Soviet-Afgan War Conflict Analysis Focus

Soviet-Afgan War Conflict Analysis

FOCUS & OBJECTIVE of the STUDY

The objective of this work is to analyze the Soviet-Afghan War that lasted from 1978 to 1989. At focus in this study is that in this particular conflict the capable Soviet military invaded a powerless Afghanistan in support of the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in their battle against the Mujahedeen, a grassroots militia resistance force.

Despite the well-armed troops and superior technology employed by the Russians, in the form of tanks and helicopters, the Mujahedeen was victorious in a long and bloody war of attrition. This was in no small part to intelligence and arms provided to the Mujahedeen by the U.S. After the defeat of the Russians was achieved, the U.S. turned its back on Afghanistan, focusing its efforts elsewhere. Arms provided by the U.S. were used as fuel by the Taliban and al Qaeda and their efforts to secure the country, and ironically bolster a very Anti-American agenda. This conflict interests me because it seems possible that the U.S. is currently engaged in a war in Afghanistan based on American policies in the region more than 20 years ago. The Soviet-Afghan War provided a place for terrorists like Osama Bin Laden to cut their teeth and sharpen their skills for the upcoming jihad. This war set the stage for the Global War on Terrorism, and unfortunately America adequately prepared some of its enemies for this conflict. Conflict is stated in the World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Team (CPR) Social Development Department document entitled: "Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF)" published April 11, 2005 to be: "...inherent to all societies. Differences in interests and opinions between groups are natural, but the method by which such differences are expressed and managed determine if conflicts manifest themselves in primarily political (non violent) or violent ways. When significant groups within the society (including the government) pursue their objectives through processes that are in accordance with the specific laws and established norms of the society, conflict is predominantly political in nature Political manifestations of conflict are not a subject of concern in CAF. When a group turns to violence to pursue its goals, and the use of violence outweighs the use of political means, the conflict is predominantly violent. Violent conflict takes on a host of forms."(World Bank, 2005, p.4)

The work of John C. McManus entitled: "U.S. Military History for Dummies" states that American intelligence analysts and policymakers knew that bin Laden's Al Qaeda and its close ally, the Taliban, were responsible for the attacks...within days of 9/11." (0000, p. 317) the Taliban was known to be a "hard-line group of Muslim fundamentalists who had come to power in Afghanistan several years after the Soviet withdrawal from that country in 1989. With Taliban approval, Al Qaeda was using Afghanistan as a base form which to launch terrorist operations." (McManus, 0000, p.317) These two groups are both "dedicated violent Muslim fundamentalists..." And as well they are stated to be "basically ideological bedfellows" with a "common cause." (McManus, 0000, p.317) Afghanistan is described as a "highly factionalized country with myriad warring tribes and interest groups. The country's harsh climate and rugged mountains make a mere existence a struggle for many Afghans." (p.317) Because of Afghanistan's terrain it was known that the U.S. And its partners that infiltration of Afghanistan with "small highly trained Special Forces teams" were the best known method instead of attempting to invade Afghanistan with "large conventional military forces or great numbers of soldiers." (McManus, 0000, p.317) the path taken by the U.S. is after having removed the Taliban from power the United States and NATO partners along with the United Nations "installed a new democratic government in Afghanistan." (McManus, 0000, p.320) the first election took place in Afghanistan in many decades in which Hamid Karzai, "a close U.S. ally" was elected as president. The new government aided extensively by the U.S. "created its own military known as the Afghan National Army. (McManus, 0000, p.320) the ANA, and American and NATO soldiers have work closely together with the ANA learning how to defeat the Taliban through specialized training, arming and equipping by the United States and NATO. Afghanistan is stated to have become "a moderately stable country, but with some serious economic and security problems that required a continued NATO presence." (McManus, 0000, p.320)

The work of Harvey (2003) entitled: "The United States, and the Legacy of Afghanistan's Civil War" states that Afghanistan is "...small, rugged, and landlocked, situated between the present-day countries of Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. It is approximately 252,000 square miles (652,000 square kilometers) in area, roughly the equivalent to the state of Texas. Because of where Afghanistan is situated "at the crossroads of Asia" Afghanistan is the "...focal point of many imperialist ambitions..." (Harvey, 2003)

According to Harvey the last one hundred years of the history of Afghanistan has been: "...been characterized, and replete with occupation by outside forces, all trying to wield their power within it. The country has become the arena where incessant jockeying for a secure foothold in, and influence over the region has played itself out." Afghanistan has been the "unfortunate victim of the competing imperialist ambitions of Great Britain and Tsarist Russia." (Harvey, 2003) the British invaded Afghanistan and are stated to have occupied it for nearly one hundred years and were "...finally driven out in 1919." (Harvey, 2003)

