How the War in Ukraine in Reinvigorating the NATO Alliance

NATO and Russia: Selected Essays

Essay #1

"NATO should not be considered the most successful military alliance in the history because it "won" the Cold War by default. Taking into consideration that Europe failed to field sufficient conventional military forces, the Cold War ended not because of effective Atlantic containment, but because of the internal demise of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR." Discuss and opinionate. In your essay, explain, exemplify, and assess the impact of the considerable disagreements and dissent between the US and its European allies during the Cold War. What was the role of Transatlantic relations and of NATO in ending the Cold War? Explain and justify.

Although many Americans and Western Europeans today believe that the primary catalyst for the end of the Cold War was President Ronald Reagan’s call to the Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in 1987 to, “Tear down this wall,” the actual causes are far more complex and multifaceted. It is true, however, that Reagan’s speech coincided with many of the momentous events that would eventually spell the end of the Cold War, and his firm commitment to outspending the Soviets militarily certainly hastened the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Similarly, even though it was technologically doomed from the start, Reagan’s call for a “Star Wars”-type defensive shield clearly shook the Soviet leaders to their core, and an acceleration in their defense spending was the result. Likewise, as discussed further below, other factors such as increasing internal political dissent from Soviet satellite nations, the Soviet Union’s costly invasion of Afghanistan and the downturn in the Soviet economy also played a major role in ending the Cold War.

Therefore, while it is accurate to assert that NATO should not be considered the most successful military alliance in the history because it “won” the Cold War by default, NATO did in fact contribute to this outcome in a number of substantive ways, most especially by maintaining strong military pressure on the Soviet Union. This pressure became especially acute when the Soviet Union inexplicably decided that it needed its own version of Vietnam in its invasion and subsequent lengthy 10-year occupation of Afghanistan which drained the Soviet budget and cost more than 15,000 Soviet lives. The clandestine military, economic and technical support that was provided the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedeen ensured that the Soviet military would lose massive amounts of national treasure and blood, and the Soviet economy simply could not sustain this costly war.

Certainly, there were also a number of serious disagreements between the NATO member-states in the years leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, then as now, the United States was concerned about the lack of defense spending as a percentage of GDP by its NATO allies, and it was obvious that many Western European nations were prospering economically as a result of the nuclear and conventional weaponry umbrella of defense provided by the U.S. which allowed them to concentrate on economic development at the expense of their military spending. In fact, defense spending represented one of the main issues of Transatlantic contention between NATO members, just as this controversy continues today.

Nonetheless, it is not entirely accurate to suggest that NATO failed to field sufficient conventional military forces to counter the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. For instance, while there were multiple hotspots around the world that involved both Western and Soviet proxies, including most especially Vietnam and Korea, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations essentially kept their distance from NATO-allied nations in Europe. This eventuality indicates that despite assertions to the contrary, NATO did in fact field sufficient conventional military forces during the existence of the Soviet Union.

It is true, though, that the Soviet Union fielded far more conventional military forces than were needed to protect the integrity of its borders from incursions by NATO. For example, the final comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces conducted by the German Federal Ministry of Defense (1987) came to the prescient conclusion that, “The Warsaw Pact still maintains far more armed forces than are necessary for the defense of its territory. This raises the question why it places such a great burden on the national economies of its members” (Force Comparison: NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 1987, p. 5). It is also true that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact consistently outspent NATO on conventional forces such as battle tanks and artillery systems, but the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact alliance just a few years later indicates that NATO did in fact field sufficient conventional forces to compel the Soviets to outspend the West, thereby hastening its end.

In addition, none of the centuries-old hostilities that existed between the European members of NATO simply vanished upon their accession to the alliance, and intra-alliance disagreements over optimal political and military strategies were inevitable and frequently protracted. Given the diversity of national interests that were involved, though, these disagreements were predictable then just as they are at present. Nevertheless, such disagreements served to bolster the views of critics of the alliance, and there was the constant threat that NATO could come apart at the seams as a result. After all, France withdrew from NATO in 1966 after hosting the alliance for 15 years, a move that came as a shock to the leaders of member-states who were forced to quickly transfer its headquarters to a new home in Casteau, Belgium. Even though France remained closely allied with NATO immediately thereafter, this eventuality made it clear that the NATO alliance was not rock-solid impervious to change.

