Kant\'s Grounding for the Metaphysics

Kant's Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals perennial question in moral philosophy concerns human justification of moral principles. Traditionally, the debate is bifurcated into two distinct groups: rationalists who, for the most part, believe that morality is founded on reason alone, and empiricists who seek to ground moral judgments on human experience. One of the towering figures in this debate is Immanuel Kant, who thought that moral principles should not be informed by a posteriori experiences, but rather should be deduced through reason, and therefore can be known a priori. Beginning with his preface to the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant is unambiguously clear in his assertion that moral dictates hold universally, since if a law is to be morally valid, then it must carry with it absolute necessity (cf. Grounding 4:389); i.e., all moral dictates are valid for rational creatures regardless of situation or circumstance. Therefore, when confronted with two conflicting moral judgments, only one can be correct, as morality is not experientially contingent. The magnitude of Kant's claim is clear, as it states that there is one correct standard by which all moral principles can be judged. It seems as though strict adherence to Kantian morality is undesirable, as pure reason can only inform certain aspects of moral life. Acknowledgement that certain emotions and other experiential elements invariably factor into our moral calculus provides a more robust picture of morality, and this is something that Kant's moral system cannot supply.

For Kant, morality is fundamentally based on his three formulations of the categorical imperative. Essentially, the first formulation states that one should act as though one's maxim could become a universal law (of nature). This is due to the fact that when a person's maxim cannot be universalized, then it necessarily is discordant with morality, as the person will encounter an inherent contradiction. To borrow one of Kant's examples, when trying to secure a loan, one cannot falsely promise that the loan will be repaid, since upon universalizing that maxim, one would be stating that it is acceptable to make false promises, and further, that it become a universal law of nature. If that were the case, then all acts that require a basis of trust essentially lose their foundation. People would not, then, "believe what was promised him but would merely laugh at all such utterances as being vain pretenses" (Grounding 4:422). Therefore, it is never permissible to lie in order to secure some good, no matter if it is for personal welfare, or for the welfare of others, since that maxim can never be regarded as a universal law.

The second formulation of the categorical imperative states that one should treat humanity as an end and never merely as a means. It is in this sense that the moral worth of individuals is given intrinsic value. Upon recognizing one's duty to humanity, one realizes that every action must take into the account the inherent value of particular others: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means" (Grounding 4:429). That is, it is not acceptable to use people as a means to your end. For example, if one donates money to the poor in order to impress one's friends, then this action has no moral worth, since the supposed philanthropist is using the poor as a means to inflate his own self-image.

The third and final formulation of the categorical imperative states that one should act so that one can regard one's will as a lawmaking member of a Kingdom of Ends. There is a distinction made here between autonomy and heteronomy. Essentially, in this ideal Kingdom of Ends, every individual member acts as the governing body, and is not subject to any external force. There is no sense of structure, nor any centralized government or sole individual that rules over everyone else. In this ideal society, everyone would act in accordance with the moral law and never encounter a situation that would contradict those laws. It would seem that this society could never be realized due to its utopian and unattainable nature. However, that should not suggest that its pursuit is wholly worthless. There is some value in striving to attain this ideal, even if it can never be realized.

Despite the appeal of the categorical imperative, follows its dictates proves to be seemingly impossible, and even in some instances, undesirable. When adhering to the principles of Kantian morality, it is clear that moral reasoning is reduced to a strict moral calculus, whereby there is only one correct answer to the question, "What am I to do?" This process, moreover, does not allow for any deviations from this strict normative standard, and morally ambiguous areas become non-existent. However, in some situations, certain actions that are in violation of the categorical imperative might be morally necessary. For example, during the Holocaust, people often had to lie to the Nazi SS when harboring Jews in their home. It seems obvious that lying violates at least formulations one and two of the categorical imperative. In the first formulation, the maxim cannot be universalized, for the same reason that one is not entitled to lie to secure a loan; if that maxim became a universal law, then the SS would not even have cause to believe the lie in the first place. In the second formulation, it seems as though the SS are being used merely as a means to secure some external end. In essence, by lying to the SS, one is not recognizing their intrinsic moral worth. So, Kant is forced to concede that when the SS inquires as to whether one is harboring Jews, it becomes necessary to tell the truth, thereby sacrificing one's own life, and the lives of those seeking shelter, which seem like a rather unwelcome consequence.