From 1979 to 1988 the country of Afghanistan was occupied by Soviet forces. Harvey states specifically: "This time, it was the Communist Soviet Union which, in the Cold War climate of the times, sought to wield its influence over the country. During these years, the United States engaged in a proxy war against the Soviet Union, its long-standing Cold War opponent. It was to become one of the bloodiest and most destructive wars ever fought; it would leave Afghanistan completely devastated. It would also leave behind scores of armed, well-trained Islam radicals, an international apparatus for, and network of terrorists, and a burgeoning anti-American sentiment." (2003)

Afghanistan is described as a "...ethnically diverse country. Its inhabitants form a complex mosaic of ethnic and linguistic groups, a reflection of the country's geographic location as well as its history of frequent outside occupation of the 27, 755, 774 million people which were estimated to live in Afghanistan in a poll conducted in 2002, 42% of them belong to the Pushtu-speaking Pathans of the east and the south. The Dari-speaking Tadjiks of the north and the south account for another 23% of Afghanistan's population. The Hazaras, of Mongol descent, live in the central highlands of the country, accounting for another 10% of the Afghani population. Another 8% of the population is comprised of the Turkmen and Uzbecks of the North. The remaining 13% of the Afghani population, are comprised of the Nuristans, an ancient people of Mediterranean descent, the Fariswan, the ethnic Shia Persians, the relatively few in number Balochi of the south, and the scattered members of the Kuchi and Aimaq nomads. Pashto and Dari are considered the official languages of Afghanistan, and are spoken by 85% of the people. The Turkish languages, (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) are spoken, primarily in the North, by another 11% of the population. Thirty other minor languages are also spoken in Afghanistan, representing the last 4% of the population. There is also a large degree of bilingualism amongst the inhabitants of the country." (2003)

The official religion of Afghanistan is Islam and Islam is said to "pervade all aspects of Afghan life." (Harvey, 2003) Specifically the population is "99%...Muslim, and of these Muslims, 84% belong to the Sunnah sect. Most of the Hazaras are Shi'ite Muslims, and, the 1% of the population which are not Muslims, are either Hindus, Sikhs, or Jews." (Harvey, 2003)

III. U.S. INVOLVEMENT in AFGHANISTAN

According to Harvey (2003) the involvement of the United States in Afghanistan "began in 1934." In 1934 the United States "...officially recognized Afghanistan's independence and set up an embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan's capital." During this time a young progressive was in rule and specifically, King Amanollah Khan, described as opportunistic and ambitious. In 1930 Amanollah made a commitment to "turning Afghanistan, which was one of the most backwards and underdeveloped countries of all the third world countries, around. To accomplish this massive undertaking, Amanollah appealed to the great powers of the world for economic support. Recognizing Afghanistan's strategically significant location at the crossroads of Asia, the United States responded to Amanollah's appeal by providing aid to Afghanistan during this early reconstruction period." (Harvey, 2003)

The United States, while interested in the development of Afghanistan and while providing it with a loan of $20 million for highway construction and another $20 million for construction of irrigation systems, only held a limited interest in Afghanistan. The largest aid provided to Afghanistan was that of the Soviet Union having loaned nearly a billion dollars to Afghanistan by 1973. Harvey (2003) reports that in the 1970s "two factors converged...which would dramatically change the United States' estimation of Afghanistan's importance" and these are stated to have been: (1) the Cold War; and (2) the fall of the Shah of Iran. (Harvey, 2003) the suspicion of the United States of the "Soviet Expansionist tendencies" had increased by the 1970s and Harvey states as well that "The pervasive mentality of Washington officials during these years was dominated by the communist domino theory which led many Washington politicians to believe that the Soviet Union sought to take over the entire world." (2003) the United States had always received a safeguard provided by the shah for their Middle East interest of oil and it was this that resulted in the United States perceiving the Soviet-Afghanistan relations as a "considerable threat...before 1979." (Harvey, 2003)

Harvey reports that while Department of State records from the early 1970s report that the United States was indifferent to the relationship that was developing between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan that the truth is that "...Recently declassified Intelligence reports also reveal that the "official history record is false."

