Tonkin Gulf Crisis

Tonkin Gulf Crisis

The Debate over the Tonkin Gulf Crisis

The Tonkin Gulf Crisis 1964 ranks with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy as events that David Kaiser of the U.S. Naval War College refers to as "controversies in American political history that dwarf all others (Ford, 1997)."

There is evidence that President Lyndon Johnson deliberately lied about the incidents leading to the Vietnam War to ensure that plans for war were supported. However, many opponents of this claim say that this is not so. According to Sedgwick Tourison in the book Secret Army, Secret War and Dr. Edwin Moise's Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, evidence that Johnson's administration was deceitful is becoming clearer than it was (Ford, 1997).

Today, Tonkin Gulf researchers are still examining the evidence to determine whether or not Johnson's administration intentionally instigated the first attack on Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin (Ford, 1997). It is still not entirely clear whether or not Hanoi actually launched a second attack on Maddox, either. Researchers are investigating the facts to determine whether or not Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara deliberately lied to the U.S. Congress to gain support for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which sealed Johnson's re-election and led the United States into the Vietnam War.

However, details regarding the former South Vietnamese special operation forces, which were part of an American covert intelligence effort known as Operation Plan 34A, are now available, now that formerly-classified documents and disclosures by former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military intelligence officials have been released (Ford, 1997).

When Hanoi changed its reunification strategy to one of armed conflict in 1960, the Communists started to develop an organized regular force opposing the Saigon regime in South Vietnam, which was an American ally (Ford, 1997). In 1961, in an attempt to stop the Communist Vietnamese government in Hanoi, the CIA developed a joint sea-land covert special operation with the South Vietnamese government to stop Hanoi from carrying on infiltration activities.

This covert special operation conducted airborne, maritime and overland agent-insertion operations. The South Vietnamese attempted to gather intelligence, gain support, develop bases of resistance and perform psychological operations behind enemy lines. The maritime operation started as an infiltration operation but would not remain as one for long, as the covert attacks were unsuccessful. According to McNamara, "It accomplished virtually nothing (Ford, 1997)."

Still, the U.S. was not prepared to back down. According to Tourison, by January 1964, McNamara had assumed responsibility for the operation from the CIA, and it became known as 34 Alpha (Ford, 1997). "DeSoto patrols were U.S. naval intelligence collection operations using specially equipped vessels to gather electronic signals intelligence from shore -- and island-based noncommunications emitters in North Vietnam. By August 2, 1964, the Communist Vietnamese had determined that the DeSoto vessels were offshore support for a 34-Alpha operation that had struck their installations at Hon Me and Hon Ngu some 48 hours earlier. In retaliation, the North Vietnamese then conducted an "unprovoked attack" on Maddox, which was approximately 30 miles off the coast of North Vietnam. During the battle that ensued, one North Vietnamese patrol boat was severely damaged by Maddox, and two others were attacked and chased off by U.S. air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga."

On August 4, 1964, Maddox and USS C. Turner Joy supposedly reported a second attack. The National Security Agency (NSA) had already given a warning that an attack on Maddox could be approaching (Ford, 1997). An hour after that warning, Maddox reported that she had established radar contact with three or four unidentified vessels coming towards her at high speed. Ticonderoga launched aircraft to assist Maddox and C. Turner Joy.

Low clouds and thunderstorms supposedly made visibility difficult for the aircraft, and the pilots were unable to confirm the presence of any North Vietnamese attackers. Over the next several hours, the ships called in several "torpedo attacks, the visual sighting of torpedo wakes, searchlight illumination, automatic-weapons fire, and radar and sonar contact (Ford, 1997)."