In addition, there were also other salient factors involved in the end of the Cold War calculus that must be taken into account. For instance, Turkey played both ends against the middle in its relationship with NATO member-states and the Soviet Union, just as it continues to do currently with the Russian Federation and its negotiations over the accession of Sweden and Finland to the NATO alliance. In fact, it is reasonable to posit that the current state of Transatlantic relations between the U.S. and Europe are far stronger, and may even result in the acceptance of Ukraine into NATO in the foreseeable future. The current state of comparatively rosy Transatlantic relations, however, is a far cry from the years leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Against this backdrop of disagreements and dissent between the U.S. and its European allies during the Cold War, the fact that NATO is still in existence today and definitely larger and stronger and more cohesive than ever as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is proof positive that it has been a successful military alliance in many ways, even if it was not solely responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed, while it can be argued that a combination of geopolitical forces caused the end of the Cold War, it is clear that NATO was at center stage of this historic outcome. During its existence, the Soviet Union and its erstwhile Warsaw Pact allies were widely regarded as the major, monolithic threat facing the West. Given the dissensions that existed between some NATO member-states concerning how best to protect Western Europe’s interests, the only viable approach to countering this threat at the time from America’s perspective was the NATO alliance even if it was disproportionately funded by the United States.

The rationale behind the viability of the NATO alliance in countering the conventional military threat represented by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact loosely resembled the “mutually assured destruction” which was understood to mean that any nuclear attack on a Western power would be countered by an overwhelming nuclear response by the United States. Likewise, NATO was established on the fundamental principle of collective defense, meaning that an attack against one member-state would be considered an attack against all member-states. During the years leading up to 1991, few Western observers could have predicted that the Berlin Wall would ever come down in their lifetimes, let alone the collapse of the seemingly mighty and insoluble Soviet empire. These positive outcomes for the West happened because the Transatlantic relations and NATO alliance were sufficiently cohesive to withstand the internal disagreements and controversies that frequently characterized the relationship between NATO member-states.

While there were certainly some significant disagreements and controversies over optimal military policies and strategies between some NATO members, some of which remain today, the alliance itself was still considered as the optimal approach for protecting Western interests during the Cold War by Western military and political leaders. It is therefore also reasonable to conclude that the strong cultural ties and solidarity among NATO member-states served to counter potential military aggression by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in ways that helped maintain stability on the European continent until for a number of decades.

Therefore, while NATO should not and cannot be considered the most successful military alliance in the history because it "won" the Cold War by default, it is clear that the sometimes-rocky Transatlantic relations and the NATO alliance served a pivotal role in ending the Cold War, and America’s unwavering financial commitment to the alliance was central in bringing about its end through the internal demise of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union. In the final analysis, although it depends on how it is measured, the research was clear in showing that NATO is among the most successful military alliance in the history given its longevity and success in facilitating the collapse of the Soviet Union and bringing about the end of the Cold War.

References

Force Comparison: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. (1987). The Federal Ministry of Defence. Retrieved from https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/3/137855/0293_ Force_comparison_1987-NATO_and_the_Warsaw_Pact_1988_ENG.pdf.

Essay #3

“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the now yearlong war has made a profound impact on Transatlantic relations and NATO but will not re-galvanize the Alliance in the long-run.” Discuss and opinionate. In your essay, examine and explain how the war has affected U.S.-Europe relations and NATO and assess how these changes will likely affect NATO’s future. Is NATO still relevant? More so? Less so?

Depending on how the term is interpreted, the “long-run” may span centuries or even millenia. Certainly, this significant amount of time will invariably bring about profound changes in the geopolitical sphere to the point where NATO is no longer relevant or needed as a security blanket for the Western allies. Indeed, given the multiple existential threats that are currently arrayed against humankind, there may not be any humanity left to worry about international relations at all. The recent earthquakes in Turkey and Syria, a North Korean parade featuring enough nuclear weaponry to destroy the United States’ regional defensive capabilities, nuclear threats by Putin and his cronies, the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, and the other ravages of climate changes such as floods and droughts combine with a “don’t look up” approach to defending earth from meteors and comets in ways that suggest humankind’s days are numbered.

