Hurricane Katrina: Disaster Response and Recovery

Implementing Emergency Services
Hurricane Katrina: Disaster Response and Recovery
Disaster response Framework
Disasters always put the emergency response team to the test, and the public members are keen to rate their level of preparedness. In the 2005 hurricane season, the disaster response team was caught unprepared, and the response was rated as low. The United states disaster response team had laid some strategies to respond to the different disaster levels, including issuing emergency call numbers. However, the system was not ready for an active hurricane. The state was blamed for failing to coordinate all entities that are involved in disaster management. With the disasters of Hurricane Katrina's stature, it was important for state and local government to collaborate with the U.S military to ensure minimal damage. The emergency response system should have a way to escalate cases that need the attention of the most powerful entities in the land (Gheytanchi et al., 2007).
The main challenge that limited the efficiency of the rescue mission was the delayed and unreliable communication framework. There was no standardized way for the state to share information with federal agencies, and therefore the chain of command was broken. Lack of a centralized decision-making system is a leading cause of confusion in disaster management scenarios. Rescue teams should have a working system that facilitates peer to peer communication, and whenever need be, they should be able to report to the next level of command for further actions (Gheytanchi et al., 2007)
The criticism that followed Hurricane Katrina prompted the authorities to form a new National Response Plan comprised of at least four different command structures. Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) controlled two levels of command, and the formation was meant to close gaps that were noticed during the recovery effort. Two other command structures were managed by two different military bases, which were the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Louisiana National Guard. The two command levels were independent, and there was no central control to coordinate their operation. Having different levels of command that were independent caused a lot of duplication in both planning and execution, and therefore the challenge of poor coordination and communication was not fixed (Gheytanchi et al., 2007).
Lack of centralized coordination also challenged the rescued people's process since there was no exact way to commission health personnel on the ground. The confusion was also visible when recovering bodies and delays that happened for days could speak it all. Blame games were the norm of the day, with Louisiana's governor claiming that FEMA had delayed making a deal with a contractor. Excuses of this kind were replicated in different command levels, and the result was a messed recovery mission (Edwards, 2015).
It took days to deliver medical supplies in places that were desperately in need of help. In other cases, the supplies were wasted since accurate communication was not made on what was needed and where it was to be delivered. For example, FEMA wasted millions of ice pounds in the process, yet some needy cases never benefited from the ice. Another waste was $900 million paid by FEMA for 25,000 mobile homes, which were never used due to the existing regulation. Many of Katrina's victims lived on flood plains, and that's why FEMA had stopped the use of the mobile homes. Weather forecaster had predicted a probable active hurricane, and therefore unpreparedness was a failure from the government side (Edwards, 2015).
In an active disastrous environment such as that of Katrina, it is necessary to have unity in operation. Different states should work as one, and decision making and command should be centralized to avoid confusion that cost lives. Collaboration should be the norm of the day to avoid unnecessary conflicts. Communication at all levels and between different departments should be synchronized to ensure on-demand distribution of medical supplies and aid workers (Howitt & Leonard, 2006).
Disaster recovery framework
The landfall of August 29 caused unexpected damages, and there was a need for immediate plans to facilitate the recovery. One week after Katrina, Congress approved an aid worth $52 billion to help restore the victims' lives. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was also boosted) from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion to facilitate borrowing in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Two months after Katrina, other landfalls happened: Rita and Wilma, and therefore the damage further extended. Congress had to go back to its chambers to accommodate the change, and they approved $20.7 billion from the existing $18.5billion to support the NFIP program. Despite some efforts to help in recovery, data shows that the recovery period was longer than expected. Some contributing factors to the delay include socioeconomic identity, which has caused an increase in poverty and the misappropriation of funds meant for recovery. Other factors that have delayed the recovery process of Katrina's victims are explained below. (Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies & XL Catlin, 2018).
FEMA does not control the entire emergency response framework, and therefore it is the government's responsibility to streamline the disaster management system. Failure by the government in Katrina to have a well-coordinated response team caused many delays that cost U.S. citizens' lives. The recovery process was also dragged by a lack of adequate policies to guide the restoration of houses, infrastructure, and businesses in the affected areas. In cases where insurance compensated the victims, the incentives were not enough to fully recover due to misquoted insurance covers (Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies & XL Catlin, 2018).
Another area of confusion was mixing the role of private property insurance with that of federal disaster assistance. Federal disaster assistance was supposed to offer post-disaster support. (Herring & Rosenman, 2016). The loan issuing process was also faced with discrimination since some lenders were only willing to lend wealthy people capable of repaying. Victims whose ability to pay loans was doubting were forced to wait longer or looks for alternatives, and the whole recovery process was delayed as a result. Insurance companies also contributed to the stagnated recovery process because of the adjustments that happened in different premiums. With the area termed as high risk, insurance covers hiked by 133% and 400%, respectively, and the rates were no longer favorable to investors. Reconstruction efforts were discouraged, and that why it took over a decade to restore the affected areas to the initial economic state (Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies & XL Catlin, 2018).
A weakness in the emergency response team is the main cause of miscommunication and conflicts experienced in disaster management. All government levels should be coordinated, and there should be no conflict because the end goal is to ensure the citizens of all states are safe. What is essential is streamlining the entire framework other than blaming different state agencies. Crisis in times of disaster always translates to political conflicts. It was evident in Katrina's case, where the FEMA director was required to resign (Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies & XL Catlin, 2018).
Delays in time of disaster always cause a lot of damage. Response time should be minimal, and the involved emergency teams should remain prepared for any emergency call. All this can be achieved by having a central disaster management agency that controls the command and communication. A reliable framework to help ensure a quick economic recovery should also be put in place. Delayed recovery continues to ruin the lives of disaster victims, and therefore funds set aside for recovery should be well managed (Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies & XL Catlin, 2018).
References
Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies & XL Catlin. (2018). Disaster Recovery Case Studies, U.S. 2005 Storms: Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/crs-case-study-hurricane-katrina.pdf
Edwards, C. (2015, August 27). Hurricane Katrina: Remembering the Federal Failures. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://www.cato.org/blog/hurricane-katrina-remembering-federal-failures
Gheytanchi, A., Joseph, L., Gierlach, E., Kimpara, S., Housley, J., Franco, Z. E., & Beutler, L. E. (2007). The dirty dozen: Twelve failures of the Hurricane Katrina response and how psychology can help. American Psychologist, 62(2), 118.
Herring, C., & Rosenman, E. (2016). Engels in the Crescent City: Revisiting the Housing Question in post-Katrina New Orleans. ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 15(3), 616-638.
Howitt, A. M., & Leonard, H. B. (2006). Katrina and the core challenges of disaster response. Fletcher F. World Aff., 30, 215.