[26] Contrary to the "official record"- - that the United States involvement in the Afghan civil war began following, and as a response to, the Soviet Union's invasion of the country- in truth, United States involvement in the Afghanistan Civil War began a full six months before the Soviet Union ever invaded Afghanistan." (Harvey, 2003)

Harvey additionally reports that Brezinski interviewing with a French reporter in 1988 "...confirmed this "little known fact" of history, admitting that the CIA had begun providing covert aid to Afghan resistance fighters fully six months before the Soviet invasion. Even more revealing and shocking is Brezinski's admission, later on in the interview, that the U.S. intention in providing this aid was to "draw the Russians into the Afghan trap." (Harvey, 2003) When, in this same interview, the reporter, shocked at having discovered that the United States intentionally provoked the Soviet Union to enter into the war, asked Brezinski whether he harbored any regrets for doing this, Brezinski's reply was: "Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea... The day the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the U.S.S.R. its Vietnam War." (Harvey, 2003)

Harvey writes of Afghanistan that it "...in a sense, became the United States' pawn. The country became the means by which we could demoralize, and attempt to destabilize, our long-standing Cold War opponent- - with little to no cost to us. Indeed, official documents from the Soviet reveal that the Soviets' entrance into the war was based, in a large part, on the grounds that secret involvement of the United States in Afghanistan was undermining the recent gains they had made in the country." (Harvey, 2003) the United States reportedly provided covert aid to the resistance fighters or the mujahideen "fighters for the faith" in Afghanistan. This is stated by Harvey to have seemed "the, to United States officials in the year 1979, an extremely strategic move. The United States could get other people- what's more, complete strangers in a distant country- to fight their war for them; it would require no commitment of ground troops of our own and would thereby ensure no American casualties. or, at least this was the assumption the CIA, Brezinski, and other high-profile Washington officials were operating under in the year 1979." (Harvey, 2003)

Harvey writes that no one considered the possibility of "repercussions that the training and equipping of zealous Afghan Islamists and their Muslim counterparts could have later on. An interview with a former CIA agent attests to the fact that during this time U.S. officials, resolute on their one-track agenda of combating the communists, failed to take into account the sort of consequences which arming Islam extremists could engender. In describing the CIA-Islamist partnership the agent said: "we took the means to wage war, put them in the hands of people who could do so, for purposes for which we agreed." (Harvey, 2003) in 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan by the "tens of thousands" and it is reported that "...as the Soviet soldiers joined forces with the PDPA and its followers in an attempt to stabilize Afghanistan's government and suppress revolts orchestrated by Afghanistan's mujahideen, officials in Washington realized that economic aid alone to the mujahideen was not enough." (Harvey, 2003) it is reported that a record states that is found in the Digital National Security Archive that "...literally days after the Soviet invasion, Carter was on the phone with Zia [the king of Pakistan] offering him hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military aid in exchange for cooperation in helping the rebels. Zia- who had his own agenda in Afghanistan- would agree as would the Saudi and Iran government's days later; and, what began as a CIA operation against our long-standing Cold War adversary was to now evolve into a global effort in the name of the religion of Islam itself." (Harvey, 2003) the plan was for the CIA to supervise in a "backseat role" allowing the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) of Pakistan perform most of the "donkey work." (Harvey, 2003)

Harvey states that the account provided by Cooley states that "...all of the arms supplies, finance, and training of the fighters was to be provided through Pakistan and not directly from the CIA. This would enable the United States government to "plausibly deny" their involvement in the war if the need ever arose. Pakistan's tribal Northwest Frontier was to provide sanctuary for refugees and become the base where fighters were to be raised, trained, and sent into battle. The ISI-in accordance with the CIA- was to become responsible for the selection, and distribution of weapons to mercenary armies. This army, according to the account given by Cooley, was to be drawn not only from the Afghanistan and Pakistan countries but from across the world; anyone who wanted to fight in this "holy war" of Islam was to be invited to do so." (2003)

The operation was described by Cooley as follows: "Virtually all would be Muslim. They would fervently believe that God had commanded them to fight his enemies, the Godless Communists and foreign Russian invaders. Their earthly rewards would be glory and generous pay. For those who died as martyrs, reward would be in heaven." (Harvey, 2003) it is reported that the United States had provided the rebels with the amount of approximately $700 million in military assistance by 1987 and the ultimate amount of $3 billion was appropriated by Congress to covert aid to the mujahideen." (Harvey, 2003)

The Soviet Troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1988 and the Geneva Accords were signed shortly thereafter. At this point Afghanistan was completely in ruins and the United States interest in Afghanistan "...its mission complete- lost interest in Afghanistan, in the years when its interest was most needed. According to Ahmed Rashid, an expert on Afghanistan, and the author of Taliban, U.S. economic and military assistance to Afghanistan decreased dramatically after 1989, and no provisions were made for rebuilding the nation, demobilizing fighters or organizing relief aid." (Harvey, 2003)