Assuming a best-care scenario, though, and interpreting “long-run” to mean a few years or even a decade or two, the current situation in Europe indicates that Russia is providing the most worrisome existential threat for the NATO alliance as Putin rattles his nuclear sabers and threatens the West with total annihilation. Moreover, the long-run will also inevitably witness the emergence of a new generation of national leaders who may more fully embrace the right-wing extremism that is characterizing the change in many countries, making the need for a collective military alliance all the more important. Conversely, it is also possible that a new generation of leaders will bring an enlightened approach to national leadership that rejects the need or logic behind maintaining a large standing army for no other reason except to serve as a deterrent.

It is also important to keep in mind that at some point, Putin and his cronies will die from whatever causes some day, and the Russian people may be eager for a return to the pre-Ukrainian invasion era when prices were low and stable and the government stayed out of their private lives for the most part. Nonetheless, the current trajectory of Russian aggression indicates that the die has been cast and there may be no turning back for the Russians unless and until they are soundly defeated on the battlefield.

The war in Ukraine has affected U.S.-Europe relations and NATO by forcing member-states to come to grips with the reality of the Russian threat. It just takes one madman to launch a preemptive nuclear strike that could destroy the world, and Putin’s reassurances that Russian will not use nuclear weapons first is consistently countered by statements from his defense officials that they most certainly will. These threats, combined with Russia’s ongoing aggressions in Ukraine, of course, have not gone unnoticed by Western leaders. This Russian aggression has translated into a re-galvanized NATO alliance that likely would not have happened otherwise. In this regard, in the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion, Guyer (2022) emphasized that:

Long a lethargic dinosaur of an organization, NATO announced new battle groups would deploy to four countries on its eastern flank, and Biden announced that the alliance would respond to Russia should it use chemical weapons in Ukraine. It’s a remarkable shift for an alliance that French President Emmanuel Macron called brain dead just two and a half years ago. (para. 3)

In other words, the lethargy and complacency of the NATO alliance that existed just over a year ago stands in sharp contrast to its current incarnation. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it was just a nebulous threat the existed on the perimeters of defense thinking, along the lines of “if it isn’t broke, don’t fix it.” Today, though, the vast majority of NATO member-states are in firm agreement concerning the need to counter Russia’s hostilities in Ukraine with increased defense spending and contributions of military armaments to the heroic Ukrainian armed forces.

This positive outcome for NATO is directly attributable to Russia making it clear that it has designs on other countries, including potentially NATO member-states such as Poland. The recent response by NATO member-states to this aggression harkens back to 1987 when President Ronald Reagan made his famous speech before the UN General Assembly concerning the need to counter a mutual threat. For instance, President Reagan made the point that:

I occasionally think how quickly our differences worldwide would vanish if we were facing an alien threat from outside this world. And yet, I ask you, is not an alien force already among us? What could be more alien to the universal aspirations of our peoples than war and the threat of war? (as cited in Hammons, 2015, para. 2)

Unfortunately, the harsh reality facing humankind now and in the future is that there always be “wars and rumors of war” (Matthew 24:6-13, NIV), and the historical record confirms this time and again. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that assuming that humankind survives the current set of challenges facing it, there will still be a need for collective defense from nations that want more than they have or because they hate others for any number of reasons, but including most especially religious and cultural issues. It is important to keep in mind that these types of differences between humans and the nations they live in are not going away anytime soon, and NATO stands as a shining example of just how effective a cohesive military alliance can be in preventing these fundamental human differences from turning into outright armed conflict with attacks on its member-states.

Nevertheless, NATO did not prevent Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, just as it failed to prevent the re-annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2015. The war on Ukraine, though, has reinvigorated the NATO alliance in ways that would not have been possible otherwise. For example, according to Bouchet (2022), “Russia’s war against Ukraine has given a shot in the arm to the transatlantic relationship after several years of concern in Europe and the United States about their slow, long-term drifting apart” (para. 3). This timely observation means that prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO was an alliance in search of a real mission that it could get its collective teeth into – and this has been the eventuality that Russia clearly did not expect. The hurried response of Sweden and Finland to join the NATO alliance immediately following Russia’s invasion was also the last thing that Putin wanted or expected from his “special military operation,” and the addition of these two countries to NATO will keep Putin and his allies up at night thinking about what they have done and what it means for their legacy in the future.