officer on the bridge. The investigation reports indicated that a second officer on the bridge probably would have more conscious of the imminent danger in the location of the ship and its failure effort to turn the autopilot steering status and the danger of ice in the tanker lane. Prior to grounding of the Exxon during the first few minutes of Good Friday, March 24; Cousins realized it was appropriate to turn the vessel back toward the traffic lanes, since its positions off the starboard side implied great danger for a supertanker that was out of its lanes and accelerating through close waters.

Cousins issued right rudder commands to result in the desired course change and took the ship off autopilot. While such efforts did not result in turning swiftly Cousins ordered further right rudder with increasing urgency. The bumpy ride and six very sharp jolts occurred at 12:04 AM. The vessel grounded towards southwest balanced across its middle on a pinnacle of Bligh Reef. Eight of the eleven oil tanks punctured flooding about 5.8 million gallons out of the tanker in the first three and quarter hours. The confessions at NTSB indicated that Cousins may have been awake and normally at work for up to 18 hours preceding the accident. There is the evidence of direct impact of fatigue on human performance error and recognized that about 80% or more of marine accidents are attributable to human error. (Details about the Accident)

The circumstantial factors like prolonged duty hours, poor working conditions, monotony and sleep deprivation can give rise to a scenario where a pilot and/or crew members may become the susceptible to the occurrence of an accident. Besides the personnel policies may also have influenced the crew fatigue. A comparative figure indicated by Arthur McKenzie of the Tanker Advisory Center in New York revealed that the tankers during 1950 required a crew of about 40 to 42 to deal with only 6.3 million gallons of oil while in Exxon Valdez could rely with a crew of 19 to transport 53 million gallons of oil. The U.S. Coast Guard sets the limits for minimum vessel manning however, without any agency wide standard for policy. While Exxon could protect their actions on economic policies the report indicates that severe criticism are leveled against them for manipulating overtime records to better justify reduced manning levels.

Larossi and Exxon could defend that the modern automated vessel technology allowed the reduced manning without any cost in terms of safety or functions. However, the literature indicated that automation cannot substitute humans in the systems instead it places the human in a different, more demanding role. Automation particularly declines the manual workload but enhances the mental workload. The NTSB and Courts finally concluded the work hours of the Cousins and the limitations of the crew personnel. The Oil Spill Commission of Alaska suggests that crew levels be set high sufficiently not only to allow safe operations during ordinary conditions in the Gulf of Alaska can be highly demanding but also to generate sufficient crew backups and rest periods that crisis situations can be dealt by a new and well supported personnel. (Details about the Accident)

The immediate response to deal with the spreading sea of oil was a challenge to the capabilities of the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and the reports revealed that it was unexpectedly slow and woefully insufficient. The global capabilities of Exxon Corp would mobilize huge quantities of equipment and personnel to attend to the spill but its efforts were not adequate during first few hours and days when containment and cleanup efforts are in full swing. The U.S. Coast Guard could indicate its prowess at ship salvage, safeguarding the crews and lightering operations, however, proved utterly incapable of oil spill containment and response. The state and federal authorities demonstrated differing levels of preparedness and command capability. The Waters of Prince William Sound and gradually about more than 1000 miles of beach in South Central Alaska would be fouled by 10.8 million gallons of crude oil. (Details about the Accident)

John Keeble narrated the story in 'Out of the Channel: the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Sound' particularly the concentrating on the way the Exxon dealt the public relations aspect of the disaster and a critique of the way Exxon handled the public relations dimension of the incident. The way Exxon Company dealt with the spill was regarded as more tragic. The major task of the Company at the time was to attempt cleaning operations in the area and generate goodwill among the residents of the area. It was strangled not only with physical cleanup but also attempted to have a spiritual cleanup. However, the inherent emotional damages could not be challenged effectively by Exxon. The individuals residing in the area felt the management of the spill by the company was quite inadequate. (Out of the Channel: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Sound)

One individual could visualize that the basic problem was initiated with the failure of the Exxon to visualize the world. They are blamed to be dealt with the PR and not cleanup. The whole management system of the clean up process appeared ineffective, mismanaged, peril while rapidly the oil was spreading more shoreline, more fishing water and endangering more species. Millions of dollars have been spent in media advertising to create campaigns assuring people that Prince William Sound would be back to normal in no time. Exxon attempted to appear good to the public and spend large amount of money towards the problem but had actually no idea of attacking the way they would actually clean the entire affected area. Exxon applied its power and money to appear good instead of fixing the problem. (Out of the Channel: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Sound)

The Exxon Valdez discarded 11 million gallons about 41.8 million liters of crude oil and made 2080 kms of coastline poisonous. The effects of such huge spreading of crude oil resulted in heavy mortality of wildlife in terms of the death of 250000 sea birds, about 3000 sea otters, 300 harbor seals, and 250 bald eagles and up to 22 killer whales. This led an Alaskan Department of Environment to regard the revival of the area was like attempting to park a Cadillac in a Volkswagen spot. The tourist industry has been feared a major setback in the area. (1989: Exxon Valdez creates oil slick disaster)