Thomas Rowland\'s George B. Mcclellan

¶ … Thomas Rowland's George B. McClellan and Civil War history: In the shadow of Grant and Sherman" that compares and contrasts the interpretations of McClellan's generalship with James M. McPherson's Ordeal by fire: The Civil War and reconstruction. Both of these historic texts center on the American Civil War and its affect on the country. Both also discuss in detail General George B. McClellan and his affect on the war and its outcome. McClellan was a brilliant organizer who let power and admiration go to his head, leading to some of the worst military decisions during the Civil War.

Both authors are extremely critical of McClellan and many of his military decisions, but author Rowland is less critical, and feels McClellan has been harshly judged, more so than many other Civil War generals who deserved some harsher judgment. He writes, "Consequently, the one thing this study does not undertake is the rehabilitation of George B. McClellan's reputation to the point of claiming he was a great commander. His lack of success militates against any such undertaking" (Rowland, 1998, p. ix). While many historians judge McClellan as the Union's and Civil War's worst commander by far, Rowland does not agree, and he uses this book to prove and defend his thesis.

Author McPherson's book takes a general look at the Civil War and hones in on McClellan during his discussion of the major battles and victories of the war. His thesis maintains that McClellan was egotistical and afraid to make decisions. He also states that McClellan did not support abolitionism, and was becoming increasingly uncomfortable leading troops that eventually would emancipate the Southern slaves. He writes that McClellan said, "I am fighting to preserve the integrity of the Union... To gain that end we cannot afford to mix up the negro question'" (McPherson, 2001, p. 236). He believes that McClellan let early success go to his head, and that he made increasingly unwise decisions based on his own ego and personal beliefs. For example, according to McPherson, the general once ignored President Lincoln and Secretary of State Seward waiting in his parlor and refused to see them, which is a breach of protocol and judgment in anyone's eyes (McPherson 235). He did not always use the best judgment about his military decisions, and ultimately it cost him the command of the Army of the Potomac.

However, Rowland refutes this story that is widely accepted, noting, "The strange thing about that incident is that not one of the principals involved corroborated it in any way. Beyond Hay's assertion that Lincoln made light of the matter, there is no mention of it in anything Lincoln wrote or said, and the same may be said for Seward" (Rowland, 1998, p. 48). He continues that McClellan never mentioned it either, even in letters to his wife, and that it seems if he had pulled off such an important coup against the president, that he certainly would have mentioned it. This defines some of the differences between the two authors. McPherson's book is a more general look at the war, and so he may not have researched each individual incident as heavily as Rowland did, and so, some of their viewpoints and conclusions are different.

Both of the authors acknowledge that McClellan chronically overestimated the size of the Confederate forces his army was about to engage, and that he many have relied on evidence of troop size that was questionable at best. They also both concede that McClellan had severe personality or mental problems that colored his ability to lead and win successful campaigns. In addition, they judge his relationship with Lincoln as poor at best, and they believe that this led to friction and distrust between the two men. In turn, this led Lincoln to sometimes make his own decisions regarding the Army, undermining McClellan's leadership and ability to make decisions on his own. McPherson writes, "The retention of McDowell's corps [by Lincoln] was the first of several actions that caused McClellan and his supporters to charge that the Republican administration did not want him, a Democratic general, to succeed" (McPherson, 2001, p. 258). These fears were never proved, but they show the ego and inability to deal with criticism that chronicled McClellan's career, items that both authors cite in their assessment of his generalship throughout the war. Both writers discuss McClellan's intense dislike of Lincoln, and his resentment at Lincoln's constant meddling in the general's affairs, which he found an intrusion and quite pointless. Both authors also maintain that McClellan was an excellent organizer, and this may be one of the reasons Lincoln kept him on as commander even after his refusal to back up General Pope during the Second Battle of Bull Run. Many people called for McClellan to be fired after that crushing defeat, but Lincoln supported him, partly because he felt he could unite an army that had lost its morale under Pope's leadership. Rowland notes, "Throughout his tenure, he retained the loyalty and respect of the majority of the officer corps" (Rowland, 1998, p. 54), and this is one reason Lincoln remained supportive, even when others did not.

One of the main arguments Rowland uses to defend his thesis is that McClellan's reputation and perceived failures were largely dictated by the Unionist position after the war. He writes, "Joseph L. Harsh has astutely observed that the more negative appraisals of McClellan became increasingly solidified in the face of a growing acceptance of the Unionist interpretation of the Civil War" (Rowland, 1998, p. 5). Rowland believes that a more balanced and less Union-slanting opinion might make McClellan's exploits a little easier to understand and acknowledge. To back up his thesis, Rowland turns to a variety of research materials, including books, journals, scholarly articles, and several other sources. He also uses the opinions of other historians to help build on his thesis and refute items that he does not believe are accurate. In fact, the first chapter of his text lists some of the other works on McClellan and he uses this list to help begin to build and form his own thesis about McClellan and his input into the war.

