Rowland and McPherson's interpretations of General George B. McClellan
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¶ … Thomas Rowland's George B. McClellan and Civil War history: In the shadow of Grant and Sherman" that compares and contrasts the interpretations of McClellan's generalship with James M. McPherson's Ordeal by fire: The Civil War and reconstruction. Both of these historic texts center on the American Civil War and its affect on the country. Both also discuss in detail General George B. McClellan and his affect on the war and its outcome. McClellan was a brilliant organizer who let power and admiration go to his head, leading to some of the worst military decisions during the Civil War.
Both authors are extremely critical of McClellan and many of his military decisions, but author Rowland is less critical, and feels McClellan has been harshly judged, more so than many other Civil War generals who deserved some harsher judgment. He writes, "Consequently, the one thing this study does not undertake is the rehabilitation of George B. McClellan's reputation to the point of claiming he was a great commander. His lack of success militates against any such undertaking" (Rowland, 1998, p. ix). While many historians judge McClellan as the Union's and Civil War's worst commander by far, Rowland does not agree, and he uses this book to prove and defend his thesis.
Author McPherson's book takes a general look at the Civil War and hones in on McClellan during his discussion of the major battles and victories of the war. His thesis maintains that McClellan was egotistical and afraid to make decisions. He also states that McClellan did not support abolitionism, and was becoming increasingly uncomfortable leading troops that eventually would emancipate the Southern slaves. He writes that McClellan said, "I am fighting to preserve the integrity of the Union... To gain that end we cannot afford to mix up the negro question'" (McPherson, 2001, p. 236). He believes that McClellan let early success go to his head, and that he made increasingly unwise decisions based on his own ego and personal beliefs. For example, according to McPherson, the general once ignored President Lincoln and Secretary of State Seward waiting in his parlor and refused to see them, which is a breach of protocol and judgment in anyone's eyes (McPherson 235). He did not always use the best judgment about his military decisions, and ultimately it cost him the command of the Army of the Potomac.
However, Rowland refutes this story that is widely accepted, noting, "The strange thing about that incident is that not one of the principals involved corroborated it in any way. Beyond Hay's assertion that Lincoln made light of the matter, there is no mention of it in anything Lincoln wrote or said, and the same may be said for Seward" (Rowland, 1998, p. 48). He continues that McClellan never mentioned it either, even in letters to his wife, and that it seems if he had pulled off such an important coup against the president, that he certainly would have mentioned it. This defines some of the differences between the two authors. McPherson's book is a more general look at the war, and so he may not have researched each individual incident as heavily as Rowland did, and so, some of their viewpoints and conclusions are different.
Both of the authors acknowledge that McClellan chronically overestimated the size of the Confederate forces his army was about to engage, and that he many have relied on evidence of troop size that was questionable at best. They also both concede that McClellan had severe personality or mental problems that colored his ability to lead and win successful campaigns. In addition, they judge his relationship with Lincoln as poor at best, and they believe that this led to friction and distrust between the two men. In turn, this led Lincoln to sometimes make his own decisions regarding the Army, undermining McClellan's leadership and ability to make decisions on his own. McPherson writes, "The retention of McDowell's corps [by Lincoln] was the first of several actions that caused McClellan and his supporters to charge that the Republican administration did not want him, a Democratic general, to succeed" (McPherson, 2001, p. 258). These fears were never proved, but they show the ego and inability to deal with criticism that chronicled McClellan's career, items that both authors cite in their assessment of his generalship throughout the war.
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