Battle of Antietam the Research

Battle of Antietam

The research here examines an analysis of the Battle of Antietam utilizing primary sources as the main source of reference. It first examines the immediate background of the battle, and how the Confederate and Union forces set up for their confrontation at Antietam Creek. In a defensive position, General E. Lee placed himself west of Antietam Creek, with the Potomac to his backside. General McClellan came from the northeast down onto Lee's much smaller forces. What resulted was the bloodiest battle of the entire Civil War, costing thousands of soldiers their lives. In the end, Lee failed to defend his position, and lost his chance for a successful invasion of Maryland and retreated, forces decimated, back to Richmond.

Introduction

The Battle of Antietam was the bloodiest confrontation between the North and South during the entire duration of the Civil War, and it witnessed a determined General Robert E. Lee fail to properly execute his planned invasion of Maryland, defended by General George B, McClellan. In the onslaught, General McClellan held true to the principle of war of leaving open the choice for either caution or decisive action, while Lee failed to recognize his own weaknesses, both in terms of men and defense point. The main resource for this research was an excellent primary source site, Home of the American Civil War, which holds biographical accounts written by actual soldiers and generals from both the North and the South and is also a great source for official records of the Civil War era, including government correspondence and official orders to the generals on the field.

Review of the Strategic Setting

The two armies meet in the middle of September of 1862, but the battle had been brewing for a while before hand. Lee had requested the permission from Confederate President Jefferson Davis to invade Maryland. Coming off of huge victories further west, like the First and Second Battle of Bull Run, the Southern General felt the need to strike the enemy at its most crucial point had come. So, Lee got his wish, and headed east into Maryland from Harper's Ferry, which he took from the Union just a few days before the epic clash at Antietam Creek that began on in the early morning hours of September 17, 1862. The Northern forces, understanding their close proximity to the capitol of Washington D.C. amassed a huge force to meet Lee and his men on that fateful day.

Comparison of the Antagonists

It was clear in this battle, that although Lee was on an invasion mission, the antagonists were the Union forces. Lee had entered into enemy territory, yet immediately took a position of defense, in preparation for meeting a much larger force than his own. Therefore, the Union forces were the main aggressors, who began the first attack against the Confederate troops, eventually pursuing them as the retreated out of the area the next few days after the original battle. The Union army was led under General George B. McClellan; he pursued General Robert E. Lee from the North, who was in the defensive position. McClellan had won an excellent reputation in prior conflicts like the Mexican War. When he took control of the Army of the Potomac, he brought with him an invigorated spirit and lifted morale to defend the capitol. According to research, "McClellan was in Washington to take command of the dispirited force that would become the Army of the Potomac; by November he was as well general-in-chief of all the Union armies."

On the other hand, General Robert E. Lee was outnumbered two-to-one. He had taken control of the Army of Virginia in June 1862, and his career proved much more distinguished than the career of McClellan at the time of the battle.

However, his reputation could not win the battle for him, and his decision to stake everything on the line backfired dramatically.

Military Systems

The two armies met on the field, but brought within them different military systems. McClellan clearly had the upper hand in terms of sheer troop numbers; however, he proved to rely on weak logistical strategies when he used faulty inside information to make his strategic decisions. McClellan gathered his intelligence using the spies of Allan Pinkerton, an infamous private detective out of Chicago.

McClellan had false reports of Lee commanding over 100,000 men; "The Federals were under the self-imposed illusion that there was a very large force opposed to them, whereas there was only one weak division until late in the afternoon."

This faulty intelligence caused him to lag on his execution of interception. It also allowed more time for Lee to procure more ready men for the oncoming fight. According to first hand accounts of the situation, "McClellan did not know it, and [apparently] feared, when Burnside was pressed back, that Sharpsburg was a Confederate victory, and that we would have to retire."

Thus, Lee was allowed more time to organize and plan a stronger defense. More and more Confederate troops joined ranks in preparation of the fight, for before the delay "They might have brushed it aside almost without halting, but for this illusion."

Lee took full advantage of the situation, and through false reports being published in Northern news facets, knew that McClellan had been overestimating his forces. Therefore, "Lee seems to have been aware of the inflated estimates of Confederate strength leaked to the press."