The problem at this time was that it was perceived by many Afghans that the United States having withdrawn from Afghanistan "...constituted a major betrayal, while Washington's refusal to harness international pressure to help broker a settlement between the warlords was considered a double betrayal." (Harvey, 2003) Reportedly, the United State's absence in Afghanistan resulted in "...leaving a major power vacuum, creating a situation which lent itself to more chaos, destruction, and in-fighting amongst Afghanistan's many warlords, who, all out to consolidate their own individual power, proved unable to unite." (Harvey, 2003)

In 1994 the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan and came together in the country of Pakistan "...as a militia of Pashtun Islamic fundamentalist students..." who had in the beginning "...appealed to many Afghans with their promise of peaceful rule and their avowal to end the corruption, feuding, and bedlam which defined the country. but, as they rose in popularity, so to, the Terrorism Project reports, did their extremism. Armed and "inflamed by religious zeal," the Taliban intensified in violence and in their intolerance for anything other than their Islam extremist policy. The training grounds that the CIA built, maintained and operated during the Afghanistan Civil War soon became camps and refuges for militant terrorists, among whom was Osama Bin Laden." (Harvey, 2003) the United States ignored the reports of oppression of the Taliban including "...the sequestration, and virtual enslavement of, the women of Afghanistan, the beatings for violations in dress code or prescribed beard length, the stoning to death of those accused of adultery, the burial alive for sodomy, etc..." (Harvey, 2003) because the United States believed the Taliban would support or Unocal project- and oil interests in- the region." (Harvey, 2003)

IV. CONFLICT PREVENTION & PEACE-BUILDING

The work of Bernard Wood (2003) entitled: "Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building" states that the "scale and devastation of violent intrastate and regional conflicts have become far more visible...since the ending of the Cold War...and demands have become more insistent for the international community to do a better job of helping the people and societies affected." (p.10) However, it is additionally stated by Bernard that despite "...wider public and political concern, some new attempts to act -- and some major lessons of acknowledged failures -- the overall performance by the international system in responding to these conflict situations has remained weak and inconsistent." (2003, p.10) Bernard believes the reason for this is the "uncertainty about how to act or even a lack of political priority, but also economic and political interests that in practice often still outweigh the laudable objectives of building peace and preventing conflicts." (2003, p. 10) Development cooperation efforts are stated by Bernard to face the need of applying "the lessons of experience" and improving "flexibility and practices to maximize its contributions" while simultaneously "recognizing its limits in helping build peace and prevent violent conflict..." (2003, p.14) Bernard states that the terms "conflict prevention" and "peace building" "basically refer to very similar, if not identical, actions and processes, but they have often been used to refer to different context." (2003, p.16) While there are stated by Bernard to be "no simple universal formulas for enduring success...there are some basic, but demanding policy foundations for success that have been proven to have wide applicability." (p.16) Those principles are stated to be the following: (1) a sound policy framework encouraging stable, growing economies with full scope for a vigorous private sector and an adequate fiscal base; (2) Investment in social development, especially education, primary health care, and population activities; (3) Enhanced participation of all people, and notably women, in economic and political life, and the reduction of social inequalities; (4) Good governance and public management, democratic accountability, the protection of human rights and the rule of law; (5) Sustainable environmental practices; and (6) Addressing root causes of potential conflict, limiting military expenditure, and targeting reconstruction and peace building efforts toward longer term reconciliation and development. (Bernard, 2003, p. 17) Stated to have a major impact on conflict prevention and peace-building are the factors of: (1) the breadth of participation and inclusion (economic as well as political); (2) the rule of law, justice systems and the respect of individual and group rights; (3) environmental sustainability; (4) equity and opportunity; (5) healthy respect for culture and identity; and (6) maintaining peaceable regional and international relations. (Bernard, 2003, p. 19)

V. FRAMEWORKS for CONFLICT ANALYSIS

The work of Shmueli (2003) entitled: "Conflict Analysis" states that conflict assessment is the "essential first stage in the process of conflict management and resolution. A primary goal of such assessment is for all concerned parties to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics inherent in their relationships. This understanding not only clarifies one's own interests and positions, but leads to an acknowledgement of the basis for the interests and positions held by others, and thereby promotes reflection by the stakeholders. The assessment maps the conflict, and then uses it as an evaluation tool to determine whether or not there is a reasonable possibility for initiating an intervention process to manage or resolve the dispute. " (p.1) Shmueli (2003) additionally states that the assessment serves to investigate such as: (1) Stakeholders' interests and perceptions about themselves and others whom they consider to be involved; (2) Issues deemed important to each stakeholder group, at least at the outset; (3) Institutional, financial, and other impediments to successful intervention; (4) Conditions stipulated by each stakeholder for participating in any type of conflict management process, and (5) Agreement as to who is to represent stakeholders (or outside interested parties) at the negotiation table. (2003, p.1)