McPherson's arguments differ from Rowland's, but they are certainly just as strong and well thought out. His basic premise about McClellan and his command is based on McClellan's own mental health. He writes, "Thus did McClellan's personality and politics become mixed up with questions of military strategy and war aims" (McPherson, 2001, p. 236). He also shows how long it took McClellan to make up his mind to attack, something that often cost him decisive victories, such as one of his first forays into Confederate territory during his advance toward Richmond. He refused to attack quickly, which allowed General Johnson to remove his soldiers toward Richmond and gain much-needed supplies that were on the way. If McClellan would have attacked at once, he could have defeated the Confederates, because he had far more manpower and supplies. Johnson created a defensive line around the city, and when he was wounded, General Robert E. Lee took over command, and immediately launched a full-scale attack on McClellan's forces. McClellan retreated, citing "superior" Southern forces, when in fact; the Union Army far outnumbered the forces Lee had sent to attack. McClellan lost his nerve, and both men agree on this point.

Probably the biggest difference between these two historians and their arguments is that McPherson subscribes to the general view that McClellan was a flawed human and general, while Rowland maintains that some of the accounts of his flaws are exaggerated and overused, and that many other famous leaders had many of these same character flaws. He writes, "Again, as in so many other particulars concerning his actions during the Civil War, McClellan is singled out as the chief sinner. Consequently, we have received a very distorted picture" (Rowland, 1998, p. 53). He is much more sympathetic to McClellan that McPherson is, and because of this, his work paints a more balanced picture of an unbalanced and disliked man. Neither argument seems illogical or full of fallacy, because the authors back up their assertions with research and support for their theories.

Both historians use a wide variety of sources to support their arguments. They use other history texts, journal articles, magazines, personal narratives, memoirs, letters, battle reports, newspaper reports, and just about any print source they could locate. For the most part, these sources are extremely reliable, as they are everything from eyewitness accounts to scholarly assessment of evidence and research. However, Rowland's assessment that the story about McClellan snubbing Lincoln may not be true indicates that no matter how reliable the source and the sources used for reference there can be varying accounts of history.

A true historian will analyze or at least make note of these variances, rather than simply reporting them as true, and so, some of McPherson's work comes into question. It is extremely clear that he has done a wide variety of research, and used a variety of reputable sources, but because his scope is broader, he does not have time to delve into every minute aspect of each resource, while Rowland, concentrating on one subject, does. Thus, the two author's viewpoints are different because of the purpose and scope of their works, and not necessarily because one is a "better" or more thorough researcher than the other.

The evidence each author uses does support their arguments very well. Each man chooses the evidence that is most compelling and includes it in their assessment of the man, and this helps their works seem more credible and believable. Both use anecdotal evidence, (such as the story of McClellan snubbing Lincoln), but they use quantifiable evidence, as well. For example, McPherson makes assessments of McClellan and his military decisions, but backs them up with maps, battle positions, and hard evidence that shows how each battle was fought, and ultimately won or lost.

Both authors paint compelling portraits of McClellan as a general and a man. It is clear he was a controversial and complex personality who made some disastrous decisions while he was in command of the Army of the Potomac. Both authors also have serious research and backup for their conclusions and interpretations. If any interpretation is more convincing, it would be Rowland's, simply because his entire book is devoted to discussing McClellan and his generalship, while McPherson's is not. McPherson discusses McClellan in relationship to the entire war, while Rowland discusses McClellan in relationship to himself and his command. They are different perspectives, and so, they achieve different results. Neither is a poor interpretation, they simply serve different purposes, and so, they achieve different aims.

It seems that Rowland's account is more interesting because it is more detailed, and because it takes more time to attempt to explain some of the historic suppositions about McClellan, his personality, and his leadership. On the other hand, McPherson's is a great overview of McClellan's rise to power and subsequent fall from grace. Each serves a purpose, and reading them both together gives a more complete picture of McClellan and his decisions during the war. It is quite clear that Rowland wants the reader to make up their own mind about McClellan and his effectiveness, and that he does not buy in to all the generalizations that have been made about his mental health and fitness for leadership. He wants to get to the bottom of McClellan's actions, while McPherson is reporting them, instead of deeply analyzing them.