McClellan's poor intelligence thus had great influence in the setting and events inside the context of the battle.

Previous Performance

The Southern Confederate forces were in high spirits because of recent victories. First-hand accounts of the battle show a force that was full of confidence, despite their small numbers; "When the Second Bull Run campaign closed we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared to attack."

Lee's army was heading south towards Washington D.C. from West Virginia where they crossed into Maryland on their way to executing Lee's invasion plan. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson had captured Harper's Ferry, successfully opening the road into Maryland. There, the Union surrendered, which built morale; however, it also left much of Lee's army dealing with Union prisoners' of war. Thus, troops streaming into Maryland from Harper's Ferry, confident with the success of the recent Union surrender.

However, the Northern forces had seen victory directly after the battle at Harper's Ferry. McClellan had just witnessed victory at the Battle of South Mountain, in the Blue Ridge Mountains. However, this delayed McClellan from intercepting Lee earlier, stopping his organization before Antietam. Here, Confederate accounts of the battle report 494 wounded and kill, with 440 missing.

The Northern victory "The left of General McClellan's army pursued a part of the enemy's forces to the South Mountain, where, on the 14th, he made a stand. A severe battle ensued, the enemy being defeated and driven from his position with heavy loss."

Thus, both armies had recent victories and losses walking onto the battle field early on the morning of September 17th.

Logical Situation

The logical situation of each army also had strong influence on the end result of the war. The Confederates did have a large stash of weapons. Primary accounts state that Lee had a wagon train full of ammunition and artillery reserves.

However, they were completely out-numbered and running low on supplies. Lee himself, in his proposal to invade Maryland, even acknowledged this lack of supply, stating most of his troops were in need of fresh clothing and shoes. He wrote to Jefferson Davis "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes."

The Northern regiments were also running somewhat low on supplies. Although also equipped with several battery cannons, McClellan also admitted to his troops needing further supplies. In fact, this is one of the reasons he justified not attacking Lee too early in the first place. Additionally, McClellan boasted new recruits, fresh out of Washington D.C., "The entire force, I concluded, was composed of fresh troops from Washington or some camp of instruction."

Lee had to rely on his war-torn troops which had already seen much conflict as they traveled further into Maryland.

Morale, Health, and Welfare

The morale of both troops was key in how well the soldiers within them fought. The southern soldiers new they were incredibly outnumbered. Despite the victory at Harper's Ferry, the Confederates were nervous "had he made the movement which Stuart and myself thought he was making, it was hardly possible for the little force under Lee in person to have escaped, encumbered as it was with wagon trains and reserve artillery."

Lee himself understood his disadvantage in terms of troop forces. He recognized the deteriorating state of his troops, but still kept up his confidence in their abilities. In his proposal letter to Confederate President Jefferson Davis, he stated, "Our army consisted of a superior quality of soldiers, but it was in no condition to divide in the enemy's country.

Lee recognized their lack of supplies, which would hinder their effort further into enemy territory. However, he would not let his disadvantages hold him back, and he threw caution to the wind by choosing to execute his invasion. His words to Davis in his proposal letter were: "Still, we cannot afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipments, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them."

The victory on behalf of the Union lifted spirits which had recently been dampened from prior successful Confederate campaigns. Local reports claim "Gen. McClellan immediately proceeded to the right, where he was enthusiastically received, and by his presence added much to our success in recovering the ground lost."

McClellan was a source of inspiration to his troops throughout the duration of the battle. The soldiers under him praised him and looked to him for motivation. According to a first-hand account shows this admiration; "What strength of character George Brinton McClellan brought to his mission was untampered by adversity."

Thus, McClellan pumped his troops up during even the height of the battle.

Review Tactical Situation

The two sides had opposing missions when they met at Antietam Creek. The Union aimed to intercept Lee on his retreat South. Thus, several brigades were deployed to meet Lee at Antietam Creek in a move to block his march towards Washington D.C. The Union force was comprised as follows:

The disposition of the troops for the impending battle was as follows: Gen. (Edwin Vose) Sumner's corps, with Banks' division, to occupy the center; Gen. Hooker's corps, with the Pennsylvania Reserves, and Franklin's corps, on the right, and (Fitz John) Porter's corps on the left of Sumner, and Burnside on the extreme left, with the view of turning the enemy's right flank. Gen. Pleasanton supported the centre with 2,500 cavalry and four batteries.