Senior officers on board said that the circumstances, including darkness, stormy seas and nervous, inexperienced crewmen, called for a "thorough investigation," although McNamara told Congress there was "unequivocal proof" of the second "unprovoked attack" on U.S. ships (Ford, 1997). Without a thorough investigation and solely on the base of McNamara's statements and Johnson's recommendations, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

McNamara's statements were fully supported by the Johnson administration. However, many others challenged his statement. At a joint executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee regarding the resolution, Senator Wayne Morse, who referred to the conflict as "McNamara's War," stated: "I am unalterably opposed to this course of action which, in my judgment, is an aggressive course of action on the part of the United States. I think you are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated (Ford, 1997)."

McNamara's Testimony

McNamara firmly denied U.S. naval involvement in the South Vietnamese-run operations, stating that the DeSoto operations were neither support nor cover for 34-Alpha raids. According to Tourison (Ford, 1997), "The MarOps (maritime operations) were not CIA-supported South Vietnamese operations that the United States had no control over as former Secretary of Defense McNamara claimed. These operations were under U.S. control, not South Vietnamese."

According to McNamara at the time of the incident, the Maddox crew did not have knowledge of the 34-Alpha raids. McNamara has since acknowledged that this claim was false, but denies knowing this at the time. The crew knew of the 34-Alpha operations and were worried that the 34-Alpha operations were putting their ship in danger. Many say that this incident made the crew nervous, therefore making them unreliable sources regarding the second attack in the Tonkin Gulf.

When the Senate approved Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Senators Morse and Ernest Gruening opposed the resolution. However, Congress voted 4160 in support. Morse stated, "I believe that within the next century, future generations will look with dismay and great disappointment upon a Congress which is now about to make such a historic mistake (Ford, 1997)."

The events surrounding the resolution show a tremendous flaw in the U.S. decision-making system at the time. Government leaders misrepresented the situation to U.S. policy-makers without properly analyzing the data. Unfortunately, the consequences were grave and actually led to complete U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Evidence shows that the decoded message on which the NSA's August 4 warning to Maddox had been based actually referred to the original attack on August 2, rather than the second attack. In addition, the "unequivocal proof" of the second attack was really just decrypted North Vietnamese damage assessments of the first attack but were presented to U.S. decision-makers as the alleged second attack. According to a U.S. News and World Report study, former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Ray S. Cline clearly exposed this series of mistakes in 1984 (Ford, 1997).

Given the enormous pressure surrounding the situation, the fact that some decision-makers were confused by messages suggesting two attacks is understandable. However, their rash actions resulted in grave consequences. In his 1999 book, Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy, McNamara tallied up the human cost of the Vietnam War (Ford, 1997): "It is estimated that something on the order of 3.8 million Vietnamese (North and South, military and civilian) were killed. The United States lost 58,000. Had the United States lost in proportion to its population the same percentage as Vietnam, 27 million Americans would have died. "

Today, in the U.S., the Vietnam War and the Tonkin Gulf Incident are topics of great controversy and debate. Even McNamara (Ford, 1997), in his book, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, McNamara admits that the U.S. "may have provoked a North Vietnamese response in the Tonkin Gulf," but claims that it was an innocent mistake. He still says, "Charges of a cloak of deception surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident are unfounded. The idea that the Johnson administration deliberately deceived Congress is fake."

Many others disagree with McNamara's statement. Daniel Ellsberg, the former Johnson administration member who allowed the press to gain access to the Pentagon Papers to the press, addressed the question of whether the Johnson administration deceived Congress (Ford, 1997): "Did McNamara lie to Congress in 1964? I can answer that question. Yes, he did lie, and I knew it at the time. I was working for John McNaughton....I was his special assistant. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He knew McNamara had lied. McNamara knew he had lied. He is still lying. [Former Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and McNamara testified to Congress...prior to their vote....Congress was being lied into...what was to be used as a formal declaration of war. I knew that....I don't look back on that situation with pride."

Ellsberg is not the only one who exposed the conspiracy. In 1977, former Under Secretary of State George Ball stated: "Many of the people associated with the war...were looking for any excuse to initiate bombing. The DeSoto Patrols were primarily for provocation....There was a feeling that if the destroyer got into trouble, that would provide the provocation needed (Ford, 1997)."

