How The War In Ukraine In Reinvigorating The NATO Alliance Term Paper

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NATO and Russia: Selected Essays

Essay #1

"NATO should not be considered the most successful military alliance in the history because it "won" the Cold War by default. Taking into consideration that Europe failed to field sufficient conventional military forces, the Cold War ended not because of effective Atlantic containment, but because of the internal demise of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR." Discuss and opinionate. In your essay, explain, exemplify, and assess the impact of the considerable disagreements and dissent between the US and its European allies during the Cold War. What was the role of Transatlantic relations and of NATO in ending the Cold War? Explain and justify.

Although many Americans and Western Europeans today believe that the primary catalyst for the end of the Cold War was President Ronald Reagans call to the Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in 1987 to, Tear down this wall, the actual causes are far more complex and multifaceted. It is true, however, that Reagans speech coincided with many of the momentous events that would eventually spell the end of the Cold War, and his firm commitment to outspending the Soviets militarily certainly hastened the Soviet Unions collapse in 1991. Similarly, even though it was technologically doomed from the start, Reagans call for a Star Wars-type defensive shield clearly shook the Soviet leaders to their core, and an acceleration in their defense spending was the result. Likewise, as discussed further below, other factors such as increasing internal political dissent from Soviet satellite nations, the Soviet Unions costly invasion of Afghanistan and the downturn in the Soviet economy also played a major role in ending the Cold War.

Therefore, while it is accurate to assert that NATO should not be considered the most successful military alliance in the history because it won the Cold War by default, NATO did in fact contribute to this outcome in a number of substantive ways, most especially by maintaining strong military pressure on the Soviet Union. This pressure became especially acute when the Soviet Union inexplicably decided that it needed its own version of Vietnam in its invasion and subsequent lengthy 10-year occupation of Afghanistan which drained the Soviet budget and cost more than 15,000 Soviet lives. The clandestine military, economic and technical support that was provided the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedeen ensured that the Soviet military would lose massive amounts of national treasure and blood, and the Soviet economy simply could not sustain this costly war.

Certainly, there were also a number of serious disagreements between the NATO member-states in the years leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, then as now, the United States was concerned about the lack of defense spending as a percentage of GDP by its NATO allies, and it was obvious that many Western European nations were prospering economically as a result of the nuclear and conventional weaponry umbrella of defense provided by the U.S. which allowed them to concentrate on economic development at the expense of their military spending. In fact, defense spending represented one of the main issues of Transatlantic contention between NATO members, just as this controversy continues today.

Nonetheless, it is not entirely accurate to suggest that NATO failed to field sufficient conventional military forces to counter the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. For instance, while there were multiple hotspots around the world that involved both Western and Soviet proxies, including most especially Vietnam and Korea, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations essentially kept their distance from NATO-allied nations in Europe. This eventuality indicates that despite assertions to the contrary, NATO did in fact field sufficient conventional military forces during the existence of the Soviet Union.

It is true, though, that the Soviet Union fielded far more conventional military forces than were needed to protect the integrity of its borders from incursions by NATO. For example, the final comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces conducted by the German Federal Ministry of Defense (1987) came to the prescient conclusion that, The Warsaw Pact still maintains far more armed forces than are necessary for the defense of its territory. This raises the question why it places such a great burden on the national economies of its members (Force Comparison: NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 1987, p. 5). It is also true that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact consistently outspent NATO on conventional forces such as battle tanks and artillery systems, but the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact alliance just a few years later indicates that NATO did in fact field sufficient conventional forces to compel the Soviets to outspend the West, thereby hastening its end.

In addition, none of the centuries-old hostilities that existed between the European members of NATO simply vanished upon their accession to the alliance, and intra-alliance disagreements over optimal political and military strategies were inevitable and frequently protracted. Given the diversity of national interests that were involved, though, these disagreements were predictable then just as they are at present. Nevertheless, such disagreements served to bolster the views of critics of the alliance, and there was the constant threat that NATO could come apart at the seams as a result. After all, France withdrew from NATO in 1966 after hosting the alliance for 15 years, a move that came as a shock to the leaders of member-states who were forced to quickly transfer its headquarters to a new home in Casteau, Belgium. Even though France remained closely allied with NATO immediately thereafter, this eventuality made it clear that the NATO alliance was not rock-solid impervious to change.