The phases of conflict assessment are stated to include the stages of: (1) introduction; (2) information gathering; (3) Analysis; (4) process design; and (5) reporting writing, feedback, and distribution. (Shmeuli, 2003, p.1) the introduction is stated to be "a clearer mandate from the convener. Preparation of interview protocols that encompass a set of open-ended questions, designed to obtain information organized around specific aspects of the conflict." (Shmeuli, 2003, p.1) the information gathering stage involves a "survey of general records and protocols" relating to the conflict as "background to stakeholder interviews." (Shmeuli, 2003, p.1) the largest part of the data is gained from personal interviews with stakeholders and other parties who are involved. Interview results as well as the examination of other various information protocols are stated to expected to render insights relating to: (1) Development of the conflict from the viewpoint of stakeholders in that category, including the historical chain of events that have led to the conflict; (2) the key issues relating to the conflict; (3) Basic interests; (4) Proposed solutions and acknowledgment of other options; (5) Points which are negotiable and nonnegotiable to parties at the outset; (6) Important issues for future discussion; (7) Perceptions and reactions to the decision-making process; and (8) Barriers to introducing an approach based on negotiation, mediation, and consensus decision-making. (Shmeuli, 2003, p.1) the analysis stage involves summarization of the findings as well as "mapping areas of agreement and disagreement and deriving framing information..." (Shmeuli, 2003, p.1) the process designs stage involves goals, agendas, selection of stakeholder representatives who will participate in the process directly as well as a timeframe for proposed stages. Finally the report writing, feedback and distribution stage involves reporting the sizes of which will be dictated by the complexity of the issues. (Shmeuli, 2003, p.1)

The work entitled: "Framework for Conflict Analysis" (2004) presents a common framework of analysis that was developed for the purpose of contributing to the following stated objective: (1) to ensure a common analytical framework for understanding the underlying causes and consequences of violent conflict, as well as the dynamics supporting or undermining peace efforts in a transition situation; (2) to support a conflict sensitive approach to programming within the UN system in a transition situation; and (3) to build a common approach to post-conflict needs assessment, or other inter-agency planning instruments, as well as facilitate the development of an overall targeted transition strategy. (Inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition situations. November, 2004) the following figure illustrates the overview of Inter-agency planning tools and instruments reported.

Figure 1 -- Overview of Inter-agency planning tools and instruments

Source: (Inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition situations. November, 2004)

The inter-agency framework for conflict analysis report states that the characteristics of transition situations include those as follows: (1) each situation is unique and complex; (2) dynamics do not reflect a steady sequential or uninterrupted path of progress from conflict to peace; (3) often a "no war, no peace" situation; (5) humanitarian activities might increase initially. (Inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition situations. November, 2004) the triggers for transition planning are stated to include: (1) advanced stage of peace negotiations; (2) cease fire agreement; (3) peace accord; (4) peace process with involvement of member states, a regional body or a combination thereof; (5) Security Council mandate which establishes a UN peace operation or peacekeeping mission.( Inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition situations. November, 2004) There are stated to be three steps in conflict analysis which are those of: (1) analysis of key conflict factors; (2) actor analysis; and (3) analysis of capacities for peace. (Inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition situations. November, 2004) Conflicts are stated to be "multi-dimensional phenomena and cannot be understood in terms of one single factor, as they result from a complex interaction and overlap of various conflict issues. For this reason, it is important to map out the causes and consequences of violent conflict from the perspective of various thematic dimensions..." (Inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition situations. November, 2004) These are stated to include: (1) Security, from a state, community and personal perspective; (2) Political/governance; (3) Economic; and (4) Social, broadly defined to include ethnographic, cultural, religious, etc. factors. (Inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition situations. November, 2004 the mapping of structural and proximate factors of conflict can be divided further into the levels of: (1) international; (2) regional; (3) national; (4) sub-national; and (5) local levels. (Inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition situations. November, 2004) the focus on the various levels at which conflict is a factor is critical and many times draws out the external dimensions of "what may be purely internal problems. Moreover, transitions usually reflect "no war, no peace" situations, where a disaggregated analysis of conflict intensity and impact is critical. (Inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition situations. November, 2004) the following is a "matrix of proximate conflict factors: