Before and After 9 11 Attacks Assessment of Security Posture of the United States

9/11 ATTACKS

Security Posture of the United States Before and After 9/11 Attacks

Introduction

From the onset, it would be prudent to note that if there was one thing that the 9/11 terror attacks made clear, it was that the national security of this great nation was inadequate. The fact that terrorists could plan and execute an attack of this nature and scale was a clear indication that the country’s national security apparatus needed to be revamped. The terror attach, as well as an evaluation of the events leading up to the terror attack resulted in the formation of the Department of Homeland Security. This text concerns itself with the security posture of the country before and after 9/11.

Discussion

Lawson, Bersin and Kayyem (2020) correctly point out that prior to the 9/11 terror attacks, the country’s experience with terror attacks on its own soil could only be described as intermittent. As the authors further indicate, most terror attacks prior to this wretched event took place overseas – albeit being targeted at the U.S., i.e. via the attack on its personnel or destruction of its installations, structures, etc. (Lawson, Bersin and Kayyem, 2020). Terrorist attacks within the country’s boarders had not been hugely successful in as far as loss of human life or damage to structures/installations is concerned. As a matter of fact, there had been no other attack of the scale of the 9/11 terror attacks prior to this particular event. This is not, however, to say that there were no flaws as well as loopholes in as far as our country’s national security is concerned. This is the conclusion that one is bound to arrive at following a review or assessment of various reports and findings released after the 9/11 attack, i.e. the 9/11 Commission Report.

a) Before 9/11

Harvey (2012) points out that prior to 9/11, domestic intelligence collection was largely governed by various regulations as well as statutes – and more specifically by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This effectively means that the criminal justice system in place was largely involved in efforts to address terror attempts and attacks. The author further indicates that various well-defined rules sought to determine the approach used by domestic and foreign agencies to exchange collected or gathered information. To a large extent, these strict rules often got in the way of information sharing among the relevant agencies. More specifically, in the words of the author, the “strict set of rules were interpreted as forbidding pure ‘intelligence’ information from being collected for law enforcement purposes, and – conversely – made it difficult to share criminal justice-derived information with other agencies” (Harvey, 2012, p. 211). Harvey (2012) is also categorical that this particular approach was largely ineffective and suboptimal in as far as the prevention of well-coordinated terror attacks is concerned. This is more so the case given that with such a structure in place, it became rather difficult to effectively chart behavior patterns of terror suspects.

It should also be noted that the rules in place at the time could not be effectively be applied in contemporary settings due to the advent of technology. A good example in this case would be electronic surveillance rules. According to Lawson, Bersin and Kayyem (2020), the said rules had been “designed to govern electronic surveillance in the days of fixed land-line communications” and could not be effectively applied “to communications media such as mobile, disposable telephones or voice over internet communications” (119). This largely meant that it was extremely difficult to incapacitate or detain terror suspects – as the admissibility of the evidence presented in this case could be promptly and easily challenged. A review of available literature, thus, clearly indicates that making use of the various criminal justice principles as the foundation of the counterterrorism efforts was ineffective in thwarting terror attacks because the focus in this case was largely on the punishment of offenders. With this in mind, there was clear need for the refashioning of the counterterrorism architecture and remodel it along the incapacitation of terror suspects, while at the same time allowing for the effective collection of intelligence as well as integration of information.

b) After 9/11

Following the various reviews conducted after the 9/11 attacks, the government sought to address the issue of effective collection of intelligence via a reconditioning of the various electronic communication interception regulation and rules. For instance, according to Abbas, Tambe, and Winterfeldt (2017), there was the overwhelming passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, or the so called USA PARIOT Act. This effectively made it possible for the relevant authorities to intercept communication between terror suspects on terms that were not as restrictive as before.

On the other hand, when it comes to the integration of information, concerted efforts were made to ensure that information was shared across the various agencies in an effective and meaningful manner. On this front, it should be noted that the 9/11 Commission report had established that one of the key factors that made the said terror attack successful was “failure to connect the dots of individual intelligence items” (Abbas, Tambe, and Winterfeldt, 2017, 362). Towards this end, there was need to have in place mechanisms – with legal backing – to enhance effective sharing of information. Abbas, Tambe, and Winterfeldt (2017) point out that the bottlenecks gating in the way of effective sharing of information were significantly reduced by the PATRIOT Act. More specifically, according to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network – FINCEN (2020), this particular law “provides financial institutions with the ability to share information with one another, under a safe harbor that offers protections from liability, in order to better identify and report activities that may involve money laundering or terrorist activities” (390). This is captured under section 314(b) of the said Act.

Lastly, as has been indicated elsewhere in this text, following a review of various reports and findings released after the 9/11 attack, it was also established that there was need for the refashioning of the counterterrorism architecture and remodeling it along the incapacitation of terror suspects. This was fraught with controversy from the onset because of the need to secure or uphold the rights of all detainees/suspects. However, it is important to note that progress has been made over the last few years in efforts to ensure that the civil liberties of terror suspects are secured, without necessarily jeopardizing efforts to protect our homeland. For instance, in the past, the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of the executive branch to hold terror suspects.