In addition, there were also other salient factors involved in the end of the Cold War calculus that must be taken into account. For instance, Turkey played both ends against the middle in its relationship with NATO member-states and the Soviet Union, just as it continues to do currently with the Russian Federation and its negotiations over the accession of Sweden and Finland to the NATO alliance. In fact, it is reasonable to posit that the current state of Transatlantic relations between the U.S. and Europe are far stronger, and may even result in the < style ='color:#000;text-decoration: underline!important;' id='custom' target='_blank' href='https://www.paperdue.com/topic/acceptance-essays'>acceptance of Ukraine into NATO in the foreseeable future. The current state of comparatively rosy Transatlantic relations, however, is a far cry from the years leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Against this backdrop of disagreements and dissent between the U.S. and its European allies during the Cold War, the fact that NATO is still in existence today and...…have been possible otherwise. For example, according to Bouchet (2022), Russias war against Ukraine has given a shot in the arm to the transatlantic relationship after several years of concern in Europe and the United States about their slow, long-term drifting apart (para. 3). This timely observation means that prior to Russias invasion of Ukraine, NATO was an alliance in search of a real mission that it could get its collective teeth into and this has been the eventuality that Russia clearly did not expect. The hurried response of Sweden and Finland to join the NATO alliance immediately following Russias invasion was also the last thing that Putin wanted or expected from his special military operation, and the addition of these two countries to NATO will keep Putin and his allies up at night thinking about what they have done and what it means for their legacy in the future.

Given the enormous diversity of national views and interests that exist between the 30 member-states of NATO, this outcome is remarkable in a number of ways that highlight the overarching importance that is assigned to collective security. Even at present, though, there is no universal consensus among NATOs member-states concerning what should be done in response to Russias war in Ukraine, what levels of spending are needed, and whether to provide the Ukrainians with state-of-the-art fighter jets, among other issues. Nevertheless, the alliances sustained growth and centrality in serving as a mutual framework in which NATO member-states can realize the most bang for the defense buck is clear evidence that the war in Ukraine has made a profound impact on Transatlantic relations and NATO.

Today, NATO has not only been reinvigorated, it has emerged as a viable model for other regional powers to follow at present and in the future. The historical record also confirms that the success of other NATO-wannabes, however, has been dismal in comparison to NATOs success in maintaining a cohesive front to counter the growing threat from the Russian Federation. As noted above, however, it remains unclear just how long NATO will be needed if and when the peoples of the world realize that war may not be as inevitable as the New Testament suggests, and the deaths of current world leaders may witness a new era where the importance of global human rights and welfare outweigh national interests. In this utopian setting, there would be no need for NATO or any military forces beyond what is needed to help people when natural disasters strike. The member-states of NATO could dissolve their alliance tip their collective hats and congratulate each other on a job well done.

This highly desirable eventuality, of course, is far-fetched at present and even a wholesale change in national leadership will not erase centuries of the cultural and religious differences that continue to fuel hostilities around the world today. Moreover, resources are scarce and some people will always be at a disadvantage compared to their neighbors. In fact, shooting wars over water rights and oil may well occur within the foreseeable future, so there is no end to the multiple reasons for armed conflict in sight at present. The foregoing issues mean that as long as security threats exist, military alliances such as NATO are going to be essential for…

Sources Used in Documents:

References

Bouchet, N. (2022, May 10). The Impact of the War in Ukraine on the Transatlantic Relationship. The German Marshall Fund. Retrieved from https://www.gmfus. org/news/impact-war-ukraine-transatlantic-relationship.

Guyer, J. (2022, March 25). NATO was in crisis. Putin’s war made it even more powerful. Vox. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/22994826/nato-resurgence-biden-trip-putin-ukraine.

Hammons, S. (2015, July 29). Reagan’s 1987 UN speech on ‘alien threat’ resonates now. CultureReady. Retrieved from https://www.cultureready.org/blog/reagans-1987-un-speech-alien-threat-resonates-now.


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