For those who are convinced that the Johnson administration knowingly deceived Congress and the American people, the only question that remains is "why?" The resolution clearly stated, "Upon request of South Vietnam or the Laotian government to use all measures including the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces in their Defense (Ford, 1997)." This resolution had been prepared in May 1964, three months before the "unprovoked attacks" took place, whether in actuality or not.

When the resolution was prepared, Johnson was running his presidential campaign based on peace. Johnson's opponent for presidency, Senator Barry Goldwater, was wanted a tougher U.S. stance in Southeast Asia. An "unprovoked attack" by North Vietnam would enable Johnson to respond with limited force and improve his image with the American people without appearing to agree with his main political opponent. The timing was perfect.

Many people believe that this was Johnson's plan when he used deceitful tactics to pass the resolution. In response to the Tonkin Gulf attacks, the president launched a limited airstrike and warned Hanoi that the U.S. would not tolerate any more aggression. As a result, just prior to the November election, the American public viewed hum as a firm leader who was still not pushing for war. His approval rating increased and he was reelected. The resolution had also given him the power to declare war.

McNamara describes the significance of the controversial Tonkin Gulf Resolution (Ford, 1997): "The fundamental issue of Tonkin Gulf involves not deception, but rather, misuse of power bestowed by the resolution. The language of the resolution plainly granted the powers the President subsequently used and Congress understood the breadth of those powers....But no doubt exists that Congress did not intend to authorize, without further, full consultation, the expansion of U.S. forces in Vietnam from 16,000 to 550,000 men, initiating large scale combat operations with the risk of an expanded war with China and the Soviet Union, and extending U.S. involvement in Vietnam for many years to come."

President Johnson's Role

For Johnson and all Americans, the Vietnam War was a great tragedy (Herring, 1996). Johnson had not created the U.S. commitment in Vietnam and initially tried to ignore it. However, pressure from the U.S. government and military caused him to reluctantly take on the war, which he was unable to win. The war undid all of Johnson's good work, including his Great Society domestic programs. In addition, it just about tore the U.S. apart.

Johnson inherited the situation in Vietnam when he assumed presidency. While he repeatedly assured the American public that he would defend the nation's interests without going to war, he faced harsh opposition when it came time for his presidential reelection. He had to show that he was not too soft. This is most likely the reason for his actions in the Tonkin Gulf Crisis.

Johnson's Tonkin Gulf Resolution was most likely issued through deception, yet allowed Johnson to "take all necessary measures" to "prevent further aggression" and gave him the power to launch an undeclared war in Vietnam (Herring, 1996). With this power and his reelection, Johnson led the country to war, yet he did not realize the ramifications of his actions.

Johnson had inaccurately assumed that the war would be over before serious opposition arose in the U.S. (Herring, 1996). This turned out to be a gross miscalculation. By the end of 1967, the war had affected the U.S. In ways he never imagined and the U.S. had become greatly torn. Many critics attacked the war on moral grounds. Others encouraged Johnson to pursue it. However, as the war continued, more deaths occurred and more money was wasted. More and more Americans questioned this heavy investment of lives and money. By late 1967, the administration was shocked by the growing opposition to the war. Johnson was viewed as a failure in America's eyes.

Use of the Media in the Tonkin Gulf Crisis

On August 5, 1964, a Washington Post headline announced, "American Planes Hit North Vietnam After Second Attack on Our Destroyers; Move Taken to Halt New Aggression." The news created a stir amongst the American people, which was further fuelled by a New York Times headline later the same day, which read "President Johnson has ordered retaliatory action against gunboats and 'certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam' after renewed attacks against American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin (Cohen and Solomon, 1994)."

In reality, there was no "second attack" by North Vietnam. Claims of "renewed attacks against American destroyers" were false (Cohen and Solomon, 1994). However, by reporting official claims as truthful news, American newspapers fuelled the fire for the Vietnam War. Over the next few years, the government continued to plant untruthful seeds in the media, leading to over 50,000 American deaths and millions of Vietnamese casualties in the war.