The Confederate goal was to conquer, fulfilling a principle of war against their Northern enemy. Lee believed that the time to invade was at hand, and wrote to President Davis "If it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable."

And so, he took a defensive position against McClellan's approaching forces. See Appendix B for a detailed map of each of the two's positions as the battle began and progressed.

Terrain

There were several aspects of the terrain that affected the outcome of battle. According to first hand accounts, "At Antietam it was a low, rocky ledge, prefaced by a corn-field."

Miller's Cornfield was at the center of the two forces, and saw some of the bloodiest fighting in the morning, the earliest stages of the battle. The Confederacy used the cover of the cornfield strategically to counter the oncoming Union forces; "Beyond this road stretched a plowed field several hundred feet in length, sloping up to the battery, which was hidden in a corn-field. A stone fence, breast-high, enclosed the field on the left, and behind it lays a regiment of Confederates."

Lee was in defensive positions directly behind Antietam Creek; "Lee's army then fell back behind Antietam Creek, a few miles above its month, and took a position admirably suited for defense."

This position proved beneficial, with infantrymen being provided sufficient cover by stone fences, limestone, and small hallows.

However, the creek which they used as their front barrier was only 60-100 feet in width, depending on the location. Accounts of generals on the field even note this limitation in terms of tactical defense cover. The creek itself was not enough to fully hamper the coming Union forces; "Antietam Creek was not so much a barrier to the Federal army as it was a nuisance, limiting troop movements and hampering a close look at the enemy's positions."

There were bridges only a mile apart, allowing the Union to spread out their forces effectively. Behind Lee's forces was the Potomac, which was much more difficult to cross in comparison to the creek. There was only one bridge at Shepherdstown, which is where the battle actually ended on September 18 with Lee's inability to effectively cross over in time.

Troops Available

Lee had the lesser number of troops in the situation. His troops numbered around 55,000 when McClellan finally decided to attack, with only 18,000 immediately ready and under Lee's command while McClellan waited. On the other hand, McClellan had a force of over 90,000 Union men. Accounts from the field acknowledged this large disproportion between; "To oppose man against man and strength against strength was impossible; for there were four lines of blue to my one of gray."

The primary source of a fighting general states that "McClellan gives his force at Sharpsburg at 87,164; Being seriously outnumbered, Lee had to commit his entire stock of soldiers in the fight, and was therefore at a disadvantage. McClellan, having the edge in terms of troop numbers, did not have to commit his entire force, and so held the strong advantage.

Disposition of Forces

The two were placed strategically at the beginning of the battle. Lee had batteries in the front of his position, in the front of Dunker church.

McClellan had reserve artillery east of Antietam.

McClellan held the east side of Antietam Creek, with Burnside and Porter heading up the left flank. Sumner, Mansfield, Hooker, and Franklin led garrisons towards the north of the site. See Appendix B for their starting positions, and the ground gained throughout the first day. Sumner, Mansfield, and Hooker made the force that pushed Confederates out of the cornfields back towards the Potomac. Yet, General McClellan over-estimated the enemy, but also had other reasons for not so quickly pursuing Lee included McClellan's belief that Union supplies were running low, "On several occasions General McClellan has telegraphed to me that his army was deficient in certain supplies."

As supplies were delayed, McClellan made the decision to wait and not attack earlier than the morning of September 17th. According to Henry Halleck's defense of McClellan's decision, "General McClellan stated that it would require at least three days to supply the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps; that they needed shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter-tents."

Initial Movements

The battle began around dawn. Major General Joseph Hooker attacked Lee's left flank and began the battle. First hand Confederate reports state that "There was an ominous lull on the left."

From 6 am to later in the morning, around 9, the battle was primarily focused around Dunker Church and the Cornfield. Additional fighting broke out in the woods north and east of Sharpsburg. The Union forces began pushing the Confederates back westward. Sumner, Mansfield, and Hooker took the most ground, forcing the Confederates to retreat to Sunken Road by the afternoon of the first day. Here at Sunken Road, the battle waged for another four long hours, racking up a total of over 5,000 casualties. Union forces focused on attacking Lee from Sunken Road, and eventually broke through the Confederate lines. General Ambrose Burnside and his troops captured a bridge over Antietam Creek and successfully moved toward the right flank of the Confederates. Fighting wrapped up towards the end of the day, with the final attack taking place at the lower portion of the bridge, where Burnside effectively cut off Lee's path of retreat; "His troops got into action about dusk, which lasted two hours, during which the enemy were driven about half a mile, with considerable loss."

