Police response to terrorist attacks in Oslo and Utøya Island, Norway

¶ … 2011 Norway attacks

Effectiveness of the response of the Police response in conjunction with emergency services and other key stakeholders

Flawed communication system

Bureaucratic failings as a source of security risk

Weaknesses in the police information sharing system

Effectiveness of the police and other stakeholders

The command challenges this event presented

Operational opportunities that arose from the event

The 2011 Norway attacks at Oslo and Utoya Island that left 77 dead indicated heightened expectations of police leadership and response to terrorist attack in the post 9/11 era (NOU,2012). The global community is living at a time when lack of communication and coordination coupled with the lack of police leadership standards can lead to an unprecedented loss of lives through acts of terrorism or natural calamities. In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of the response of the Police response in conjunction with emergency services and other key stakeholders. This is coupled with a critical discussion of the response of the key command personnel involved in terms of their operational effectiveness. This paper also highlights the command challenges this event presented, operational opportunities that arose as well as practical opportunities commanders had available to mitigate the impact of those factors.

A brief overview of the 2011 Norway attacks

The 2011 Norway attacks at Oslo and Utoya Island were two separate but sequential terrorist attacks executed by a lone wolf against the Norwegian government, the Norwegian civilian population as well as a summer camp ran by the Workers' Youth League (AUF) (Criscione,2012).The attacks took place on 22nd of July 2011 with a fatality of 77 innocent lives.

The attacks started by the a car bomb explosion in the city of Oslo within the executive government quarter of Norway at around 03:25:22 PM (CEST) (Norsar,2011). The bomb that was used in the attack was made from a mixture of fuel oil and fertilizer and then placed in the back of Breivik's car.The car was the placed at the front side of Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg's office. This particular explosion killed 8 people and injured two hundred and other nine people. The second attack took place about two hours later at a summer camp located on the island of Utoya in Tyrifjorden, Buskerud.The gunman, Bevrik dressed himself as a policeman and then armed with a fake identification, gained acess to the island and the opened fire on the participants at the camp.He killed 69 of them and injured at least one hundred and ten with fifty five of them being injured seriously. This attack was the deadliest one in Norway since the 2nd World War (Park,2011,p.1). The Norwegian Police eventually managed to arrest the killer Anders Behring Breivik aged 32 on the island and the charged him with the attacks. This was however after he succeeded in killing 77 people.

Effectiveness of the response of the Police response in conjunction with emergency services and other key stakeholders

A review of the events indicates a general failure or lack of effectiveness of the Police response in conjunction with emergency services and other key stakeholders. This is very clear from the general opinion that the killings could have been prevented if the police would have been proactive against the attacks or had they responded quickly to the situation after they were alerted within minutes of the unfortunate events. According to the official report, the Norwegian terror attacks could have been effectively prevented or at least interrupted had the Norwegian police as well as the nations intelligence services had not made a series of blunders (NOU,2012;Lewis,2012).

This is true because despite receiving a very clear and detailed description of the attacker (Anders Behring Breivik) about 10 minutes after he set off a car bomb in Oslo, a "catastrophic" communication breakdown within the police communication system allowed the terrorist to make a 2-hour journey to his final place of terror, Utoya Island even after passing 2 police cars before eventually boarding a boat with a cache of assault rifles with which he murdered sixty nine children and young adults.

Flawed communication system

An effective communication system is one of the main elements of an efficient counter-terrorism police network (Bjelopera,2011).The Norwegian Police communication system was visibly flawed on the day of the attack from the very beginning. For instance, the note containing Breivik's description was unintentionally left on the table in a police operation's room. This is one of the blunders that added to the unnecessarily high death toll.

The Gjorv Report clearly indicated that the attack on the Norwegian government complex in the city of Oslo could have been appropriately prevented through an effective implementation of the security measures that had earlier on been approved for government buildings (Gustaffson,2012). A quicker police action and operation to protect lives on Utoya Island was very realistic and possible and the terrorist could have been stopped earlier than the date of terror. The report also indicated that more emergency and security measures aimed at preventing further attacks as well as mitigating the attack's adverse effects should have been implemented on the 22nd of July (BBC,2012a).

According to the commission that was formed to investigate the incident, the Norwegian police suffered a series of shortcomings prior to and during the time when the Utoya shooting was taking place. These were evident from the tardiness with which the terrorist's description as well as vehicle were released coupled with other factors such as the communication breakdown, failure to follow the standard operating procedure, the inadequate means as well as other factors (BBC,2012a).

The commission observed that in a nutshell, the events of July 22nd, 2011 highlighted the serious shortfalls in the Norwegian society's emergency preparedness as well as their ability to avert threats (Koranyi,2012).