According to the newspapers, North Vietnamese torpedo boats launched an "unprovoked attack" against a U.S. destroyer plane on "routine patrol" in the Tonkin Gulf on August 2, 1964 and that North Vietnamese PT boats launched a "deliberate attack" on two U.S. ships two days later (Cohen and Solomon, 1994). However, this story was not true.

The U.S. destroyer Maddox was not on routine patrol on August 2.Instead, it was on an aggressive intelligence-gathering mission in cooperation with coordinated attacks on North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese navy and the Laotian air force. "The day before, two attacks on North Vietnam...had taken place," according to scholar Daniel C. Hallin. These attacks were "part of a campaign of increasing military pressure on the North that the United States had been pursuing since early 1964 (Cohen and Solomon, 1994)."

Two days later, the U.S. Pentagon announced that a second attack by North Vietnamese PT boats took place earlier that day in the Tonkin Gulf. President Lyndon Johnson reported this statement on television that evening as he announced an escalation in the war: air strikes against North Vietnam (Cohen and Solomon, 1994). This statement was untrue yet Johnson gave orders to U.S. bombers to "retaliate" for the North Vietnamese torpedo attack, even though it never actually took place.

Before the U.S. air strikes, Washington officials had evidence that the Aug. 4 attack by North Vietnam never took place. Cables from the U.S. task force commander in the Tonkin Gulf, Captain John J. Herrick, gave reference to "freak weather effects," "almost total darkness" and an "overeager sonarman" who "was hearing ship's own propeller beat (Cohen and Solomon, 1994)."

Navy pilots flying overhead that night recalled, "I had the best seat in the house to watch that event and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets -- there were no PT boats there.... There was nothing there but black water and American fire power."

In 1965, Lyndon Johnson revealed, "For all I know, our Navy was shooting at whales out there (Cohen and Solomon, 1994)."

However, the media took Johnson's fraudulent speech on Aug. 4 very seriously. The next day, the New York Times reported that Johnson "went to the American people last night with the somber facts." The Los Angeles Times called for the need to "face the fact that the Communists, by their attack on American vessels in international waters, have themselves escalated the hostilities (Cohen and Solomon, 1994)."

In the book The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam, author Tom Wells describes the Tonkin Gulf incidents (Cohen and Solomon, 1994). In an interview, Wells reveals that the American media "described the air strikes that Johnson launched in response as merely 'tit for tat' -- when in reality they reflected plans the administration had already drawn up for gradually increasing its overt military pressure against the North." Wells provides a reason for the flawed new coverage, stating that the media had an "almost exclusive reliance on U.S. government officials as sources of information" and a "reluctance to question official pronouncements on 'national security issues.'"

Still, in the book

The "Uncensored War," author Daniel Hallin says that journalists had "a great deal of information available which contradicted the official account (of Tonkin Gulf events); it simply wasn't used (Cohen and Solomon, 1994). The day before the first incident, Hanoi had protested the attacks on its territory by Laotian aircraft and South Vietnamese gunboats." In addition, "It was generally known...that 'covert' operations against North Vietnam, carried out by South Vietnamese forces with U.S. support and direction, had been going on for some time."

On August 5, 1964, Johnson went before Congress to discuss the situation. According to the Department of State Bulletin, these were his words (Department of State, 1964):

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime has given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well-known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 19554. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations - all in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening... As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos..."

Without a complete and truthful account, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was basically a declaration of war against North Vietnam, passed through Congress on Aug. 7 (Cohen and Solomon, 1994). This resolution enabled Johnson "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The result was the Vietnam War.

What Really Happened

In August 1964, the lives of many Americans would change forever. As the result of a clash between the militaries of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Cold War struggle for Southeast Asia took a drastic turn (Marolda, 2002). President Lyndon B. Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, announced their concerns in early August that the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), America's ally, was unsuccessful in its fight against Communist Viet Cong guerrillas.