Major General a.P. Hill led a counter attack which ended the fighting for the day. Lee retreated south while still fighting of McClellan's forces and suffered immense loses. The Confederates then retreated to Bunker Hill and were pursued by the Union army over the next few days.

The Northern pursuit followed the Confederate army south; "The next morning (the 19th) shells began to come from over the river, and we were started on the road to Richmond with a mixed guard of cavalry and infantry."

For a detailed description of the time line with a visual aide see Appendix a.

Outcome

What resulted was the bloodiest battle in American history. All parties involved saw huge losses. First-hand accounts state that "The effect was appalling. The entire front line, with few exceptions, went down in the consuming blast."

Both the North and South saw these huge losses. Southern accounts show nearly all of their already few numbers being massacred in the span of the first major day of fighting, with "Nearly one-fourth of the troops who went into battle were killed or wounded."

Soldiers were mowed down by the entire row, as commanders forced line after line to gain the advantage. According to a Confederate soldier, "I was not at the front when, near nightfall, the awful carnage ceased; but one of my officers long afterward assured me that he could have walked on the dead bodies of my men from one end of the line to the other."

The carnage was immense. Newspaper reports from the Washington Star reported that "It is impossible at this writing to form any correct idea of our loss or that of the enemy, but it is heavy on both sides."

At the end of the day, the Union was chasing Lee and his remaining and battered forces out of Maryland, back towards Richmond in utter defeat.

Long-Term Significance

Despite the immense losses, the battle had much long-term significance. It basically spelled out the end of the war for the Confederates, who had wasted men and resources in a botched invasion attempt. The crushing blow to Southern morale was never fully recovered from, as more and more Southern losses came in close succession. Additionally, the South had been bidding for foreign support by attempting to be recognized as an independent county. Thus, the battle was significant in the fact that it proved to European nations that the Confederacy was too weak to be recognized as a single independent country. This stopped countries like England and France from interfering on behalf of the Confederacy, despite Confederate effort to influence them to do so. Thus, the Second Revolution, as many Confederates called the Civil War, did not receive the same foreign support the original Revolution had seen with French intervention. This signaled the isolation of the Confederacy during war, which eventually helped influence the eventual Confederate decline.

With the decline of Southern confidence came the rise in Northern morale. The confidence of Northern superiority which came from the Battle of Antietam gave President Abraham Lincoln the confidence to publish the Emancipation Proclamation.

If the Confederates had won, they would have had a wide open road to capturing the capitol of the Union, Washington D.C. This would have been significant, basically spelling the end for the Union itself. By successfully fighting off the invading Southerners, the Northern people had successfully turned the tides of the war.

Analysis

The actions of the battle were decisive, yet full of interesting mishaps and miscalculations. The bloodiest battle of the Civil War could have easily avoided so many casualties if McClellan had acted earlier in quelling Lee's much smaller force. When Lee initially arrived, McClellan could have easily taken out the small Confederate force. Yet, he waited, and allowed for Lee to amass a much larger force than the one he had originally arrived with. However, this decision was based on faulty intelligence, which McClellan took too literally. With this in mind, it is clear that McClellan was acting within the principles of war. McClellan always made sure to air on the side of caution. He followed the principle to keep both a risky and cautious strategic move, never going too all out despite the enemy's retreat. He understood that too overt of a move could cost him in the end, especially so near the Union capitol. Washington D.C. was in threat -- therefore this battle was of extreme significance. It also was a reason for McClellan to be overly cautious, not attacking too feverishly, possibly leaving room for a successful counter attack that could push through. Therefore, it was extremely important for McClellan to always leave open the room for caution in his strategic decisions during the duration of the battle McClellan failed to follow up on his successful attacks with the power of his sheer numbers -- thus, this allowed Lee to muster up counter-attacks and drug the actual battle on much longer than it should have been.