The Norwegian police should have automatically engaged drills that are aimed at safeguarding against any cases of multiple attacks but due to the weak leadership coupled with disorganization, delays resulted which resulted in the unnecessary/preventable loss of innocent lives. The Norwegian military was never informed immediately and the police too could not find a working helicopter to use in reaching Utoya Island.The police boat which was to be used for ferrying the Special Forces across the waters to the Utoya Island too could not carry the entire necessary load. These logistical challenges were attributed to poor leadership and poor communication as opposed to the lack of adequate response from the necessary personnel.

As the chairman of the commission, Alexandra Bech Gjorv, noted, the failure to effectively mobilize the helicopters, accept help from the private citizens who wre prepared to drive their boats to the island as well as the failure to share information contributed to brutality at an inconceivable level (Lewis,2012).Even though there were good plans for reacting to such an incident, the Norwegian authorities had not learned adequately from the drills or even implemented the approved measures. This prompted the commission to recommend for radical change of the nation's emergency preparedness routines.

Bureaucratic failings as a source of security risk

The ability of a nation to respond to disasters as well as reel from its effects in a quick manner is noted by Cook (2009) to be hampered by the bureaucratic failings that often dog our police and emergency service departments. In this case the bureaucratic failings that existed between the departments is what left the main government building in the center of the city to be vulnerable to the terrorist attacks.Earlier on, the building had been considered a potential target for terrorist in a previous security exercise that had effectively recommended the closing of the main street where the terrorist (Bevrik) had packed the explosive-laden van (Lewis,2012).

The Gjorv Report clearly indicated that the car bomb at the government complex as well as other coordinated attacks had been recurring scenarios in the nation's threat assessment and exercise as well as safety scenarios for several years (the Globe and Mail,2012).The government building should have therefore been better protected due to the fact that it had earlier on been identified as a potential security risks several years earlier. However, due to the Norwegian government's tendency to squabble over very minor security details, very little was done to protect the building and its occupants (Koranyi,2012). The street immediately outside the office of the prime minister too was not closed to the general traffic as recommended earlier in 2004 (BBC,2012b).A parking ban in front of the prime minister's office building area too was not enforced (Ritter & Amland,2012).

The Gjorv Report also gave details of a tip off phone call by a pedestrian about ten minutes after the bombing of the prime minister's official building at Oslo. Even though the pedestrian gave a vivid description of the assailant carrying a weapon and wearing protective clothing to the operator who passed it on to the police, the tip-off information was never acted on for about 2 hours (BBC,2012). This indicated a total failure of the Norwegian nationwide message service. The police could not act on the information which even indicated the license number of Breivik's car which he used to ferry himself and his dealy arsenal of automatic weapons to the Utoya Island, a final scene of his atrocious acts of murder of innocent children and young adults.

Pineda (2012) noted that the tip was wasted entirely due to communication problems, the failure by the police to follow procedures as well as inadequate means-Factors that together bogged down the Norwegian Police's reaction as well as operation on the emergency following the incident.

The Gjorv Report also indicated that the nation's only helicopter in the city of Oslo was unusable since its crew was absent on vacation (Blair,2012). This is inefficiency by the Police since this is a clear sing of a lack of disaster/emergency preparedness. There was no emergency/replacement crew to fly the chopper. The availability of the chopper was also "limited." The understaffing of the police centers was also another problem.

Weaknesses in the police information sharing system

At the time of the Oslo and Utoya Island terrorist attacks, the Norwegian Police information-sharing infrastructure was subjected to a very formidable weakness. Further, the Police Security Services never had sufficient training to deter or react to a terrorist attack (Greene,2012). This is evident from the fact that even though it was quite clear that an act of terrorism had been committed and was even still underway on Norwegian soil, no immediate rapid response warning or alert was issued. No roadblocks were set up neither was their any observation posts set up to deal with the situation. The operation center was in fact overloaded to an extent that the personnel could do very little to prevent attack propagation.

The time taken by the police to reach the Utoya Island trouble spot was simply unacceptable the Gjorv Report indicated that if the right procedures could have been followed and adhered to, then the police could have arrived at Utoya Island around 12 minutes earlier. This could have possibly saved several lives (NOU,2012).

The Norwegian Police Security Service was also ineffective since it failed to detect Breivik's actions earlier. The Gjorv Report indicated that Breivik could have been stopped about 7 months earlier prior to the attacks had the nation's internal security service acted on a tip from the Norwegian's customs officials who successfully flagged a very suspicious purchase of bomb-making materials from Poland (Lewis,2012). A more effective police response to the warnings on Breivik would have effectively revealed that he had been secretly buying automatic rifles. His frequent visits to far-right websites too should have been flagged (Lewis,2012).

Effectiveness of the police and other stakeholders

The findings of the commission which was initiated to look into what transpired during the Oslo andUtoya attack revealed a number of loopholes within the police force and other stakeholders which couldworks with policeto avoid the bloodbath. According to the report, the police didn't carry out their duties ineffective. This is because, even though theyhad intelligent information of the planned attack. The police failed to coordinate properly with other relevant stakeholders, such as the military which could have assistedthem in tracking down the killer (McCormack, 2011, pg. 1).

The way the police responded to the Utoeya mass shooting was unprofessional because the police center was understaffed and only a few helicopters were available to be used for transportation. A part from that the station lacked a qualified pilots who could fly the helicopter were on because most of their pilots went for a vacation. Instead of the police center engaging other departments or stakeholder such as the military to provide a qualified pilot to assist them, they simply ignored. This however indicates lack of proper leadership and communication within the police force. The commission report pointed out that, the two police officers who arrived to the scene first were supposed to do anything possible to reach the island, but they didn't do anything. Instead they stayed at the lakeshore, claiming that they couldn't get a boat to get them across to the island. It was until the police's elite Delta force, which came from Oslo which is located forty kilometers away, to arrive at the island to safe people; this was after experiencing a lot of difficulties on their way to the island (McCormack, 2011, p.2).

According to the commission report published in 2012, Breivik should have been arrested much earlier before causing a lot of casualties. If police could have acted on the intelligent which was provided by one customs official who noticed a suspicious shipment of bomb making chemical from Poland but the intelligent and the police failed to put him on the watch list. The special commission revealed that if Breivik was put on the watch list and brought in for questioning, he would have informed the police and intelligent where he stored the chemical which was used for making bomb and therefore the attacked could have been avoided (Libell, 2011).

The police could have prevented attack on the Oslo complex if the security measures which were approved early had been effectively implemented. These measures were to involve the deployment of more rapid operation to safeguard people living on Utoeya Island. It could have provided adequate time to stop the gunman from causing a lot of causalities and advanced preparedness would have been in place to responds to any further attack. In the commission report, they term the reaction of the police to the incidents at the Utoeya shorting as inadequate, highlighting the way which Breivik as describe by the police as a show of lack of seriousness and irresponsible, and the method with was used communicate the registration number of his vehicle was an indication of lack proper channel of communication in the police center. The laydown procedures and protocol were not followed properly (Libell, 2011).

However, to safeguard the people the police should have automatically initiated drills which are meant to protect the public against a number of attacks. But the kind of weak leadership and organization skills resulted to the delay in the deployment of these measures. More accurate disaster and threat measures or preparedness should have been initiated to handle the casualty. The coordination with other stakeholders was very poor, this why the military was not immediately engaged. If the police would have contacted the military, the possible of getting a helicopter to take over the island would be there and they could get to the Utoeya Island within a minute. This however indicates the evidence of some of the challenges which is normally being experience in the police center. Most so lack of leadership and communication, and limited number of available response personal to deal with such threat, this therefore shows the ineffectiveness among the police forces and other stakeholders which are supposed to assist during such threats (Seidl, 2011, pg. 3).

In critical analysis of how the key personnel responded to the threat, it showed lack of priority and serious in part of the police and stakeholders. It is stated by McCormack (2011) that the police took much time to get the island and some of the available police officers who arrived at the vicinity first could not do anything because they lacked materials like boat and helicopter.

The response initiated was very insignificant and needed proper coordination. This was seen right away from the beginning, instead of the police raising road blocks on all major roads across the town and providing the registration number to all the traffic in the area, which would have helped in getting the gunman and stopped him from reaching the island, the police mistakenly communicated wrongdetails about the vehicle registration number and color. This however, indicates the point of lack of effective execution of duties and laxity among the police officers and stakeholders (McCormack, 2011, pg. 6).

Moreover, McCormack (2011) noted that according to the report, the commission identified bureaucracy within various departments for deserting the government building in Oslo for attack. Even though the building previously had been marked by the National Intelligent as soft spot and might be reliable anytime for terrorist attack long time back in the year 2006, which force the security apparatus to come up measure such as closing the surrounding streets especially where Breivik parked his explosive van. The police should have placed a good number of security personnel around the building to offer better protection since it had been identified earlier years before. This made the commission of inquiry to ask why Grubbegata, the street which is located just outside the office of the prime minister, was not closed for any traffic even though, the measure was recommended early in 2004. This plan was initiated much earlier to ensure all the streets located both in front and at the back of the building was approved to be closed but physical barrier was not completely constructed and parking ban in the area was not strictly enforced., however, it could easily be assessed and that what Breivik used to assess more close place to the government building (McCormack, 2011, pg.4).